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PART IV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

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155	Sir G. Lowther ..	359 Tel.	29.	Bagdad Railway. Change of *trace* was proposed by company, but rejected by Council of Ministers. Refers to No. 153. .	179

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. February 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

Part IV.

[38359]

No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 652.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 26, 1911.

SINCE the 28th August, the date of my despatch No. 603, I have received no recent reports of the course of events in the Yemen and Assyr from His Majesty's consular officers at Jeddah and Hodeidah.

According to the "Turquie" of the 21st, it has now been decided to organise a column, consisting of twelve battalions, at Jizzan to pursue Seyyid Idrisse into the mountainous districts of Sabia, whither he retreated after the capture of Ibha in the month of July. Eight of these battalions are being taken from Izzet Pasha's army in the Yemen, and the whole force is to be under the command of Colonel Riza Bey, who has already left Eumran for Jizzan. It is to be hoped that the operations will be carried to a successful termination within a couple of months.

In the Yemen, according to the same statement, Izzet Pasha has been treating with the Imam Yahya, who, since the recapture of Sana'a, has taken up his quarters at Shehareh, in the Saadé country. The negotiations have resulted, the "Turquie" says, in the acceptance by the Imam of all the conditions imposed by Izzet Pasha, but it must be confessed that they are far from unfavourable to the Imam. The terms of the arrangement are as follows: that there shall be a truce for four years; that the Imam shall restore all prisoners taken during the recent fighting, and that the Imam "shall enjoy complete liberty in the region which he commands," *i.e.*, Saadé. The "Turquie" adds that Sherif Mahmoud, the Sheikh of Saba, who was one of the Imam's partisans, has made his submission to Izzet Pasha, and that the latter has appointed him Kaïmakam of Saba with the usual salary.

The "Turquie" adds that Izzet Pasha has initiated the scheme of reforms, which is being prepared by a special commission at the Porte, by establishment at Hodeidah of a school, admission to which is to be restricted to the sons of sheikhs held by the Government as hostages for their fathers' good behaviour—a measure which, if it seem somewhat out of place in a constitutional country, the French journal applauds as likely to conduce to the tranquillity of the province.

I heard that it is said in Turkish circles that the Turkish losses in action and from illness during the operation in the Yemen and Assyr have reached the enormous total of 50,000, a figure which is obviously grossly exaggerated.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[38362] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 655.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to state that Mr. Lorimer has reported that Jemal Bey, the new Vali of Bagdad, has been making a variety of anti-foreign speeches, which, although he cannot be sure of details, were clearly indiscreet and mischievous.

On the 22nd instant his Excellency made a strong after-dinner speech accusing all foreigners of shamelessness, while at a dinner to local journalists he is reported to have declared that, as a result of Abd-ul-Hamid's weakness in giving way too much to foreigners, the latter now regarded themselves as the masters of the country, and even ordinary travellers assumed airs of authority—a state of things which should not continue.

Jemal Bey seems to have impressed the same views on the Nakib, after a dinner with that functionary, for communication to the Arabs generally, and he added, for their special information, that the Turkish Government was strong enough to prevent the importation of arms and ammunition and their sale to Arabs.

At dinners at the Union and Progress Club and at the Military Club his Excellency is said to have remarked that Turkey could safely defy any Great Power, as that Power would be prevented from taking action by the other Powers, and at the Military Club he added that Europeans should know that Turks were no longer afraid of them.

Mr. Lorimer adds that during the last week rumours have been current in Bagdad in regard to secret negotiations between Kurds and Arabs with a view to a united demand for exemption from military service outside the province and some degree of autonomy, on the lines of the concessions granted to the Albanians.

Although it is possible that the reports of the speeches are not strictly accurate, it is disappointing to find that language of this nature should be used by a governor who is considered to be one of the most efficient and successful products of the new régime, and in view of the Grand Vizier's statement to me that the vali had been given instructions to observe a very conciliatory attitude, it would seem either that the vali thinks himself strong enough to disregard them or that he was given other instructions in a sense precisely contrary to those which were communicated to me.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[39361] No. 3.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received October 7.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, September 27, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the transport of material to the Hindieh barrage. The powers held by Sir John Jackson (Limited) enable him to organise a special service of steamers for the purpose of the transport of his material, provided that the Turkish Steamship Administration decline to undertake the transport. There is nothing in the contract restricting Sir John Jackson (Limited) to the use of the Euphrates only, and our contract with Sir John Jackson (Limited) provides for the transport, in case of need, of the material up the Tigris viâ Bagdad to the barrage at an increased cost. Before entering into the contract with us Sir John Jackson (Limited) satisfied themselves that the Turkish Steamship Administration declined to undertake the work at all.

The cost of conveying material up the Tigris and hauling it overland to the barrage on the Euphrates is so great that it was never contemplated that the Tigris route should be used except in case of emergency. Moreover, the Turkish Steamship Administration have at present a large quantity or ordinary merchandise detained at Bussorah in transit for Bagdad owing to want of space. The obstacles which the new Vali of Bagdad is placing in the way of our fulfilment of our contract would seem to be in part dictated by the fear least, after the contract had been completed, we should refuse to take the special steamers off the river. This of course is not the case. We should be prepared, if necessary, to enter into a formal arrangement to remove the special steamers directly the contract had been completed. Meanwhile we would claim the protection of His Majesty's Government in having the contract upheld. I would remind you that, as stated in my last letter, we have, on the faith of the contract, ordered special vessels in this country for its prompt execution. Some of these have already been shipped and the remainder are approaching completion. I must add that the River Euphrates may be expected to rise very shortly—directly the rains fall. We may therefore at any moment be enabled to send up the two special steamers which we have devoted to this work, and which had already conducted operations on the Euphrates before the river fell.

I have, &c.
THOS. H. ROBERTS, *Acting Secretary*

[39393] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 246.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 7, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

The arrival at Beirout of a French man-of-war is reported by His Majesty's consul-general there. Its object is to protect Christians generally and French interests in particular. Tranquillity reigns in the town.

Order is reported to prevail in Smyrna, but His Majesty's consul-general hears from several independent sources that the fanatical elements of the population are being excited by the Imams in case of an unsatisfactory settlement of the Tripoli question. Mr. Cumberbatch is of opinion that it would be prudent to dispatch a British warship to neighbouring island.

[39429] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 672.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van relative to affair of Shamsdinan.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Van, September 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency of the following incident which has taken place between Sheikh Abdul Kadir, a member of the Senate, and his nephew, Sheikh Taha, the Sheikh of Shamsdinan.

At the close of the parliamentary session, Sheikh Abdul Kadir came to spend the recess in his native country. During the period of his exile by Abdul Hamid his nephew had become Sheikh of Shamsdinan, whereas he claims that by right the succession should have come to him. Jealous now of his nephew's great wealth and of his great influence among the Julamerk-Shamsdinan Kurds, Abdul Kadir has set about to gain the sympathies of the population with the hope of being proclaimed sheikh in place of Taha, or at least of securing the succession to his son. With this object in view, he is said to have been holding out prospects to the Kurds of an autonomy in the near future. Such promises being in conformity with the desires of the Kurds were not without their effect, and he succeeded in gaining over to his side a large number of the former adherents of Sheikh Taha. The latter then forbade the inhabitants of his own villages to receive either Abdul Kadir or his agents.

Recently, on the occasion of the tobacco tithes for the harvest of 1911 being put up to auction, Sheikh Taha, who had been accustomed to secure the tithes without opposition, found himself opposed by Sheikh Abdul Kadir. Eventually, however, the tithes fell to the Sheikh of Shamsdinan, but at an increased price of 910*l.*

Upon this, Abdul Kadir's people attacked those of Sheikh Taha, with the result that a bloody conflict ensued, in which a dozen men were killed (among whom was Abdul Kadir's chargé d'affaires) and two villages burnt. In order to restore order, the vali applied to the military commandant for troops to be dispatched from the Persian frontier. This application the commandant refused, suggesting that some other vilayet should supply the troops. This has unfortunately brought about bad relations between the vali and the military authorities. Eventually, no soldiers being forthcoming, a commission composed of the Procureur général, the Director of Police, and the Director of Public Instruction left a few days ago for Shamsdinan charged with the task of reconciling the two sheikhs.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[39430] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 673.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van relative to recent raid by Kurds on Nestorians.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Van, September 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency of a serious raid recently made by the Kurd tribe Jerikli on the Nestorians of the village of Ashita.

At the beginning of July last some seventy families of Ashita were encamped in their yaila at a distance of ten hours from their village. One night, it appears, they were surrounded and attacked by a large number of Kurds of the above-mentioned tribe, who killed eight men, two women, and wounded a dozen other Nestorians, and carried off, according to Nestorian statements, 6,900 sheep and a number of mules.

The headman of Ashita village subsequently came to Van to represent what had occurred to the vali and to demand the necessary action of the Government on behalf of the Nestorians.

The vali appears to have acted with energy in this affair. He caused one battalion of infantry from Van, one from Sert, and one from Mosul vilayet to be sent against the raiders. The troops surrounded the tribe, disarmed them, seized all their flocks, and detained them prisoners pending instructions from the Kaimakam of Julamerk, in whose charge the operations had been placed.

According to the report of the Julamerk officials, the number of sheep stolen amounted only to 3,000. The vali accordingly ordered this number of sheep to be restored to the Nestorians and the ringleaders of the raid to be arrested. As regards the additional 3,900 sheep said by the Nestorians to have been stolen, the vali informed them that it rested with them to prove this in the law courts, and that, if they were able to substantiate their statements, these also would be restored to them.

It is to be hoped that the Government will show its sincerity in this matter by dealing severely with the offenders; otherwise it is possible that the exasperated Nestorians may take the law into their own hands and engage in reprisals.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[39432] No. 7.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 675.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, relative to criticisms of constitutional régime made by Armenian newspapers.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, September 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a condensed translation of an article recently published in a local Armenian newspaper, which has caused a good deal of ill-humour in Moslem circles in Erzeroum, its drastic criticism of the present régime having been distorted by a version reproduced by a Turkish newspaper into an almost unveiled demand for Armenian autonomy.

As a result of this imprudent, but characteristic, utterance, several meetings were held at the Union and Progress Club, when the expediency of "giving the Armenians a lesson" is said to have been discussed, and the local authorities instructed the public prosecutor to enquire into the question of responsibility for the publication.

Fortunately, it appears that, thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the vali, counsels of moderation have prevailed, and the assurances given by Vart Kess Effendi, one of the Armenian deputies for Erzeroum, to the effect that the Turkish translation was erroneous, and that a demand for autonomy had not been formulated, have pacified Moslem susceptibilities for the present.

There can, however, be no question as to the folly of publishing such an article under present circumstances, and this latest elucubration is unfortunately but too typical of the opinions constantly aired by the Armenians both in conversation and in the press, obstinately oblivious as they seem to be of their disastrous experience in the recent past.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Extract from the "Haraeh" of August 23 (September 5), 1911.

(Abridged translation.)

THE Albanian movement has attained its object, the Malissori having won for themselves a species of autonomy which will doubtless eventually have to be extended to the remainder of the fellow-countrymen.

The Arabs also are on the eve of obtaining concessions practically equivalent to self-government.

We regret that our Government, instead of making timely concessions, has weakened its resources and diminished its prestige by unnecessary strife and bloodshed, reintroducing incidentally all the evils of the old régime.

In this respect no provinces in the Empire have suffered more than those of Eastern Anatolia.

The Kurdish chiefs are again raising their heads, the officials are returning to their former practices in protecting robbers, spreading hostility between the various nationalities, and trampling on the most sacred feelings of the Armenians.

We have been hoping against hope that the constitutional régime would bring about an amelioration of our lot; but we see that the Government turns a deaf ear to our complaints and our deputies, mere political beggars, have become fixtures in ministerial anterooms.

When we complain we are first told that "the necessary steps will be taken"; then that "strict instructions have been given"; then that "tranquillity exists"; and finally that "the Government's attention is occupied elsewhere for the present."

In the meantime, reaction and oppression prevail unhindered, and such people as the Féros, Hussein Pasha, Mussa and Kassim Beys bask in the sun of Government favour.

Taking into consideration the facts of the situation, we have no desire to embarrass the Government by raising an Armenian question; but matters are going from bad to worse, the constitutional régime is no longer a word to conjure with, and the outlook is threatening.

Now that the hands of the Government are free in Albania and Arabia, let it act ere it be too late.

[39436] No. 8.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 679.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah relative to foundation of Moderate Liberal Club in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Acting Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Bussorah, September 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that the Bussorah "Moderate Liberal" Club was formally opened on the 7th instant.

As mentioned in my despatch No. 46 of the 19th ultimo, the organiser and president of the club is Seyyid Talib Bey, the local deputy, while Hajji Mahmoud Pasha En-Naina, ex-president of the Union and Progress Club, and Sheikh Abdullah Bashayan are vice-presidents. The Union and Progress Club can scarcely be said to exist at present, its members being reduced to a few Turkish officials.

It is doubtful whether the Moderate Liberal Club will be an improvement on the Union and Progress Club. The published programmes of both clubs do not differ greatly, but it is to be remarked that, while the Union and Progress Club was organised and controlled by Turkish officials, the leading men in the new organisation are local Arab land-owners and notables. It is also noteworthy that, while the Union and Progress party aimed at the Turkification of the non-Turkish elements, the Moderate Liberals profess a desire to give all nationalities fair and equal treatment.

The past record of Seyyid Talib Bey in Bussorah is not a good one, much of the disorder that formerly occurred in the town being due to his instigation. Some ten years ago Seyyid Talib was mutessarif of the Hasa sanjak, which post he held for about a year; after which he spent some six or seven years in virtual exile at Constantinople as a member of the Council of State. His influence in Bussorah is due principally to the position which his family occupies in local estimation. His father, Seyyid Rajab, the Nakib-ul-Ashraf, is the head of a wealthy family, the members of which enjoy a considerable religious prestige as descendants of the Prophet. The family has been settled in Bussorah for over 800 years.

When Seyyid Talib called on me on the 17th July last, shortly after his return from Constantinople, he boasted that he had prevented the Central Government from putting into execution its ill-advised scheme for converting freehold ("mulk") into State land ("miri"). His successful opposition to this scheme made him very popular with the local land-owners and notables.

With regard to the attitude of the Moderate Liberals to Great Britain, Seyyid Talib professes to be Anglophile, and there is no doubt that the local notables and the inhabitants generally are weary of union and progress blundering, and long for some moderate and settled policy such as will meet with British approval.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[39708] No. 9.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 438. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, October 6, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 164, Very Confidential, of the 4th instant, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of my interview with him on that day, expressed his desire for Anglo-French co-operation in Turkey.

I reminded his Excellency of the observations which I had made to him on that subject at my first interview with him on his assumption of office (see my despatch No. 329 of the 17th July). I said that such co-operation had been for some time past desired by His Majesty's Government, and that successive French Ministers for Foreign Affairs had advocated such a policy, but the obstructive attitude of the Ottoman Bank, nominally an Anglo-French institution but practically a French establishment, had prevented any arrangement for financial and industrial co-operation which at Constantinople would be an essential element in combined political action. The pretentions of the Ottoman Bank had been supported by the late French Ambassador and the present one, who appeared to have policies of their own, and also by the French Ministry of Finance.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[39873] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Therapia, October 10, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad telegraphs that the embodiment of regular military reserves in his district is expected, but that they have not been called up yet; that the enrolment of volunteers from all classes for the war has been started, but that proceedings appear to him largely farcical, and that, so far, there is no genuine enthusiasm among the local population, though work at military equipment factory is going on unceasingly.

[37343] No. 11.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd August, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that a despatch has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that the Turkish Government have informed him that it has been decided to allow your company's steamers to tow a second barge until the 3,800 tons of cargo accumulated at Bussorah have been forwarded, and that the necessary instructions have been sent to the competent authorities. The communication of the Turkish Government went on, however, to say that, inasmuch as this permission was accorded in exceptional circumstances, it could not constitute a precedent, and it must be understood that when the accumulation of cargo had been forwarded the steamers were not to employ barges at all. As this appeared to indicate a desire on the part of the Porte to deny to your company the right of towing even one barge, Sir G. Lowther made repeated representations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs against any such intention, and ultimately addressed the Grand Vizier on the subject. His Highness replied that the communication of the Turkish Government had been badly worded, and that he had not intended to interfere with the one barge.

With regard to the employment of your company's reserve steamer, I am to state that Mr. Whittall informed Sir G. Lowther of the dispatch of Houloussi Bey's telegram to the Acting Vali of Bagdad of the 26th July on the same day. The reply from Bagdad was evasive as to the existence of political objections, but recommended the

immediate purchase of three more steamers for the Ottoman Company; and the Minister of Public Works seems to have been content to delay a definite decision till the new vali should have taken up his post. Mr. Whittall thought that in the circumstances it would be useless for Sir G. Lowther to press the Porte to agree to the reserve steamer being put into service, especially as the recently given permission to tow a second barge robbed the argument based on the accumulation of cargo of much of its force. In this opinion Sir G. Lowther concurs, and thinks that it would be injudicious to run the very grave risk of encountering a point blank refusal which might prejudice your company's chances of a successful application at some future and more propitious occasion.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[39393] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1911.

SITUATION at Smyrna.

I will ask Admiralty to order a ship to Smyrna if there is really danger to British lives. It would, however, be impossible to detach ships for all ports in Turkey, and I should therefore like further information before approaching Admiralty.

[40481] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 162.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1911.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that, for the purposes of the war, his Government would naturally like to overthrow the Turkish fleet in the Red Sea and all Turkish transports. This would not only have a great moral effect, but it would also remove all danger of Turkish troops being transferred from the Yemen to the Tripolitaine. No doubt the Tripolitaine was blockaded by the Italian fleet, but there was a long line of coast, attempts might be made to force the blockade, and even if they were unsuccessful the prospect of them would increase the strain on the Italian fleet and necessitate a larger force being kept for the blockade when the Italian Government might wish to have some of their ships spared to protect their interests elsewhere. But the sincere friendship of Italy for Great Britain made her wish to meet our desire that the Red Sea should be kept free for commerce. The Italian Government were therefore prepared to agree to the neutralisation of the Red Sea on certain conditions, as to which he handed me the accompanying memorandum.

He asked me, however, that when I approached the Turks I should do so in such a way as not to prejudice Italy's position in the matter. I understood him to mean that he wished not to avoid giving the impression at Constantinople that it was Italy who was making the proposal in her own interest, lest this should be taken as a sign of weakness.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

NO operations of war would be carried out in that sea either on our part or on that of Turkey, and the lights would be lit there.

Turkey would have to undertake as a condition *sine qua non* not to carry out any transport of troops, arms, and ammunition in that sea in any direction in order that they may not enter the Mediterranean either by the Suez Canal or by the Hedjaz Railway, or by any other route; and not to allow the departure from that sea towards the north of any war-ship or military transport, even if empty.

[40057] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October* 11, 1911.

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, now on his way back to his post from Mokha, wires that acting vice-consul reports that launch belonging to British ship was sunk by a shell during an action on the 2nd October, in which two Italian ships fired twenty-one shells over the town of Hodeidah.

Holy War has been proclaimed by Imam Yahya and other notables. Tribes of the interior are collecting and intend to march down to the coast. They are in a state of great excitement.

Mr. Richardson thinks it most advisable that British Admiralty should send war-ship to Hodeidah, to remain for the present in the neighbourhood of the town.

[40142] No. 15.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, October* 12, 1911.

I HAVE been asked by Italian Government whether we could obtain through our consul at Jeddah any information as to the truth of a rumour which has reached them of the massacre of thirty Italian workmen employed on the Hedjaz Railway. They have themselves no means of verifying it.

[40140] No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1911.

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of following, and ask if Turkish Government would agree.

His Majesty's Government are anxious, in the interest of British commerce, to secure the neutralisation of the Red Sea in the present war, in order to ensure free navigation and to prevent interference with lights. His Majesty's Government have reason to suppose that the Italian Government, whom we have already approached, will agree, on the condition that the Turkish Government engage to send no munitions of war, arms, or troops to or from the Red Sea in any direction whatever, either by the Hedjaz Railway, Suez Canal, or Mediterranean, or any route, and that no hostile operations shall be conducted in the Red Sea by either belligerent.

[40282] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October* 13, 1911.

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

Situation at Smyrna (see your telegram No. 374 of the 11th instant).

Since I dispatched my telegram No. 246 of the 7th October Mr. Barnham has returned to his post at Smyrna, and he reports that everything there is very quiet. Dispatch of British man-of-war to that port is therefore, he considers, not a matter of urgent necessity.

[40312] No. 18.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 268.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 13, 1911.*

SITUATION on Lower Tigris.

Please refer to my telegram No. 638 of 19th September.

I am informed by the consul at Bussorah that as result of threatening situation on the Lower Tigris authorities intend to patrol river with two armoured motor-boats. He doubts, however, if river can be kept open for traffic by these proceedings.

Vali is discouraging demonstrations, and the situation in the town of Bussorah remains normal.

[4005] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 14, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

See your telegram No. 258 of the 11th October, concerning state of affairs at Hodeidah.

His Majesty's Ship "Medea" is at present at Las Korai and can communicate with Aden by Marconi. She has been warned that she may have to proceed to Hodeidah. If possible, His Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid sending her there. Please instruct His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah to send you the most recent information.

[40494] No. 20.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Therapia, October 14, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 377 of 12th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that the Turkish Government would gladly welcome any proposal for the neutrality of the Red Sea on the basis of an undertaking by both belligerents to refrain from all hostile operations there. They could not, however, accept second condition suggested, as it is essential that they should have freedom of military action within their own territory adjacent to the Red Sea. They would consider any restriction on the use of the Hedjaz Railway as inadmissible, and would ask for freedom to satisfy their military requirements in the above-mentioned territories by sending troops from Turkish shores of the Red Sea to any town port there or elsewhere, and *vice versâ*. They would further ask His Majesty's Government to obtain an undertaking that transports used for this purpose should not be molested, even in the Mediterranean.

Minister for Foreign Affairs dwelt on the necessity of the above, in order to make it possible to repatriate troops invalided in the Yemen, and to replace them there. He cited instance of transport with invalids now at Suez, and unable to proceed on their voyage from fear of capture by Italians. He was evidently much attracted by the idea of the neutrality of the Red Sea, on terms agreeable to Turkey, and desired that the Turkish Government's desiderata be recommended to the favourable consideration of His Majesty's Government.

[40518] No. 21.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, October 15, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 377 of 12th October to Constantinople.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just called to tell me that Italian Government have information that a number of dhows are being massed at and near Mocha, and they believe attack is contemplated at Assab, which is practically

defenceless. In view of the negotiations on foot for excluding the Red Sea from the area of war they have of late observed passive attitude there, but Ministry of Marine would not be warranted in preventing Italian cruiser in Red Sea from watching coast between Hodeidah and Mocha with a view to dispersing any flotilla which threatened this outlying colony. He urged, therefore, that Turkish Government should be pressed to come to a decision. In these circumstances, they could not prevent cruisers taking action if necessity arose.

[40493] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 15, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN War.

Report has been received from His Majesty's acting consul at Jeddah that action of Italian Government has resulted in the food supply of the town being limited. In view of the fact that there are thousands of pilgrims of all nations, and especially from different British possessions, in the country, a grave situation is imminent. You should ascertain from Italian Government whether any such limitation has been placed on the food supply of the town, and, if this is the case, urge them to permit, on behalf of the pilgrims, the free entry of cereals into the port.

[40493] No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 15, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN War: Importation of cereals at Jeddah.

I have repeated your telegram No. 272 of the 14th instant to Sir R. Rodd, asking him to find out whether it is true that importation has been subject to restrictions.

His Excellency has been instructed, if such restrictions have been imposed, to press the Italian Government to have them removed.

[40523] No. 24.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 687.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, reporting on the relief of Abha, but that Seyyid Idrisee still holds out; on the sickness among the Turkish troops; and on the unsatisfactory conduct of the Grand Shereef of Mecca.

I have heard apparently well-authenticated reports that Seyyid Idrisee has again advanced against Abha, and has met with some small successes.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Jeddah, September 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to Acting Consul Dr. Abdur Rahman's despatch No. 33 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following summary of my information as to events in Assyr:—

The Grand Shereef, with about 1,500 of his Bedouins, and with twelve battalions of regulars (say, 5,000 men) and about fourteen light guns, six of them apparently Hotchkiss guns, the regulars being under the command of Brigadier-General Nesha'at Pasha, of the General Staff of Constantinople, left Guns (about six hours from

Cronfudah) on the 19th June, and entered the besieged Abha, chief town of Assyr, on the 16th July. The siege, which had lasted about nine months, was thus raised, and desperately-needed provisions were brought in for the garrison. A few days, however, before the relief of Abha, four blockhouses in strong positions close together in the immediate neighbourhood of Abha, all four held by one weak battalion with two guns, surrendered to the Idrisee insurgents for want of provisions, and are still in the hands of the insurgents. One of the guns has been since recovered. The men apparently remain prisoners.

On the way from Gans to Abha there were no serious encounters, but the insurgents, who were without artillery, on several occasions fled before the artillery fire. The losses on the side of the Government in killed and wounded were very small, but among the regulars, who suffered greatly from the heat, the losses from disease were very heavy, Nesha'at Pasha admitting that 800 regulars died of disease, seemingly cholera or dysentery. The Grand Shereef returned from Abha to Taif without any regular troops or guns. There are now sixteen battalions with twenty-six guns, six of them heavy guns, in Abha. The member of Parliament for Abha, Seyyid Ali, who having been shut up in the besieged town has not been able to attend Parliament, has now gone to Taif. He is an ignorant Arab of the Bedouin type. Brigadier-General Mohammed Ali, Vali of the Yemen, is now in Geezan with 2,000 men, and Colonel Hamdi Bey with six battalions (say, 2,500 men) in Loheiya. They are waiting for cooler weather to advance against Sabiyeah, Idrisee's head-quarters, near which place Idrisee himself is now on Mount Faifa. Nesha'at Pasha has returned to Constantinople.

The Grand Shereef since his triumphant return to the Hedjaz has become exceedingly independent, and is likely to give much trouble to the Government. The Shereefian prison for Bedouins in Mecca, which, since the advent of freedom, has been in a doubtful position, is now a firmly-established institution, and the Grand Shereef is asserting his power of life and death over the Bedouins. At the reception held on his arrival at Taif he violently and publicly abused some Shereefs of the Dani Zeid, between whom and his own rival line of the Abadilah there is an immemorial feud; and he has had a serious quarrel, only just now patched up, with the vali, Hazim Bey, a weak and insignificant person, because the latter remonstrated with him for this unseemly conduct. He has caused four carriages, brought by speculators into Mecca for the conveyance of pilgrims, to be burnt, on the ostensible ground that immorality was being practised in them, but really because such carriages had never hitherto been ridden in by anyone in Mecca except the Grand Shereef and the vali. He has begun in this present pilgrimage to extort money from the Java pilgrims, who being exceptionally well-to-do are the most tempting, and the turn of the British Indians will no doubt follow.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[40537] No. 25.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 703.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, respecting the necessity of the presence of a British gun-boat in the Shatt-el-Arab during the date season.

This matter had already been brought to your attention in my telegram No. 202 of the 12th September, repeating a telegram from Mr. Crow, and I observe that, according to the telegram from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, enclosed in your despatch No. 251 of the 19th September, the "Odin" has been ordered to Mohammerah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Acting Consul Mattheice to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Bussorah, September 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that a feeling of insecurity and nervousness prevails in Bussorah at present. This feeling is due in part to the recent disturbances on the Lower Euphrates and Tigris, where the authorities have only been able to bring about a temporary semblance of order, by capitulating to the authors of the disturbances.

During the past few months, comparatively little disorder has occurred in the town of Bussorah, but a spirit of lawlessness is abroad, and signs are not wanting that trouble is brewing. The two following incidents are not encouraging:—

At the beginning of Ramazan, Tenuma, a village on the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, opposite Bussorah, was attacked by a gang of brigands, who were beaten off by the villagers, the brigands losing one man killed. Some days ago, the brigands, who are said to belong to Hawizeh, informed the villagers of their intention of returning in a few days to exact a tenfold vengeance.

About midday on the 11th instant, the leading local sarraf, a Jew named Mir Ghobai, was attacked in his shop, which is situated in the main bazaar, by a band of brigands, who shot him dead and dangerously wounded a companion, named Mush Cohen. As the brigands were departing with their plunder—a sum of about £T. 450—they were attacked in their turn by two Afghan gendarmes, who, from a point of vantage in a side street, succeeded in killing two of their number and recovering the money stolen, while the remaining members of the band sought safety in flight. The band appears to have consisted of twenty-four individuals, including accomplices posted in the neighbourhood of the sarraf's shop. A fellah, who appears to have had no connection with the affair, was killed during the fifteen minutes' firing which took place, and it is surprising that the casualties were not more numerous. No arrests have been made, and the affair is something of a mystery, although it is said that Seyyid Talib Bey, the local deputy, is not unconcerned in it. The Vali of Bagdad and the local Moderate Liberal Club have each given £T. 10 to the gendarmes, whose conduct on the occasion was most praiseworthy and rather unusual. Mir Ghobai had large dealings with local British firms, to one of which, the Bussorah Trading Company, he died debtor to the extent of £T. 2,000.

My attention has been drawn to the present unsatisfactory situation in Bussorah by the local British merchants, who have requested me to represent to your Excellency the desirability of having one of His Majesty's ships located in the river during the date season.

As stated in Mr. Crow's despatch No. 8 of the 7th February, 1910, the presence of one of His Majesty's ships at Bussorah was intended as a protection to Indian sailing-vessels engaged in the date trade. These sailing-vessels have now begun to arrive, and fears are entertained that there will be a renewal of piracy during the present date season. Moreover, the experience of the past two years in Bussorah and Bagdad justifies the assumption that claims in respect of loss caused by piracy will not be treated with any greater consideration than has been shown to claims on account of the wanton destruction of British house property.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that the mere presence in the river of one of His Majesty's ships would have a powerful deterrent effect upon would-be pirates and brigands, if it did not altogether prevent piracy and brigandage.

In his despatch referred to above, Mr. Crow shows that in February 1910 the authorities had the means at their disposal to deal with river piracy. This is, however, no longer the case. The entire local flotilla consists of the "Marmariss" and one small steam-launch; it is reported, however, that eight armoured motor-boats for patrolling the river have been ordered from Messrs. Thorneycroft, three of which should arrive here in a few weeks. With regard to the boats mentioned by Mr. Crow, the "Kilid-ul-Bahr" is stationed at the bar as a light-ship, the "Alus" is no longer at Bussorah, while the "Baghdadi" has been put back on the Bussorah–Bagdad run as an ordinary cargo and passenger steamer, but is not proving a great success, as she took thirteen days on her last trip, which is accomplished by the steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company in three to five days. The armoured steamers "Frat" and "Rosafa," and the launch "Birinji," must remain on the Lower

Euphrates until the volume of water in the river increases, and may be dismissed from consideration so far as this date season is concerned, while the launch "Ikinji" is said to be at Bagdad.

Under the circumstances described above, I respectfully submit to your Excellency that it is desirable that one of His Majesty's ships should be located in the Shatt-el-Arab during the present date season.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[40778] No. 26.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic) R. *Rome, October 16, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of yesterday.

Further telegram received from Asmara by Italian Government states that 1,200 Turkish troops arrived at Mocha on 9th and 10th instant from Taiz; others expected from Hodeidah. Some thirty dhows already collected at Oukeha, and orders given for all those between that port and Sheikh Said to come in.

[40494] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 16, 1911.*

THE Italian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office this afternoon and saw Sir A. Nicolson, who read to him the substance of the Turkish reply, contained in your telegram No. 273 of the 14th October, respecting the proposal for the neutralisation of the Red Sea. The Marquis Imperiali said he would telegraph this to his Government, and ascertain whether they would concede the transport of troops by the Hedjaz Railway, but he was positive that his Government would not agree, if the Red Sea was neutralised, to the Turks being allowed to transport their troops or so-called invalids to and fro by the sea-routes. The neutralisation would then be all in favour of the Turks. The Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson telegrams to the effect that the Turks were collecting armed sambouks at Moka and another port for a raid upon Erythrea, and he said that if these sambouks, or the two or three Turkish gun-boats now in the Red Sea, moved, the Italians would have to destroy them. He asked what was our main object in regard to the Red Sea. Sir A. Nicolson said that we were most anxious to have the lights relit, and also, of course, to avoid hostilities taking place in the Red Sea.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40792] No. 28.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 16, 1911.*

RUMOURED murder of Italians.

Please refer to telegram from Rome No. 101 of the 13th instant.

Rumour of murder of Italians on Hedjaz Railway declared absolutely false by Minister for Foreign Affairs, who states that it was circulated by M. Tittoni in Paris. Rumour declared entirely without confirmation by consul at Jeddah.

[39361] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 280.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 206 of the 17th ultimo, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a further letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company relative to their contract with Sir J. Jackson (Limited) for the transport of material for the Hindieh barrage.*

Your Excellency will observe that the company state that the Turkish steam-ship administration declined to undertake the work of transport, whether by the Euphrates or the Tigris, and that Sir J. Jackson (Limited) were satisfied of this before entering into the contract with Messrs. Lynch.

I also enclose, with special reference to the final paragraph of your Excellency's telegram No. 206, copies of two letters to Mr. Maxwell from Colonel Picot, which show that there is agreement between the two firms in regard to the contract concluded between them.

In these circumstances, I have to request that your Excellency will urge the Turkish Government not to continue to obstruct Messrs. Lynch in fulfilling the terms of their contract, and you should at the same time point out that the firm is prepared to enter into a formal arrangement to remove the special steamers from the river as soon as the contract has been completed.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Colonel Picot to Mr. Maxwell.

My dear Maxwell, *Erin Lodge, Weybridge, October 8, 1911.*

I SHALL see Sir J. Jackson's people in the City to-morrow, Monday, to learn what fresh news they may have received from their agent at Bussorah. Will you therefore very kindly postpone taking any action on the letter I left with you on that subject last Friday until you hear from me again. I want to make quite sure that the said letter has the approval of Jackson.

With kind regards, yours sincerely,

H. PICOT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Colonel Picot to Mr. Maxwell.

My dear Maxwell, *Erin Lodge, Weybridge, October 10, 1911.*

I SAW Sir J. Jackson's representatives yesterday. They were quite agreeable to our letter of the 27th September to the Under-Secretary of State going in its present form, so will you kindly take action on it.

Yours sincerely,
H. PICOT.

[40988] No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 18.)

Sir, *India Office, October 17, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite attention to the letter addressed to you by Viscount Morley's instructions on the 20th August, 1910, regarding Turkish aggression at Bagdad, and in connection therewith to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India on the same subject.

It appears to the Marquess of Crewe that, so far from "a distinct stand" having been "made by us against illegal action to prevent the process going further," the position of His Majesty's Government is now weaker in proportion as their protests have been allowed to pass unheeded and their demands to be left unsatisfied. To the best of his Lordship's belief, not only has not one of the questions that were outstanding fourteen months ago made appreciable progress towards settlement, but other attacks upon the status and property of British subjects and protected persons have been made in the interval. There is no indication that the negotiations initiated for a compre-

* See No. 3.

hensive settlement in the Persian Gulf are likely to reach a conclusion satisfactory to India, and our position for taking an effective part in such negotiations will be seriously impaired if it is manifest that we are unable or unwilling to protect the interests that we already claim to possess.

The present moment, therefore, when persistence in a similar line of conduct towards the Italian Government has involved the Porte in war, seems to Lord Crewe eminently suitable for pressing them, as Lord Hardinge proposes, for immediate satisfaction and for guarantees against the repetition of these systematic aggressions. But while he concurs with the Government of India to this extent, he feels that it is worse than useless to add one more to the list of fruitless representations at Constantinople, and unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to present their demands in such a form as will ensure their success he would prefer that they should not be presented at all. But in that case the question of active measures in the Persian Gulf to vindicate our position will have to be faced in the near future, and Lord Crewe is fully aware of the gravity of the issues which may necessarily be involved.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 12, 1911.

PLEASE refer to my predecessor's telegram dated the 18th August, 1910, and to Lorimer's letters of the 17th July and 14th August, 1911, forwarded with weekly letters of the 17th August and the 7th September, 1911, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, regarding situation at Bagdad.

It would appear that obstructive attitude of local Turkish officials continues, and that no progress has been made in settlement of claim of Messrs. Lynch and Co. Municipal engineer of Nazim Pasha has been retained by the new vali, and intention of making a great street through centre of town has been announced by the latter. It is vali's intention, Lorimer has reason to believe, to proceed with programme of municipal improvements drawn up by his predecessor, by which further surrender of area belonging to Messrs. Lynch will be involved; there is also a rumour that road will divide the premises of the British Residency. Lorimer was informed by Sir G. Lowther that instructions to report on British claims for compensation had been given to the new vali, but this is denied by the vali. I am inclined to share the view of Lorimer, who, in letters mentioned above, cites other instances of unfriendly attitude of Turks, that the various attacks on British interests are deliberate and prearranged with Turkish Government's approval. Turks have also apparently failed to meet the demand which in April 1911 His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to make for compensation to Bahrein's whom Vali of Bussorah illegally detained. It is very desirable, as I venture to urge strongly upon His Majesty's Government, that pressure should be brought to bear on the Porte with a view to outstanding cases being settled and British prestige restored. I foresee that, failing this and the conclusion of the larger negotiations pending with the Turkish Government in a satisfactory manner, it will be necessary during ensuing cold weather to vindicate our position in the Persian Gulf.

[40964] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October* 17, 1911.

MOLESTATION of Italians at Damascus.

His Majesty's consul at Damascus telegraphs with reference to your telegram No. 276 of 16th October that allegations are entirely false. No molestation of Italians in Damascus vilayet has taken place.

[41198] No. 31.

Note communicated by the Marquis Imperiali, October 19.

(Translation.)

THERE would be no difficulty on the part of the Italian Government in consenting, even with the neutralisation of the Red Sea, to the Ottoman Government continuing to transport troops by the Hedjaz Railway, on condition, however, that there should be no further transport of troops by sea.

The Italian Government, animated by the desire to be agreeable to His Britannic Majesty's Government, would then consent to the relighting in the Red Sea of the lights which are of importance to international navigation along the Italian coasts, and which serve as a guide to ships proceeding from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and *vice versâ*.

Italian Embassy, October 18, 1911.

[41637] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 708.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul, Mr. Devey, at Damascus, relating to local sentiments in respect of war with Italy.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Damascus, October 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in respect of the existing state of war, upon the popular sentiment here.

In the first place, Bairam falling on the 24th ultimo and succeeding days, no newspapers were published last week till Saturday the 30th, when fierce diatribes were issued against Italy by the press, and on Sunday the notification of war and an erroneous report that Kiamil Pasha was appointed Prime Minister appeared.

The people—but not the press—are inclined to grumble against the Government and to remark that, since the establishment of the constitution provinces, have been lost to Turkey. On the evening of the 30th a patriotic meeting was held at the house of Ahmed Pasha Shama, attended by two of the four Damascus deputies (the other two happen to be temporarily absent) and about seventy notables. The deputies will, of course, hasten to the capital, and the people will be prepared to make sacrifices. In some quarters vague hopes are entertained that British support may be forthcoming in this distress for Turkey.

The situation of this province is fairly quiet this year. Bedouins generally have been less turbulent, and no doubt the hanging of certain sheikhs four months ago contributed to this. The Druzes have had little to complain of, and are quiet, and I have just heard that Selim Atrash (mentioned only ten days ago) is reported by the kaïmakam as having been killed by a troop of soldiers. But the arrest of the Ruweka chief (reported separately) will provoke trouble, and possibly mischief, along the Hedjaz line.

Certainly, a first result of Turkish war with a European Power will be to relax the hold of authority in Syria. Damascus not being a seaport, and thus liable to immediate direct peril, and the recent stir of pro-Arab or anti-Turk sentiment, may contribute, as accidents, towards counterbalancing the possibility of local effervescence of Moslem fanaticism, for in Turkish official and military quarters no doubt the aggression of Italy is most keenly felt and bitterly resented.

The local market and trade interests will not be very largely affected, and the populace are on the whole calm, and not making manifestations or gatherings. A war fund is begun.

Italian business will receive attention at the French an Russian consulates.

I have, &c.

G. P. DEVEY.

[41639] No. 30.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 710.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 628 of the 9th September, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. McGregor, His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, transmitting despatches from acting vice-consul at Bitlis reporting anarchy in Bitlis vilayet.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, September* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 65 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the anarchy at present prevailing in that province in consequence of the incompetency of the authorities, and the increasing lawlessness of the Kurdish chiefs, notably Musa Bey and the Sheikh of Khizan.

Mr. Safrastian's gloomy picture of the condition of the province is in complete accord with the account given by the German missionary at Mush of the state of affairs there, which he describes as hopeless.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Bitlis, September* 23, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the present month the state of affairs throughout this vilayet has undergone such a fundamental change for the worse, that I humbly venture to observe that since July 1908 no such disorder and anarchy had prevailed in the district.

Ismail Hakki Bey, the vali, has left Bitlis for Constantinople on leave of absence. Reshid Bey, the mektubji here, has been appointed to act during his absence.

On the day of his departure, a fortnight ago, the vali was very rudely insulted by the parents of a murdered Kurd, the assassins of whom he was unable to discover, owing no doubt to the incapacity of the corrupt police officials of this town. The opinion is that Ismail Hakki Bey will not return and that his eleven-monthly tenure of office at Bitlis was a thorough failure. I must say that there is some truth in this assertion. Endowed with a fair measure of goodwill and energy to strike at the root of some of the evils from which this country is suffering, he no doubt would have been able to introduce certain reforms if allowed to. Unhappily, however, being surrounded by a completely rotten Government staff, and encountering obstacles and difficulties on every part, from the Porte downwards, he in fact achieved very little. His failure in Khuyt (see my despatch No. 21 of the 29th July) was taken as a test by the Kurds, who watched his movements with attention. Most of the responsibility of this failure, however, is to be charged to the credit of the Central Government, which invariably refused to grant to the vali some measure of power to act in accordance with the requirements of the situation, thus bringing discredit upon the vali. Then happened the criminal disclosures of Kushir Osman Pasha at Kaskeui, in Mush, as reported in my despatch No. 23 of the 8th August last. Later on came Djavid Bey, the ex-Minister of Finance, whose ill-judged meetings with the notorious Musa Bey and Haji Faris, of Kolossig, in the plain of Mush, greatly encouraged the Kurds.

All these events seem to have driven the Kurdish chiefs to think that the old blessed days had returned, and that they could undertake their old habits of lawlessness and robbery.

In order to give you an idea as to the degree of disorder prevailing at present in the province, I humbly venture to state that within the last three weeks some fifteen people have been killed in the vilayet, ten of the victims being Kurds and the rest Armenians, the latter being killed as always by Kurds, in consequence of land disputes and old grudges (two in Mush, two in Sairt, and one in Akhlat).

A fortnight ago the Government mail was attacked at Chiliftra Pass between Bitlis and Sairt, as it sometimes happened under the old régime; one of the escorting Zaptiehs was wounded, but happily there was not much money in the bags, which, after a search, were handed over to the courrier.

A band of brigands organised by the notorious Musa Bey, of Khevner, robbed a Kurd of his money in the outskirts of this town. Even the plough oxen belonging to Haji Nejmeddine Effendi, himself an influential brigand of this town, were carried off from Tchukur, five hours from here, by the band of Musa Bey. All this is understood as aiming to exasperate the Kurds against the constitutional Government.

Whole pages would be required for summarising the robberies and plunder of cattle which have taken place in almost every district of this province during the last month. The public security and confidence in the authorities have almost disappeared, and this is the first time since the revolution that the Armenians feel some uneasiness in travelling round the country. Twice lately they have fled from the bazaars here, closing their shops, on account of the threatening attitude of Kurds.

"There is no Government in the country," is an expression which I have often heard during last week, even from the lips of some highest Government officials.

Reshid Bey, the acting vali, is not quite capable of coping with the situation. In order to avoid further disorder of more serious character, the immediate appointment of a strong vali with full powers to act, seems to be the most imperative need of the moment.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Bitlis, September* 25, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sheikh Seyyid Ali, of Khizan, and the notorious Musa Bey, of Khevner, appeared to have combined their forces of late in order to carry out an anti-Government propaganda on a larger scale than they hitherto have been able to do.

They have been disseminating lately a declaration addressed to the Kurdish people, and published in Kurdish and Turkish, copies of which have happily come to the hands of the authorities.

I understand from a reliable source that by this declaration the above sheikh is preaching union among the Kurds, and exhorts them to combine and rise against the Government, demanding administrative autonomy for Kurds in the way the Albanians and the Arabs succeeded.

The two above-mentioned leaders have further organised bands of brigands with a view to carrying out their plan of disturbing the peace and terrorising the people into submission. Tahsin Bey, the acting military commandant here, told me the other day that the authorities here knew well that such bands of the sheikh had been perching upon the hills overlooking this town, instructed to do everything to dishonour the Government. He further added that the latest recrudescence of brigandage and disorder were mostly due to the activity of the bands belonging to the above Kurdish leaders.

I am further informed by the same well-informed official that the Sheikh of Khizan is in communication with the Bedrkhans in Bohtan and other discontented Kurdish chiefs in Van and elsewhere, attempting to bring about a combined action, and thus provoke a simultaneous rising against the Empire throughout Kurdistan.

It is a great misfortune that there does not appear to exist any well-qualified authority to care for the maintenance of order and endeavour to prevent the gathering of clouds.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[41640] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 711.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. McGregor, His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting visits of British and French experts to oil-fields in vilayets of Van and Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 78. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, October* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, as an indirect consequence of the railway schemes now under consideration for establishing communications between Van, Erzeroum, and the sea, the possibilities of working the petroleum deposits in these districts seem now to be receiving some attention from both British and French capitalists.

Mr. Maitland Edwards, a mining engineer employed by a British syndicate, recently paid a visit to Korzut, near Berghéri, in the vilayet of Van, for the purpose of inspecting an oil-field, the concession of which is held by Marshel Fuad Pasha, and he has now left Erzeroum for the purpose of visiting other wells at Pülk (kaza of Terjan) and Chymaghyl (kaza of Baiburt), in this vilayet, options for the eventual working of which have practically been secured.

Mr. Edwards informs me that, although the configuration of the land at Berghéri is not such as would usually be taken to indicate the presence of oil, and although the surface is covered with lava of recent formation, still there are oil-flows of sufficient importance to justify preliminary sounding operations. On the other hand, he does not think that any of the wells he has seen are sufficiently promising to warrant an outlay of capital on them alone, and the final decision in this respect will be taken after he has reported on the Mendeli fields in the vilayet of Bagdad. Should this prove satisfactory, the syndicate would then be prepared to take up all the fields inspected and thus secure a practical monopoly for the production of petroleum in the vicinity of the new railways.

M. Roussel, a mining engineer in the service of a French firm, which, I understand, is financed by a certain Comte Redon de Colombiers, is also at present engaged in inspecting, not only various oil-flows in Kiskim and Terjan, but also several reputed deposits of copper in the vicinity of Ispir and Rizé, and my French colleague informs me that M. Roussel has expressed himself as satisfied with what he has hitherto seen. I have, however, reason to believe that no attempt has yet been made to interest British capital or technical skill in this scheme, and that without such co-operation the chances of a serious undertaking being set on foot are doubtful.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[41641] No. 35.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 712.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul, Mr. Devey, at Damascus, reporting arrest of Nouri, sheikh of Ruwela tribe.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Damascus, September* 30, 1911.

AMONG other doings of Sami Pasha to establish better order and security in Syria, his Excellency had entered into communication with Sheikh Nouri Shaalan (son of Sattam Pasha Shaalan), of the Ruwela tribe, as mentioned in my despatch No. 25 of the 27th May.

The Ruwela, a most important branch of the Aneyza Bedouins, number some 15,000 tents in all, who give allegiance to two chiefs, Nouri and Mahb. Nouri's tribesmen are distributed from the vicinity of Damascus so far south as Amman, and retire to the desert between Maan and Jauf during the winter.

Latterly Sami Pasha had made various promises and offers to Sheikh Nouri, but called on him to surrender 2,000 rifles; Sheikh Nouri came to Damascus a few days ago, presumably for further discussion, and was almost at once arrested and imprisoned.

This has caused immediate excitement among the Ruwela in this neighbourhood, who are now moving south, and already beginning to plunder and commit excesses.

I have, &c.

G. P. DEVEY.

[41649] No. 36.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 723.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 16, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, reporting on current events in his district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir, *Mosul, September* 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency on current events in this district as follows:—

1. *The Turco-Persian Frontier.*

In paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 24 of the 10th July mention was made of steps taken towards the formation of Turkish administrative centres at Bana, Serdesht, Pesswa, and Nagirdeh. I am informed that Turkish civil officials with the title of "Idaré Me'moura" have now been appointed to the Pishder and Gulumbar districts.

The Turks have at last realised the folly, in view of their present frontier policy, of continually provoking the Jaff tribe. They have suspended the ill-timed attempts at regular taxation and are conciliating Mahmoud Pasha, the principal chief of the tribe, who seems to have threatened a general exodus of his following into Persian territory, and to have listened to proposals of Salar-ed-Dowleh. According to the most reliable information obtainable here, he is now receiving from the Turkish Government a monthly allowance of 50 liras. The reconciliation was effected by Ali Sidi Bey, one of the inspectors sent to Bagdad to investigate the charges against Nazim Pasha.

The Russian vice-consul for Mosul proceeded in July to Van, by way of Sairt and Bitlis. He is reported to have left Van on the 15th August for Urmia. He did not visit the Nestorian patriarch at Koshannes, but members of the Archbishop of Canterbury's mission state that there have recently been Russian attempts to influence the Nestorians in favour of the Russian Church.

In August one of the Germans in charge of the excavations at Shergat visited Koshannes. It has been impossible to ascertain what conversations he held with the patriarch, but a Nestorian, who acted as his guide, states that he said to him (the guide): "Why do you Nestorians look to the English rather than to the Russians? The English will leave you in the lurch."

The Sheikh of Barzan, whom I saw near 'Amadia, tells me he has twice been invited by the Russian consul at Urmia to negotiate with him at Urmia. He has refused. (An account of the resources of this sheikh and the extent of his influence was given in the second Appendix in my despatch No. 36 of the 31st October last.)

2. *Akra District.*

In paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 24 of the 10th July the very improper appointment of Asaf Effendi as Acting Kaimakam of Akra and its probable consequences were reported. As was expected he lost no time in endeavouring—in the

interests of certain local notables and of the Roman Catholic party—to involve the Sheikh of Barzan in hostilities with the Government. One Molla Gibrail, a member of the Akra Administrative Council, was mysteriously murdered within a stone's throw of the Konak—probably by an agent of the acting kaimakam—and the Sheikh of Barzan was represented to have instigated the deed. Reprisals followed between the friends of Molla Gibrail and the sheikh's men, and there have been some insignificant encounters near Zibar. The importance of these has been exaggerated by the acting kaimakam, who has applied for troops to maintain order.

Happily the present vali is not so easily or willingly deceived as his predecessors. He tells me Asuf Effendi is being recalled and a man favourable to the Sheikh of Barzan appointed in his stead. It appears that this man is connected with the family of Abdul Kader, the new Sheikh of Neri, who is on good terms with the Sheikh of Barzan.

(On his return from exile a few months ago, Sheikh Abdul Kader, a son of the famous Sheikh Obeid Ullah, took the place of his nephew, Sheikh Taha, at Neri. This change probably accounts for the presence at Neri in February or March last of a Turkish inspector, as reported in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 24 of the 10th July.)

3. Various Incidents.

1. The acts of highway robbery reported in paragraph 11 of my despatch No. 31 of the 17th instant have been followed by the plundering of three more caravans within the past week. The information received regarding each of these cases is as follows:—

(*a.*) A caravan proceeding from Bagdad to Mosul was robbed of twelve horses or mules and goods of considerable value in the Wadi-el-Kassab (between Hamam Ali and Shergat).

A woman was outraged. The robbers are said to have been about 200 in number. It is not known for certain whether they were Shammars or men of the Anazeh tribe, which has come nearer than usual to Mosul this summer, and has encroached much on the Shammar districts. But it is generally believed that Sheikh Asi is again responsible.

(*b.*) A caravan proceeding from Erbil to Tel-Keyf, consisting of twenty-five mules laden with corn, was held up by Arabs in the Shamamuk district. All the mules and their loads were carried off. The robbers are believed to have been Shammars, who had crossed the Tigris, which is now very low.

(*c.*) A caravan proceeding from Aleppo to Mosul was robbed near Tel Afar by unknown Arabs. An officer who was travelling with the caravan was robbed of his sword.

The authorities have taken no steps in connection with any of these incidents, which are therefore likely to be followed by others. Complete official lethargy has prevailed during Ramazan.

2. Sheikh Sadun, of the Muntafik tribe, arrived here on the 30th August under escort of 100 "Hester-Suwar" on his way to Aleppo for trial. He continued his journey on the 2nd September by way of Deir-el-Zor. Whilst here he resided at the Sarai.

4. Military Information.

1. During the past week fifty Armenian recruits have arrived in Mosul. There are now some 550 Armenians in the Mosul army corps. Sixty of them, who were recently sent to Kerkuk, petitioned the Ministry of War not to order them to the frontier posts, where service is most unpopular both amongst officers and men. I have heard of no Armenian complaints of ill-treatment in the army.

2. The Acting Chief of Staff tells me that the new commandant of the Mosul Army Corps is expected here in a few days. It is rumoured that he will shortly proceed to the frontier district.

5. Gendarmerie.

Ten foot gendarmes have been sent from Mosul to Pesswa and forty, with four sergeants, have been sent to Kerkuk, Suleimanieh, and Rayanduz.

6. The Mosul Deputies.

Mohammed Ali Effendi and Daoud Youssefané, deputies for the town of Mosul, have left for Constantinople.

7. Measures against Cholera.

Orders were received from Constantinople more than a fortnight ago directing the local authorities to take the necessary steps to protect Mosul against cholera, which has occurred at Diabekir as well as at Bagdad. Nothing has been done.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[41651] No. 37.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 725.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting the receipt in that town of the news of the declaration of war by Italy and the action which he took in respect to an application made to him, in his capacity of Italian consular agent, by certain Italian residents.

On the 3rd instant I received a telegram from Mr. McGregor stating that the vali had announced that Italian subjects who wished to remain in Turkey would be afforded protection and that those who wished to leave would be escorted to the frontier. The Italian residents, who number five, applied to Mr. McGregor, who informed the vali that pending receipt of instructions from me he expected him to secure Italians from molestation. I at once referred the matter to the German Embassy here, and at their request telegraphed to His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum to advise the Italians to remain in Turkey and to have confidence in the promises of protection given them by the vali.

Subsequently I was informed by the German Embassy that it had been arranged that in places where there was no German consul, the Austrian consul would take charge of Italian interests, and I so informed Mr. McGregor by telegraph on the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, October 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on the evening of the 29th ultimo, in a public meeting held at the Government House for the purpose of enabling the deputies for Erzeroum to give their constituents an account of the work accomplished during the last parliamentary session, the Governor-General received a telegram from the Minister of the Interior to the effect that Italy had declared war against Turkey on account of the claims of the former in Tripoli of Barbary.

This wholly unexpected announcement caused great excitement, and the meeting having been closed, the vali, accompanied by many notables, proceeded to the Committee Club, where patriotic speeches were delivered to the crowd assembled outside the building.

The vali announced that he was awaiting instructions regarding the steps to be taken with respect to Italian subjects, and exhorted the people to avoid any disturbance of the peace.

In my capacity as Italian consular agent, I have been approached by some of the Italian subjects living here as to their position with regard to the authorities; but I have informed them that I have no official knowledge of a rupture of relations.

The redifs of 1292, 1293, 1294, and 1295 who were in process of being summoned

ostensibly for six weeks' training, but in reality, it is believed, for dispatch to the Persian frontier of this province, were dismissed immediately on receipt of the news of the state of war existing with Italy, and the prevailing frame of mind is one of depression.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[41653] No. 38.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 727.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting on the effect produced there by the outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, October* 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that rumours of the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey began to circulate about midday on the 30th ultimo, and that an official notification of the fact was made in the course of the afternoon.

Both the Italian Consulate and post office were closed, and the charge of their interests was handed over to the German consular and postal authorities. The Italian consul left on the 4th instant, the consular agent at Jaffa having preceded him by two days.

To my knowledge no Italian subjects have as yet left, and up till yesterday work on the site of the proposed Italian hospital was proceeding as usual.

There was some talk of demonstrations both at Jaffa and in this city, but nothing of the sort actually occurred. On the whole very little feeling appears to have been aroused. Such indignation as was provoked was largely mingled with apprehension lest the Redifs should be called out. Should this be the case, there is some likelihood that a certain number of the non-Moslems, at any rate, will endeavour to avoid service by leaving the country.

Among the large number of rumours which are naturally current, there has been a persistent one to the effect that Egypt had been annexed by Great Britain. This rumour has in nearly every case been traceable to German sources. I do not, however, think that there is any feeling in favour of Germany at present. If anything, it seems to be felt that the present war is the result of the Germanophil policy recently pursued by the Ottoman Government, and several times regret has been expressed to me that old friendships had been abandoned.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[41662] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 736.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith report on the affairs of the Turkish, Asiatic, and African provinces for the quarter ended the 30th September, 1911.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Quarterly Report on Events in Turkey in Africa for the period June 30 to September 30, 1911.

Wadai.

TROOPS under the French flag are reported to have advanced to Dour and driven out the followers of Doudmourrah. The troops are, however, said to have left Dour without raising the French flag in that place.

Lawlessness in Benghazi District.

The district of Benghazi has during the last three months been in a most unsettled condition. The tribes fight out their quarrels and raid one another's flocks within a few miles of the town. In reply to complaints on the part of the tribes resident in the town the governor stated on the 7th September that the number of troops at his disposal were insufficient to maintain order. Two days later further fighting took place, in consequence of which 200 Turkish troops with four guns were dispatched to punish the Ait Azzi, the Ait Ganfud, and the Ait Ijka tribes for their attack on the Katan tribe and to recover the stolen flocks.

Sollum.

Early in July information was received to the effect that the Turkish Telegraph Administration proposed to extend their line from Sollum to Gara, a point some 24 kilom. east of Sollum, and therefore incontestably in Egyptian territory. A protest was accordingly made to the Porte. Early in September, however, materials for extension of the Turkish telegraph line were landed at Sollum. As it was locally believed that these preparations were for the extension of the line east of Sollum, further representations were made to the Turkish Government. In reply to these representations the Grand Vizier said that he had given orders that all such work should be stopped until the matter had been looked into. He promised to find out what was actually happening.

Recall of the Vali of Tripoli.

The vali, Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, was recalled in August, after less than a year of office. He had done absolutely nothing for the improvement of the vilayet, and he seems to have made himself disliked even by the troops.

Turco-Italian War.

In consequence of reports of mobilisation of Italian troops, the appearance of Italian men-of-war off the coast on the 28th and 29th September caused a panic among the population, and Europeans began to leave the town. War was declared on the 30th September.

Quarterly Report on Affairs of Anatolia for Quarter ended September 30, 1911.

1. *Greek Boycott in Smyrna and adjacent District.*

The boycott committee, if not less virulent against the Hellenes, seems to have become, on the whole, more discriminating as to the nationality of their victims.

Three serious attacks have, however, been made on a farm not far from Aivali, recently rented from a Greek by a British subject named Wilkinson. On representations by His Majesty's Embassy, the Minister of the Interior sent stringent instructions for their cessation.

2. *Adana.*

The former vali, Jemal Bey, at present Vali of Bagdad, has been succeeded by Mohammed Bey, a young civilian who, in spite of a nervous manner and rather insignificant appearance, has begun well.

On his arrival, on the 26th June, he found that, as a consequence of the recrudescence of the Greek boycott, the rougher elements of the town had adopted an overbearing attitude, and some uneasiness was being felt among the local Christians, one "Boycottaji" having actually fired several shots in front of a Greek café and wounded one man, in the presence of several policemen, with impunity. His Excellency at once gave orders that he was to be shot at sight if he did not surrender within twenty-four hours.

3. *Erzeroum.*

A frontier incident was reported from Bayazid on the 1st July. A smuggler had been pursued into Russian territory by a Turkish soldier. Both were driven back and shot on Turkish territory by Cossacks.

A commission of enquiry was appointed, and, after reference to Constantinople, the incident was declared closed.

4. *The Agrarian Question.*

Continued Troubles between Kurds and Armenians: the Government Attitude.

Certain Kurdish chieftains, notably two members of the influential Bedrkhan clan, Hussein Pasha and Hassan Bey, have been travelling about the vilayets of Erzeroum, Diarbekir, and Bitlis, apparently with the object of rousing the Kurds for a demand for some sort of autonomy on the lines of Albania. Their proceedings, coupled with the growing disaffection of the Armenians, including the Tashnak Clubs, have led the Government to display a Pan-Islamic and pro-Kurdish policy in the hope of averting trouble similar to the Yemen and Albania.

During the past quarter this policy has been exemplified by the settlement under Government auspices, of Circassian Moslem emigrants on lands belonging mostly to Armenians, and some to Kurds, and no serious steps have been taken towards any equitable solution of the agrarian question.

In Mush the situation appears to be most unsatisfactory, and in Khizan still more so. Mervan Agha, the murderer of five Armenians in February last, still remains untried at the latter place. Ismail Hakki Bey, the Vali of Bitlis, in face of strong opposition from local Kurds, notably Moussa Bey and the Sheikh of Khizan, was forced to give up his expedition against the Kurds of Khuyt and return to Bitlis at the end of July without catching the real criminals responsible for the murder of eight Armenians in June. It is understood that the Central Government refused to give him more troops to carry on his expedition. Early in July he had a meeting with Marshal Osman Pasha, commander-in-chief of the troops in the vilayet, who about the same time delivered a speech to the Armenian notables of Mush roundly abusing them for daring to question the proprietary rights of Moslems to Armenian lands, which, he said, had been conquered by Moslems at the price of their blood.

On the 1st August Javid Bey was at Erzeroum making rhetorical speeches and receiving the notorious Kurdish chieftain, Hussein Pasha, of Patnotz. After leaving Erzeroum Javid proceeded to Bitlis where most of his time was spent in colloquy with notorious Kurds.

On the other hand the Armenians have in many instances adopted a provocative attitude and have managed to engineer a somewhat artificial agitation in their favour in the Constantinople press. On the 5th July, the Armenian Gregorian Bishop of Erzeroum called on His Majesty's consul there to express the apprehensions of his community, caused by the attitude of the authorities with respect to the land question, and after a three weeks' tour in the district, presented the consul with a somewhat meagre list, stating only a few cases of spoliation of recent date and omitting all mention of other cases which had been reported by the local Tashnakist journal as having been brought to the bishop's knowledge.

5. *Van.*

Abd-ul-Rezzak Bey, a Kurdish chieftain, who had been engaged in seditious propaganda amongst the frontier Kurds, telling them that in the event of a rising they would receive the support of Russia, in June took refuge in the Russian consulate at Urmia and was thence escorted by Russian Cossacks to Tabreez, thus, according to a local Turkish source, escaping arrest by the Ottoman consulate.

There appears also to have been an idea prevalent among the Turkish authorities at Van that Russia had changed her attitude towards the Armenian revolutionaries and would assist the latter in the event of their making trouble there.

Quarterly Report on the Affairs of Arabia for the Quarter ending September 30, 1911.

Revolt in Yemen and Assir.

Since the relief of Sana'a on the 4th April (see last quarterly report) there have been practically no military operations in Yemen proper worth recording, and the commander of the forces, Izzet Pasha, has been busied with minor operations in the neighbourhood of Sana'a with a view to the pacification of the country. Many sheikhs have come in and made their submission, being dismissed with lavish presents and sums of money. It is estimated that since the end of April over £T. 80,000 have been distributed in this manner in Sana'a alone.

An expedition was at one time contemplated to Shahara, Imam Yahya's mountain stronghold, but it now seems unlikely that the Turks will carry military operations any further.

The results of the insurrection in the Yemen may be summed up as follows:—

It has cost Turkey some 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 to dispatch and maintain in the field a force of some 30,000 men, while the Turks have only succeeded in inflicting slight punishment on the Imam's levies and in regaining lost positions.

On the other hand, the Imam has himself suffered little by the operations and incurred but small expense. He can, moreover, boast of having taken 1,000 prisoners and added to his arsenal some six or eight guns and a quantity of small arms and ammunition.

The local press now announces that, as a result of negotiations between Izzet Pasha and the Imam, the latter has accepted the Turkish terms, which are as follows:—

There shall be a truce for four years, that the Imam shall restore all prisoners, and that he shall "enjoy complete liberty in the region which he commands," *i.e.*, Sandé.

Affairs in the province of Assir, on the other hand, gave the Turkish authorities more trouble.

The Grand Shereef of Mecca, who was to undertake an expedition, reinforced by Turkish regular troops, for the relief of Ibha, besieged by rebels since November 1910, arrived at Confudah on the 3rd May. After a slight reverse suffered about the middle of the month, the Grand Shereef's sons sallied forth on the 29th May and met with a somewhat doubtful success in an engagement with the enemy. The Grand Shereef himself remained at Confudah. Another relief expedition was at the same time being prepared, to march from Jeezan under General Mahommed Ali Pasha, Vali of the Yemen. This force made a sortie on the 13th June, but was surprised by a force of about 12,000 Arabs and overwhelmed, the Turks losing between 1,000 and 1,600 killed, 400 wounded, and many missing. Colonel Raghib Bey was in command at the time. After this it became clear that, unless large reinforcements could be spared from Sana'a, the expedition from Jeezan would have to be abandoned, and at the same time it was feared that the water supply of Loheia would be cut off, and that all available troops would be required for the defence of that town. However, internal quarrels among the investing tribesmen enabled the Turkish authorities to get possession of the wells, and danger in this quarter was thus averted.

Meanwhile, the Grand Shereef of Mecca had begun his advance (with about 5,000 regulars and 1,500 Arabs), and after three successful encounters entered Ibha on the 16th July. From that place he went on to Taif, arriving there on the 11th August.

It has now been decided to organise a column of twelve battalions to march from Jeezan under Colonel Riza Bey against Seyyid Idris, who, after the relief of Ibha, took refuge in the mountainous districts of Sabia.

The losses sustained by the troops from disease, principally cholera, were very heavy. Though it is impossible to ascertain exact numbers, some idea of the virulence of the epidemic may be formed from the fact that Neshat Pasha, commanding the 5,000 regulars with the Grand Shereef's expedition, admitted to having lost 800 men through sickness.

Wavell Case.

A note was sent in to the Sublime Porte on the 13th June protesting against the ill-treatment of Mr. Wavell, as reported by His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah (see last quarterly report), and requesting that urgent orders might be sent for a strict investigation of the case with a view to reparation being made.

Some days later the Porte received a report of the case from General Izzet Pasha, who stated that Wavell and his servant left Sana'a surreptitiously about the 25th May, were found hiding a short distance from that town, and were courteously brought back into the town, where Izzet Pasha found Wavell dining with the vali; that Wavell and his servant were then sent with a police escort to Hodeidah.

This report no doubt distorted the plain facts of the case, but it became apparent that Mr. Wavell had been aware that he was regarded with great mistrust by the Ottoman authorities, and he accordingly, by escaping surreptitiously from Sana'a, only confirmed those suspicions, and put himself to a certain extent in the wrong. As regards his ill-treatment, it appeared also that the first reports received must have been somewhat exaggerated, as fifteen days after the incident no traces of violence were observed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah.

The Sublime Porte replied to the embassy's note of the 13th June by a note dated the 8th August, in which they denied ill-treatment, and drew attention to the admitted fact that Wavell carried two passports, one of which was made out by the Ottoman consul at Marseilles in the name of Ali-bin-Mehmed.

This fact constituted an additional difficulty in the way of the embassy pressing the case at the Sublime Porte.

Quarterly Report on the Affairs of Mesopotamia for the Quarter ended September 30, 1911.

Military Operations against the Arabs of the Montific.

An expedition was sent from Bussorah on the 17th May (see last quarterly report), consisting of 190 men and 3 guns, to operate against the Montific Arabs who had revolted against the domination of Saadun Pasha. Saadun was reported to be blockaded at Nasirieh, having retired thither from Maiah, where certain members of his family remained. After a short skirmish with some Bedur Arabs, the expedition reached Maiah and there landed provisions for Saadun's people. About 100 more troops and 4 guns were sent up the river (6th June) to Nasirieh, the siege of which town was being vigorously prosecuted by the Arabs.

Fighting was reported from Maiah on the 13th June, and a few days later Saadun was said to have fled from Nasirieh and to be with the Al-Azeirij tribe, which, together with the Al-Ibrahim, had returned to their allegiance to him.

The vali's policy had been to give Saadun all possible support, whereas, on the other hand, the military authorities desired to avoid giving provocation to the Arabs, and sent orders to the commandant of the expedition to effect a pacification.

Saadun Pasha's ill-success against the Dhafir tribe last March lost him a great deal of prestige with the tribes, and the Turks probably could not, even if they would, make any more use of him as an administrative agent.

The immediate cause of the disturbance was the cruel treatment meted out by Saadun to nine of the leading sheikhs of the Bedur tribe. Saadun's agent in Bussorah gained the vali's ear, and prevailed on him not to listen to complaints made by the other sheikhs, who consequently took the law into their own hands and attacked Saadun.

The refractory tribes tried to persuade the authorities that non-receipt of revenue from them in the past was due to Saadun's dishonesty, and direct relations will now be established between the Turkish officials and the tribesmen; but it remains to be seen whether this will produce satisfactory results or whether it will not rather be a cause of friction.

A mixed civil and military commission, appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Montific country, arrived at Bussorah on the 13th July. The commission decided that it would be of little use visiting the disturbed districts so long as Saadun was at large, and it was decided to arrest him. This, however, could not be done forcibly, and

he was consequently invited by the Vali of Bussorah to an interview. Saadun, relying still on the support which he had always received from the authorities, came to Bussorah, was taken on to the "Marmaris," and there detained. On the 22nd July he was transferred, under a guard, to one of Agha Jaffer's steamers, and sent to Bagdad.

In the following month the commission visited several localities in the area of disturbance, including Nasirieh and Maiah, and it was reported that two tribes had submitted to the Government and promised to pay taxes in future.

Anti-Greek Demonstration at Bussorah.

The Vali of Bussorah, a Cretan, and strongly Anglophobe, summoned, through an anonymous committee, a public meeting of Moslems on the 6th July, for the discussion of measures to be taken against Greece for the protection of Islam. About 5,000 persons attended, numbers of armed villagers coming in from the neighbouring country. Some excitement was created, but the meeting passed off without serious incident.

Disturbances on the Lower Tigris.

On the 3rd August the Vali of Bussorah informed His Majesty's consul that 600 Persian brigands had crossed the frontier and reached the Tigris, near Ezra's tomb (Ozair). The next day the arrival of a grain-lighter, which had been fired on near Ezra's tomb, confirmed the vali's statement.

On the 5th Messrs. Lynch's launch, lent for the purpose by the firm, was sent up the river with some sixty troops.

Negotiations were opened with the brigands, who were discovered to be for the greater part Arabs of the Al-Bu-Mohammed tribe, reinforced by some Arabs from the Beni Turuf tribe of Hawizeh in Persia, under the leadership of a certain Abdul Kerim, of the Al-Bu-Mohammed tribe.

His followers numbered about 2,000 fairly well-armed men.

The cause of his demonstration was the fact that the Government had outlawed the leading members of his family, and had assigned to other sheikhs certain lands which had for the last fifty years been farmed out to the Seihud (Abdul Kerim's) family, in virtue of which they had made a deposit of £T. 2,750 with the Governor of Amara.

A settlement was proposed whereby half of these lands were to be granted to the Seihud family, and it was expected that this would prove a satisfactory arrangement.

Abdul Kerim's followers plundered some grain barges, and burnt two of them, but he maintained that his object was not plunder, but merely to obtain the redress of his legitimate grievances.

The river was reopened to navigation on the 7th August.

Bussorah Committee of Union and Progress.

Seyyid Talib, deputy for Bussorah, who enjoys considerable local influence and, on the recall of the vali (the 13th August) remained practically master in Bussorah, formed a committee, called the Moderate Liberal Committee, the vice-president of which was the former president of the local Committee of Union and Progress, which as a consequence practically ceased to exist.

Seyyid Talib was considered a dangerous man by the ex-Sultan, and spent some seven years in virtual exile as member of the Council of State in Constantinople.

New Vali of Bussorah.

The local press indulged in attacks on Jellal Bey, Vali of Bussorah, and at the beginning of August it was rumoured that he would be transferred. On the 18th August he left to take up his duties at Diarbekir, where he had been appointed vali, leaving the defterdar in charge pending the arrival of his successor, Hassan Riza Bey.

His Majesty's consul reported that while he believed in the honesty of Jellal Bey, he was unsuited to the post owing to his chauvinistic hatred of everything foreign, and that "his dismissal would be preferable to his transfer."

The new vali arrived at Bussorah on the 20th September.

New Vali of Bagdad.

Jemal Bey, the new Vali of Bagdad, arrived at his post in the middle of August. From speeches which he has made, he seems inclined to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Nazim Pasha, and to be pronouncedly anti-foreign in his sympathies.

Arrest of Bahreinis at Bussorah.

In accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a further note was addressed to the Porte (18th August), enquiring whether the vali had been reprimanded, as requested, and repeating the request for an assurance that Bahrein passports would be accepted as heretofore. A reply was also asked for to the demand for compensation.

No reply has as yet been received, the Grand Vizier always stating that this matter would find a place in the general settlement of Persian Gulf questions.

In connection with this case, it is satisfactory to note that a consular dragoman on the 8th July attended a trial, on the invitation of the president of the court of first instance, in which a native of Bahrein was plaintiff. The public prosecutor objected to the presence of the dragoman, but was ruled out of order, and the sentence of the court was afterwards signed by the dragoman. It will be remembered that the refusal of the local authorities to admit the attendance of a British dragoman at the trial of the Bahreinis illegally arrested formed one of the chief points of contention.

Mesopotamian Irrigation.

Trouble arose at the beginning of August in connection with the transport of material for the irrigation works from Bussorah to the Hindieh barrage. Under their contract, Messrs. Sir John Jackson were empowered to make what arrangements they chose for transport of their material, if the Turkish steam-ship administration refused to take it. The latter declared their inability to transport the material viâ the Euphrates, and Jacksons accordingly entered into negotiations with Messrs. Lynch in London, and on the 1st August a Lynch steam-boat, flying the Turkish flag, was sent up the Euphrates with 130 tons of coal for the irrigation works. The acting vali protested strongly against this, and the protest appears to have been supported by the new vali on his arrival in Bagdad. At the request of Messrs Lynch, His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to urge the Turkish Government not to obstruct the carrying out of the Jackson–Lynch contract, but Messrs. Jackson's agent in Constantinople being of the opinion that Messrs. Lynch desired to use his firm as a means of eventually establishing a service of steamers on the Euphrates, and that Lynch had acted wrongly in not apprising the Turkish Government of their intentions, begged that no representations on their behalf should be made which might compromise his firm with the Turkish Government.

Lynch's Steamers and Barges.

In consequence of the continued accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, Messrs. Lynch applied to the Turkish Government towards the end of June for permission to run an extra steamer between Bussorah and Bagdad.

The Ministry of Public Works eventually expressed their readiness to consent to the proposal provided that a definite term were fixed during which the extra steamer should be allowed to run, but enquiries were made of the Vali of Bussorah. The latter sent an evasive reply, and the Ministry wired to him to say that the proposal to run the extra steamer for two months was approved, provided there was no political objection. To this no direct reply was sent, and the Ministry of public works seems to have been content to delay giving a definite decision until a report was received from the new vali. It was agreed that it would be inadvisable for the embassy to make official representations on the subject.

On the 19th July the Vali of Bagdad demanded the discontinuance of Lynch's second barge, on the ground that the accumulation of cargo (4,800 tons) had been worked off, and that the permission to tow a second barge, was consequently at an end.

Messrs. Lynch complained that there still remained a large accumulation of cargo to work off, and protested against the cancelling of their permission.

The original permit had been given with a view to working off the then accumulation of 4,500 tons. This was done, and accordingly, if the agreement was to be continued, a renewed permission would be necessary.

This renewal was granted, and instructions were sent on the 23rd August to allow a second barge to be towed until the present accumulation (3,800 tons) could be worked off.

Turco-Persian Frontier.

The Turkish consul at Khoi refused to allow the British and Russian delegates to take their escorts with them to Urumia viâ Dilman, but sent a Turkish escort with them, their own escorts proceeding viâ the shores of the lake. This caused some delay, and the delegates waited in Urumia pending the result of negotiations in Constantinople. These resulted in the Porte agreeing that the delegates should proceed from Urumia with their escorts, the latter to be reinforced, where necessary, by a Turkish escort. The Russian and English escorts were only to be left behind, and replaced by a Turkish escort on the delegates entering territory incontestably Turkish.

The delegates left Urumia on the 8th July, returning to Tabreez on the 18th September, having accomplished their mission without incident.

Bagdad Demolitions.

The language used by the Sublime Porte seemed to give good ground for believing that the new Vali of Bagdad was commissioned to make a joint enquiry, with His Majesty's consul-general, and report on the subject of demolitions of house property of British subjects. The new vali, however, on his arrival, informed Mr. Lorimer that he had no such instructions, but that he was simply ordered to report to the Central Government.

There appear to be no funds at the disposal of the Bagdad municipality, and it seems likely that considerable difficulty will be experienced in obtaining compensation.

Quarterly Report on the Affairs of Syria for the Quarter ended September 30, 1911.

Beirout Vilayet.

Riot at Haiffa.—At a meeting organised by the committee in connection with the Cretan question in June, the ignorant mob at Haiffa got very excited, and nearly lynched a British subject—a Jew—who, irritated by the anti-Jewish remarks of one of the speakers, had ventured to interrupt him. He was rescued by the military, but was kept under arrest for one day. No other incidents have been reported, and Mr. Cumberbatch's report on the administrative and economic conditions of the vilayet is not yet to hand.

Damascus Vilayet.

General Situation.—The district has been fairly quiet and prosperous; Bedouins and malcontents have played mischievous tricks, such as cutting down telegraph poles, but doing no serious harm; and there was the beginning of a riot at Hama owing to the exactions of the tithe farmers on a scanty harvest, but it was suppressed without bloodshed. Nevertheless the outflow of emigration continues from all parts of the district and without distinction of race or class, apparently on account of the conscription, and the Government appears to make no attempt to check it.

Anti-Turkish prejudice continues to be manifest, and seems to have been increased by certain speeches delivered by the local deputy Shukri-el-Assali, and the committee has continued to lose influence. A large delegation from Salonica was to have come to try to remedy this state of affairs, but the project has been suspended, though there have been individual visitors.

The harvest generally has been abundant, and business lively.

Kerak, Hauran, and Jebel Druze.—About a hundred Bedouins suffered punishment for the revolt at Kerak last December. Of these half-a-dozen were hanged. Yahia Atrash and seven other Druze sheikhs were removed in August to Rhodes for imprisonment there. A detachment was sent to capture Selim Atrash, implicated in the Katrana and Kerak insurrection, at Ghureiriyeh, but was driven off by Selim and his partisans. Most of the 1,300 Druze recruits who were called to the colours last autumn have been allowed to return home after serving only from three to six months. Barracks and blockhouses are being built in the Lijah and Hauran.

Algerian Immigrants.—During the past two years about 3,000 North Africans have immigrated to Damascus, but finding the only available land very poor, they have been returning to their original homes, and there are only about 800 left—in destitute circumstances. It appears that they are to be settled, at Government expense, in Adana vilayet.

Jewish Colonisation Schemes.—The Jewish Palestine Society is said to have revived the idea of purchasing all the Crown lands in Syria and Palestine (which had apparently been dropped in consequence of the vigorous anti-Semitic press campaign it had evoked some months ago), and to be endeavouring to buy the silence of the local press by offering them shares in the enterprise.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, the native Jews of Damascus are leaving their homes in increasing numbers, mainly on account of the conscription.

Jerusalem Sanjak.

Jewish Colonisation.—His Majesty's consul was instructed in July to do what he could to deter Jewish colonising agents from endeavouring to establish colonies in Egyptian territory or on the frontier, and reported on the 23rd August that purchases of land had ceased. It is impossible, however, to be quite sure of this, since His Majesty's agency at Cairo have heard that they are made secretly.

New Mutessarif.—Djevdet Bey, the new governor, arrived on the 12th July. There seems to be a general impression that he will be an improvement on his predecessor.

Naval Visits.—An Italian fleet of seven ships arrived off Jaffa on the 22nd June, and the vice-admiral in command visited Jerusalem officially. The 6th Cruiser Squadron, under Sir D. Gamble, arrived on the 27th June. Sir Douglas was unwell, and unable to land, but received a deputation of notables of Jaffa on board. Large parties of officers and men from both of these fleets visited Jerusalem.

Aleppo Vilayet.

Nothing to report.

[41792] No. 40.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received October 23.)

3, Sailors' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, October 21, 1911.

Sir,

WITH further reference to your letter of the 17th instant, on the subject of the transport of material to Hindieh, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter which we have to-day addressed to Sir John Jackson (Limited).

You are probably aware that Sir John Jackson (Limited's) agreement with the Turkish Government is a provisional one—a fact which we ascertained only some time after the conclusion of our agreement with them. We understand that the provisional agreement was to have been either abrogated or ratified within a few months after its conclusion; but that this ratification has not yet taken place. Under these circumstances we can well understand that Sir John Jackson (Limited) are averse to raising any difficulties with the Turkish Government. On the other hand, we feel confident that the forces at present directing Turkish policy will refuse to come to any decision one way or the other for the present as regards the ratification of Sir John Jackson (Limited's) agreement. They will prefer to allow Sir John Jackson (Limited) to go on with the work under the provisional agreement—a course which renders Sir John Jackson (Limited) more willing to advance the money without immediate repayment in the hope of the eventual ratification, and also renders them in other respects more malleable. This course at the same time makes it more easy for the Turkish Government to give the eventual contract to the Germans. In this connection we would recall to you the fact that a German engineer, M. Tholens, has recently visited the site and made full investigations.

The circumstances above set forth explain the attitude of the Turkish Government in connection with our own agreement with Sir John Jackson (Limited) of May last. If the Turkish Government can obtain a cancellation of this agreement they will feel themselves more free in dealing with Sir John Jackson's agreement as a whole

should they desire to transfer it to the Germans. After the undertaking which we are giving, and of which we enclose a copy, should they continue to raise objections to the performance of our agreement we can only assume that they are animated by distinctly unfriendly feelings towards all British enterprise in Mesopotamia.

We have, &c.

THOS. H. ROBERTS,
Acting Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Letter addressed to Messrs. Sir John Jackson (Limited), dated London, October 25, 1911.

WE understand that the Turkish Government do not view with complete satisfaction the arrangement which has been made between yourselves and this company, for the conveyance of cargo from Bussorah to the Hindieh barrage.

As this attitude on the part of the Turkish Government may arise from the fear that we shall claim to have acquired some fresh right on the Euphrates after the termination of our agreement, I am to assure you that nothing is further from our thoughts, and it is clearly understood between us that the steamers and barges which we have already employed on your behalf for conveying this material up the Euphrates, as well as any steamers or barges which may hereafter be employed, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, are operating on the Euphrates under the powers possessed by you, and we undertake to remove them at the conclusion of our agreement.

[41946] No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 392.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.*

NEUTRALISATION of Red Sea.

In the interests of commerce the Italian Government have decided to relight immediately all Italian lights in the Red Sea. Seeing the great importance of the question, you should do your utmost to induce Turkish Government to follow their example.

At the same time you should urge them to answer the last proposals made by the Italian Government respecting neutralisation as soon as possible. It is impossible to expect that the Italian Government will agree to an indefinite abstention from all action in the Red Sea.

[41932] No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 5th October, 1911, relative to the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

(Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.)

India Office, October 23, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, September 30, 1911.*

AGREEMENTS with Seyyid Khan and Islam Khan were sent to director, Indo-European Telegraph Department (Persian Gulf section), in June for necessary action, but Grumbley was unable to get them to come to coast then, and reported eventually

that he would endeavour to get them to come to his camp during the coming winter. If agreements are to be of any use, they should be executed at once. It would seem convenient if Craufurd and Gumbley were to proceed together to Bint and Ceh to meet chiefs at beginning of October, when Craufurd returns and Gumbley starts on his annual tour with his escort. Director, Indo-European Telegraph Department (Persian Gulf section), has no objection. If proposal commends itself to your Excellency, will you communicate your concurrence to Government of India and instruct Craufurd?

(Repeated Foreign.)

[41999] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 286.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 24, 1911.*

DREDGING of bar of Shat-el-Arab.

The London firm of Messrs. Strick, Scott, and Co. have been approached by the vali, through their local manager in Bussorah, for a tender for the carrying out of the work.

Above is very confidential.

[42149] No. 44.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 25, 1911.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he has instructed Russian Ambassadors at Rome and Constantinople to support proposals of His Majesty's Government with reference to the neutrality of the Red Sea.

42137] No. 45.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 288.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 25, 1911.*

LIGHTS in the Red Sea.

Please refer to your telegram No. 392 of the 23rd October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped to give me an answer on Thursday with regard to the relighting of lights after submitting the question to the Council of Ministers. He showed no disposition to modify his views with regard to neutralisation, and his personal attitude was avowedly opposed to accepting any such proposals for relighting lights independently of general question of neutralisation. Turkey had in the Red Sea, he pointed out, only one available weapon, which was the extinction of lights, and the abandonment of this weapon would, he considered, not secure to Turkey the advantages of neutralisation which would thus be given to others. He is not alarmed at the prospect of belligerent action by Italy in the Red Sea, as Italy has not a sufficient force to establish an effective blockade and Turkey has no fortified ports to be bombarded.

The neutralisation of the Red Sea, unless it enables Turkey to transport her troops without fear of seizure, would, it seems, be of little advantage to her. A modification of the Porte's attitude is therefore unlikely, and we should probably only arouse resentment in Turkey by pressing the proposal.

Dissatisfaction is expressed at His Majesty's Government advocating terms favourable to Italy alone, though Minister for Foreign Affairs professes to recognise that Italian Government are responsible for those conditions which he considers inadmissible.

[42271] No. 47*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1911.

YOU should ascertain the terms on which Turkish Government are willing to allow the four important lights in the Red Sea, especially that of Abu Ail, to be relit.

If the terms they offer are reasonable we are as ready to ask agreement to them at Rome as the Italian proposals at Constantinople, but they must put us in a position to lay some suggestions before Italian Government.

[42277] No. 46.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October* 26, 1911.

NEUTRALISATION of Red Sea.

Only action taken respecting Red Sea by my Russian colleague (see your telegram No. 398 of 25th October) has been with regard to food supply of Jeddah, about which he spoke to Turkish Government. Question of neutrality has not been touched upon by M. Tcharykow.

To-day, however, he has received instructions to join with me and my each colleague, when we have been similarly instructed, to urge Turkish Government to accept an arrangement whereby all hostile operations shall be forbidden in the Red Sea. This arrangement, M. Tcharykow supposes, would include the recognition by Italy of the right of the Turkish Government to send troops through the Mediterranean to replace time-expired men and invalids on the Red Sea littoral, and to transport the latter home.

[42271] No. 47.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, October* 26, 1911.

NEUTRALISATION of Red Sea.

Your telegram No. 226.

I learn from Russian Ambassador that he enquired at Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to prospects of proposal, advocating its acceptance, some days ago. Yesterday he was instructed by Russian Government to concert with his British and French colleagues in pressing Italian Government to agree to proposal. I understand, however, that he confined himself to asking what progress had been made in the matter, having ascertained that neither I nor the French Ambassador had received instructions to take definite action.

[40109] No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 287.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1911.

I HAVE been approached by Mr. Ridgeley Carter, on behalf of the president of the Ottoman-American Company, who had asked him to ascertain whether there would be any objection on the part of His Majesty's Government to the participation of British capital in the Chester concession for the construction of railways in Asia Minor in the event of its being obtained from the Turkish Government.

A copy of the reply which I have addressed to Mr. Carter is enclosed herewith.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40109] No. 49.

Foreign Office to Mr. Ridgley Carter.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to Mr. Ridgley Carter, and has the honour to inform him, with reference to his enquiry regarding the participation of British capital in the Chester scheme for the building of railways in Asia Minor, that His Majesty's Government could never intervene to

* No. 49.

prevent the British public from investing their capital where they please, but they could not actively support the Chester scheme unless some British group were interested and the enterprise were Anglo-American, a form which would be quite welcome to His Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.

[42585] No. 50.

Memorandum communicated by Colonel Picot, October 27, 1911.

(Confidential.)

IN view of the fact that the Germans are now making all their arrangements for the dispatch of a very large quantity of railway material for the Bagdad Railway early next year by way of the Tigris route to Bagdad, it is of immense importance that we should not lose the Jackson contract for the carriage of material up the Euphrates. The Bagdad Railway concession gives the Germans the right to put steamers on the Euphrates as well as on the Shat-el-Arab and on the Tigris. If the Turks succeed in cancelling our agreement with Sir John Jackson Company (Limited), nothing is more certain than that the Germans will make a bid for the carriage of the Jackson material in conjunction with the carriage of their own Bagdad Railway material. In that case Sir John Jackson Company (Limited) will probably find in the course of time that they too will be supplanted by German engineering enterprise. The Germans will be unable to resist the temptation of profiting by what they will regard as indifference on the part of our Foreign Office.

The Germans are at present engaged in carefully thinking out the best way of transporting their railway material to Bagdad, and have been for some time past in negotiations with our Bagdad agents in connection with this matter. The suggestion is that we should carry the material up for them under the powers which they possess according to the terms of the Bagdad Railway concession. They realise that this course would be far the cheapest for them, but they are being pressed by German local enterprise to profit by the hostility displayed towards British enterprise in Mesopotamia by the Turkish Government in order to put steamers on themselves. In that case we have gathered that the German idea would be to constitute a river company for the purpose of conveying material, and that their hope would be to get these powers extended to the conveyance of general merchandise, which would of course decrease the cost which would have to be borne by the Bagdad Railway material, as the steamers conveying such material would be able to engage downward freights.

At present those responsible for the Bagdad Railway affair have come to no definite decision in the matter. If they find that we are well supported by His Majesty's Government in the matter of the Jackson contract, they will probably decide to go on with their negotiations with our Bagdad agents for the carriage of their railway material. In the contrary event, they are likely to yield to German local representations.

I may add that I recently made it my business to enquire whether it is at all likely that the rivers of Mesopotamia will be rendered unnavigable by irrigation works. I find that there is no present prospect of this, and I would therefore urge that the maintenance of the British position on the rivers should be one of the principal considerations governing British policy in these countries.

As matters now stand, we propose to instruct our agents in Bussorah to resume the carriage of Sir John Jackson's material in our steamers directly the rains have provided a sufficient volume of water in the Euphrates, which is likely to occur early in November. We should instruct them not to yield to any verbal representations on the part of the Vali of Bussorah, but only to yield to written orders to desist. Should any interference of this contract take place, we will at once inform the Foreign Office.

[42288] No. 51a.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 27, 1911.*

RED SEA.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 293 of 26th October repeated to you.

You should express hope that Italian Government will consider these proposals favourably.

[42288] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 26, 1911.*

NEUTRALISATION of Red Sea.

Please refer to my telegram No. 288 of the 24th instant.

Except in connection with neutralisation, Turkish Government refuse to agree to relighting of lights. They are, however, willing that the Red Sea shall be excluded from all hostile operations provided that the transport of Turkish troops between ports of Red Sea littoral is allowed, and also the shipment from the Red Sea to Mediterranean ports of time-expired men and invalids, a demand inspired by humane motives alone. The Turkish Government are ready to promise to abstain from sending troops into red sea, but they demand that ships conveying time-expired men and invalids from Red Sea shall enjoy immunity from capture.

Turkish Government maintain that this a substantial modification of their first reply, and express earnest hope that His Majesty's Government will use their efforts to secure neutralisation on this basis.

[42616] No. 52.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, October 28, 1911.*

TRIPOLI. Neutralisation of Red Sea.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 273.

On my enquiring yesterday how the question stood I was informed by Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had submitted as a condition that, in case of necessity, either side should be able to denounce the agreement. He said he was awaiting an answer as to this. His reason for putting forward this condition was, he said, not that the case appeared to him likely to arise, but because Italy might not wish to deprive herself of the lever for inducing Turkey to sue for peace, which might be provided, if the war dragged on for a long time, by her embarrassments in Arabia, where he know the situation was more serious than was admitted at Constantinople.

I am in the meantime acting on the instructions contained in your telegram No. 234, and am informing his Excellency of the modified conditions put forward by Turkey.

[42637] No. 53.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 742.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Sana'a, transmitting report on Yemen vilayet, political, administrative, and economic.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41/E.)
Sir, *Sana'a, September 14, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 32/E of the 12th June last, I reported that negotiations were proceeding between Izzet Pasha and the Imam Seyyid Yahya, with the view to coming to some amicable arrangement whereby the continual warfare and bloodshed in this province might be permanently avoided in the future.

I now learn that a satisfactory understanding has at last been reached between the

two above-mentioned parties, and that the settlement only awaits the approval of the Ottoman Government.

The negotiations have been conducted throughout with great secrecy, but it is generally believed that they have recently been concluded with satisfactory results. The terms of the settlement as far as I can ascertain are, in the main, on the following basis.

Seyyid Yahya has agreed to renounce his claim to the Moslem Caliphate, to drop the title of "Commander of the Faithful," assumed by his predecessors and himself, and to style himself simply "Imam of the Zaidees."

He has further consented to release from custody all Arab hostages, the fulcrum of his authority in applying pressure on and in securing the assistance and co-operation of the Zeidi tribesmen in the Yemen highlands, in his frequent revolts against the Turks. These hostages, numbering over 400, represent nearly every tribe in the mountains north of Menekha and Taiz respectively, and were taken from the sheikhs and headmen in 1903, during their several visits to Seyyid Yahya to announce their allegiance on his succeeding to the Imamate on the death of his father, the Imam Mamid-ud-Din.

The restoration of these hostages will practically divest the Imam of all civil authority over the Zeidee tribesmen, the majority of whom are tired of joining in the risings got up by him.

During the late insurrection certain clans were, at their own request, specially exempted from taking part, binding themselves at the same time to remain neutral. Their country, however, was overrun and devastated by the Imam's hordes dispatched thither from other parts, and was the scene of fighting between the Turks and the intruders. Appeals to the Imam by the sheikhs and tribesmen concerned proved futile.

Since the collapse of the revolt, Seyyid Yahya has lost the sympathy of a considerable number and influential section of his co-religionists, and there have been signs of alienation from him, and even of open revolt against his authority. This factor has played an important part in the present negotiations, and has brought pressure to bear in inducing him to make the best of any bargain offered by the Turks.

Amongst other conditions agreed to by Seyyid Yahya are the liberation of all Turkish prisoners taken during the past six years, and the renunciation of his right to collect the "zakhat" or religious taxes from his co-religionists under Ottoman jurisdiction.

The Ottoman Government on their part undertake to support Seyyid Yahya against all possible rivals to the Imamate in the future, to permit him to reside at Kaukaban, and to grant him and his immediate entourage an annual subsidy of something like £T. 25,000 from the revenues of the vilayet.

The "kanon" or civil law will in future be entirely abrogated in seven "cazas" in the highlands, viz., those of Amran, Kaukaban, Damar, Yerim, Ibb, El-Hajjeh and El-Hajjur. The "cheri" or Islamic law will be substituted in the above districts, and will be administered under the superintendence of the Imam Seyyid Yahya. The latter will, in future, nominate the "cadis" or judges of Mahommedan law to posts situated in the above-mentioned "cazas," all major appointments being subject to the approval of the Central Government.

Nearly every sheikh of any importance in the mountainous districts has been granted a monthly subsidy, and similar allowances have been made to the "ulema" and "fakih" (learned men) and seyyids throughout the Yemen.

The above, I am told, represents fairly accurately the nature and the terms of the settlement arrived at, which has been accepted in principle by the Cabinet at Constantinople.

The so-called "treaty" will, however, require ratification by the Turkish Parliament when it meets again.

When this has been done, I am informed that Izzet Pasha will meet the Imam either at Kaukaban or Shiban, and the arrangement agreed to will be formally ratified by them.

There appear good reasons for supposing that the arrangement will meet with the approval of Parliament.

The Imam has already liberated 500 Turkish prisoners made during the recent rebellion, and who arrived here on the 16th of last month. The release of the Arab hostages will shortly follow.

It has been decided to send away all reinforcements that have arrived in this province to deal with the revolt. Three battalions of Albanian reserves are under

orders to proceed to the coast within the course of a week, whence they will be transported to their homes.

It need hardly be remarked that the settlement reached with the Imam Seyyid Yahya records a brilliant success for Izzet Pasha's diplomacy, as it means practically the establishment of peace and tranquillity in this province for many years to come, if not permanently.

The terms of the agreement eliminate all the principal sources of friction and discord between the Turks and the Zeidee tribesmen under Seyyid Yahya in the past.

Izzet Pasha's success has not been unattended with the element of good luck, as he happened to approach the Yemen sheikhs at a favourable moment, and won over the majority of Seyyid Yahya's stanchest supporters at the beginning of the negotiations opened with that notable.

It will be possible in future, with the above agreement in force, to reduce the permanent garrison stationed in the Yemen considerably, and thus effect a big curtailment of military expenditure.

It is expected that the expenditure incidental to subsidising the Imam, sheikhs and seyyids, &c., can easily be met from the revenues of the vilayet.

The whole of the highlands has been remarkably quiet and peaceful since Izzet Pasha's relief of Sana'a in April last.

News from Assyr is scarce. On the 12th August, Izzet Pasha received a communication from the Shereef of Mecca officially confirming the report of the relief of Abha on the 17th July. It was also reported that the chiefs of all clans in the neighbourhood of Abha had tendered their submission and promised to co-operate against Seyyid Mahommed Idrisee and his following.

Hussein Pasha (the Grand Shereef) has since returned to Taif to keep the Ramadan Fast.

Affairs in the Sabyeah district are, more or less, *in statu quo*. According to certain reports, it would appear that the tribesmen are concentrating in that quarter with the view to opposing the Turkish advance, while others state that the pretender has been abandoned by his followers and has escaped to the mountains.

Mahommed Ali Pasha is still at Geezan, and has been inactive ever since his arrival there. He has been reinforced with about 2,000 troops.

A considerable quantity of munitions of war, provisions, &c., are being accumulated there for the operations it is proposed to undertake during the approaching cold weather against the Idriseeites. Izzet Pasha will personally conduct these.

Troops have already been moved to Loheia, Zahra, and Zaidyia, an encircling movement being contemplated against the Seyyid and his rebel followers. It is expected that General Suleiman Pasha will also advance from Assyr in the direction of Sabyiah to co-operate with the Yemen force.

At the conclusion of these operations Izzet Pasha hopes to divert his attention to the country lying south of Hodeidah inhabited by the Zereneek clans, who have been again defying Ottoman authority, owing to the preoccupations of the local administration elsewhere.

An expedition will probably be dispatched to their territory under Colonel Riza Bey, with the object of bringing about the complete subjugation of these truculent tribesmen.

I learn from a reliable source that on Izzet Pasha's departure from the Yemen, Mahommed Nedim Bey, one of the deputies for Hodeidah and a former adjoint of the Governor-General of this province, will be appointed vali of the Sana'a vilayet, and General Seyyid Pasha commander of the local army corps.

It might be of interest to mention that the administrative officials in this vilayet, civil and military, are by no means as capable as most of the officers employed during the Hamidian régime. Hodeidah affords an excellent example where the present mutessarif, Ibrahim Pasha, a weak and inexperienced officer, is perhaps more incompetent than any of his predecessors during the past decade.

In deference to the wishes of the Imam, the local administration have recently abolished certain octroi dues at Sana'a known as "ridadyia," being brokerage levied on the sale of produce coming in from the adjacent districts.

Steady progress is being made in the construction of the proposed railway from Hodeidah to Hujjeila at the foot of the Harraz range of mountains, and also of the new harbour at Ras-el-Kotib to the north of Hodeidah.

It is expected that these works, for which a French syndicate have secured the concession, will be completed before the autumn of 1912.

The Government have not as yet decided on the course to be taken in its

prolongation to Sana'a and Amran. They are in favour of a route going to the south of Hodeidah viâ Beit-el-Fakih and Zebeed, and ascending east by the Wadi Zebeed in the vicinity of Taiz and Damar, and thence to Sana'a and Amran.

A party of French engineers sent out by the syndicate referred to is at present engaged in a survey of the proposed route, and is studying the question.

Trade in general is fairly brisk in Hodeidah and other places for the season of the year.

The revenues of the Hodeidah customs show a marked increase since the beginning of this year, due to the presence of a big military force in this country. Increased activity and more efficient surveillance of the coast by Ottoman gun-boats have to some extent contributed to the above cause by checking contraband traffic.

There have been good rains throughout the vilayet, both in the Tehema and in the mountains, although the rainfall in Sana'a itself is below the average.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[42639] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 747.)

Sir, *Therapia, October 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 285 of to-day's date and to your telegram No. 391 of the 20th instant, I spoke to Assim Bey yesterday again on the subject of a possible understanding as regards the neutralisation of the Red Sea. He appeared to resent very much the mere mention by the Italian Government of the question of the use of the Hedjas Railway, with which that Government had no right or power to interfere. His view seemed to be that the Turkish Government would gain nothing whatever by agreeing to the suggestions put forward, and implied that as the present state of affairs constituted an inconvenience to the commerce of the world, the Powers might perhaps bring some influence to bear on Italy in the direction desired by Turkey.

Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, to whom I also spoke on the subject, said that the use of the Hedjas Railway was of no advantage to Turkey for her military operations in the Yemen and Assyr, for its terminus was twelve days' journey from Jeddah, and they never had and never could send troops viâ Medina to the scene of operations. It was essential for this country to be able to repatriate her troops, sorely tried by illness, and he had hoped that humanitarian instincts would have pleaded in favour of some arrangement to this end, but his Excellency added that it was also necessary to bring back time-expired men, and to replace these and the sick by fresh men. Turkey would have been disposed to enter into an engagement under no conditions to make any attack on Italian possessions in the Red Sea, and such an engagement could be given to England, and should be sufficient for Italy. There seemed, therefore, no reason why Italy should put obstacles in the way of an arrangement which merely facilitated the repression of a rebellion in Turkish Arabia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[42640] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 748.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reporting excitement at Jaffa, but not such as to necessitate dispatch of man-of-war.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 70.)

Sir, *Jerusalem, October 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last three or four days the population of Jaffa has been showing signs of excitement and apprehension owing to the circulation of rumours that the Moslem element had decided to rise and massacre the Christians.

On the 12th instant three persons called on the acting British vice-consul, and informed him that the rising was fixed for the following day, being Friday. Similar information was also given to the other foreign consuls. The German and Russian vice-consuls thought the situation such as to justify their telegraphing to their respective embassies that the presence of a war-ship was urgently necessary.

Mr. Fiani called upon the kaimakam and drew his attention to the situation. He received assurances that the authorities had sufficient force at their disposal to maintain order, and that they would do so. The chief of police gave similar assurances, and added that a proposed demonstration to be held the following day to collect funds for the "Red Crescent" had been forbidden.

I have to-day received a letter from Jaffa stating that nothing happened yesterday, except that a small demonstration was made by a band of about 100 so-called Afghans, who marched to the barracks and offered their services as volunteers in the war. The military authorities thanked them, took down their names and dismissed them.

Such danger as there may have been therefore seems to have passed. It is, of course, impossible to foresee absolutely what may happen in a place like Jaffa, where, in addition to the usual disorderly and turbulent element to be found in a sea-port, there are also a number of doubtful characters, Algerians, Afghans, and the like, employed as watchmen in the orange-gardens, and where the non-Moslem population, which includes many Jews, is nervous and timid. On the other hand, the local authorities seem sincerely determined to maintain order. The military commandant of Jerusalem is at present at Jaffa.

I should add that Moslem notables of Jaffa approached the kaimakam with the demand that he should not allow the honour of the Moslems to be sullied by the misconduct of the rabble; and that they also sent assurances to the Russian consulate that they would themselves defend the Christians in case of trouble.

Under the circumstances I do not think that the presence of a war-ship is necessary, although the visit of one would naturally tend to produce a feeling of confidence.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[42641] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 749.)

Sir, *Therapia, October 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 385 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a somewhat garbled further telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting that the agreement with the Imam Yahya has been confirmed, and that the Imam has offered the services of 100,000 Arabs for the Turco-Italian war.

Dr. Richardson adds that the Turkish troops under the command of Mahomet Ali Pasha evacuated Jeezan a fortnight ago, fearing an attack by Italian warships, and proceeded to Firs and Confudah. Seyyid Idris seized the opportunity to occupy Jeezan, which he is about to fortify.

A fanatical spirit still pervades Hodeidah according to Dr. Richardson's report, but quiet reigns in the interior in spite of the general excitement which prevails.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[42645] No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 753.)

Sir, *Therapia, October 22, 1911.*

I SPOKE to-day to Assim Bey and to the Minister of War on the subject of the recent dispatch of some 500 men to the island of Samos, and, while pointing out that this was in contravention of the statute governing that island, which was guaranteed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, there appeared also to be a disposition to leave them there permanently, as barracks were about to be built there. There seemed to be no likelihood of Italy attacking that island.

Assim Bey said he would enquire into the matter, of which he knew nothing. The Minister of War was more communicative, and said that, although he had sent a small detachment of men to most of the Turkish islands in those waters, in the possible eventuality of an Italian attack, which, however, they would be unable to resist, these 500 men had been sent to Samos to check a possible rising in the island itself against the governor, as the rebellious spirits there might perhaps consider this a good opportunity to make trouble. He did not, however, volunteer any suggestions that they would be withdrawn at the close of the war, and he pointed out that, while the statute decreed that there should be no troops, it would be a serious matter if a rising took place with which they had no means of coping. He admitted that barracks were to be built, for it was impossible to continue the present system of having the men scattered about the island in small detachments.

The French Ambassador spoke to Assim Bey on this subject and received a similar reply.

It will no doubt be impossible to urge on the Sublime Porte a strict adherence to the statute governing Samos as long as the war lasts, but the matter will require attention at its close.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[42901] No. 58.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, October 30, 1911.*

NEUTRALITY of Red Sea.

My immediately preceding telegram.

I am informed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish proposals on the subject are considered most dangerous by the Ministers of Marine and War, who give as one of their principal objections that they would facilitate the passage of Turkish officers to Cyrenaica through Egypt, alleging that Italy is exposed to the most serious danger from these officers. It is thus the view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, with due regard to her friendly feelings towards Great Britain, Italy must make use of all the means in her power in order to force Turkey to sue for peace.

(Very Confidential.)

A secret report has been addressed to the President of the Council by the Minister of Marine protesting against the action of the Egyptian authorities in allowing Bedouins and Turkish officers to cross the frontier into Cyrenaica and Tripoli, where arms are supplied to them for the purpose of fighting against Italy. I have been furnished privately and very confidentially with a copy of this memorandum, which is couched in strong terms, and I am sending home a copy by the bag. I am further informed by Minister for Foreign Affairs that he learns from Italian consul at Alexandria that six Turkish officers have left by Mariut Railway, and that a force of Bedouins is concentrating near the frontier of Cyrenaica; further, that the purchase of provisions and their dispatch to Cyrenaica by Egyptian caravan routes has been decided on by the Egyptian Nationalists.

[40988] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 404.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 31, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

Please avail yourself of the first favourable opportunity which occurs for urging the Turkish Government to settle outstanding claims.

Refer to Lorimer's despatches of 17th July and 14th August, addressed to you.

[43082] No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 296.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 31, 1911.*

RED SEA.

Please refer to your telegram No. 402 of yesterday. X

All knowledge of the condition as to denouncing agreement, which Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rome says he has submitted, is denied by Sublime Porte.

It seems difficult to understand how this point has been put forward, as Porte affirms that this matter has been treated by no other Power here.

As regards the situation in Yemen, there is no indication here that it is serious. As you will see from my despatch No. 742 of the 21st October, the contrary appears to be the case.

[43249] No. 61.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 1, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

Please refer to your telegram No. 401 of 31st October.

Categorical promises of payment to me here of compensation for demolitions have been given me during last fortnight by Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Favourable consideration has been promised with regard to ice factory claim, which I also pressed.

Please refer to my despatch No. 647 of 22nd September for question of legalisation of certificates of registration.

I have not heard of any further difficulties from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, who was informed of instruction on 27th September.

[43082] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 405.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 1, 1911.*

NEUTRALISATION of Red Sea.

You should inform Porte that Italian Government has been urged by us to accept the conditions formulated by Porte just as we urged acceptance by Porte of Italian conditions, and that only object is commercial security.

The Italian Government refuse, however, to agree to any neutralisation of the Red Sea, which would still permit the transport of Turkish troops to the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. They have agreed, however, to restore their lights. You should, in these circumstances, strongly urge the Porte to relight at least the light at Abu Ail (which is considered the most important by the Board of Trade), and if possible also the lights at Zebayer, Mocha, and Gebil Tir. You should inform Porte of Italian reply.

Reference is to your telegram No. 296, dated the 31st October, 1911.

X Repeating No 52

[40988] No. 63.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 3, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant relative to the aggressive attitude of the Turkish local authorities at Bagdad.

Sir E. Grey notes from the final paragraph of your letter that the Earl of Crewe is of opinion that any further representation to be made to the Turkish Government should be presented in such a form as to ensure its acceptance, or not presented at all, and that, in the latter case, the question of taking active measures in the Persian Gulf to vindicate our position will have to be seriously considered.

Sir E. Grey is fully sensible of the gravity of the present situation, and of the importance of obtaining satisfaction from the Turkish Government of the various British claims which have resulted from their aggressive and unjustifiable proceedings, but he considers that at the present juncture it would be unwise policy to present anything in the nature of an ultimatum to the Porte.

He does not therefore feel able to do more at present than instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to take the first favourable opportunity of urging very strongly upon the Porte a settlement of the claims in question, and a telegram, of which a copy is enclosed,* has been sent to Sir G. Lowther in this sense. In the meanwhile he would be glad to learn what are the steps that Lord Crewe would propose to take for the vindication of the position of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf in the event of non-compliance on the part of the Porte with the demands of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[43717] No. 64.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 757.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting the political state of the country through which he passed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Van, October 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency a report on the political state of the country through which I passed during my recent journey.

The principal towns I passed through were Vostan, Mush, Kighi, Peri, Erzingan, Chemishgezek, Khozat, and Kharput.

In almost all the districts where Armenians were to be found the still unsettled land question was a source of much complaint and bad relations between Armenians and Kurds. The authorities may have hoped that a policy of inaction would result in the Armenians being reduced to a state of hopelessness such that they would be content to accept as permanent the present state of affairs. However, on the contrary, the question is much more acute than it was last year, and it is quite time the authorities took the matter into serious consideration and settled it definitely. The Armenians are steadily acquiring arms and ammunition, and their being driven to desperation might lead to serious trouble.

It is ridiculous to tell the Armenians to have recourse to the law courts for establishing their claims. There are very few cases which can be settled other than administratively. A large number of the difficulties are due to the carelessness or

* Not printed.

incapacity of the Government officials in drawing up the "tapous" in the first instance. There are cases where the land dealt with by two "tapous" overlaps, so that a portion of land is common to both. Then, again, in cases where Armenians have been compelled by massacres to desert their villages and have returned after the time limit, when by law they forfeit the right to their property, no claim in the law courts could be successful, as the courts do not take cognisance of the causes which obliged the Armenians to quit their homes. It was said that the recent tour of Djavid Bey in these parts was made partly with the object of studying the land question. If this was a fact he took no pains to become acquainted with the Armenian point of view, as no single Armenian was invited to give any information on the subject.

The whole question was much aggravated by the imprudent remarks of Mushir Osman Pasha to the Armenians of Haskeui (near Mush), which were reported in every Armenian newspaper in the Empire. In a conversation with Osman Pasha I received his account of what he had said to the Armenians of Haskeui. In the first instance, he was much irritated by the incivility of the inhabitants of the village in not meeting his requirements of forage, &c. (My experience of Armenian villages leads me to believe that this at any rate is true.) Then, much against his will, he consented to receive some Armenian priests. In replying to some of their questions he was led to draw a comparison between the conduct of the Armenians of the Mush plain and the Kurds. He pointed out to them, and with considerable truth, that the Kurds had never risen in revolt against the Government, whereas they, the Armenians (they are all ex-fedais in this village), after rising in arms, fled to Russia to escape the consequences of their acts, and when on their return they find Kurds in occupation of their lands they proceed to cry out loudly for their restoration.

Vostan.—Dependent on this kaimakamlek is a large nahié of some 150 villages called Kachigan. Here on my return journey I found the Armenians in a state of considerable alarm. Three Armenians from different villages had recently been murdered by Kurds. One of these Armenians had been kidnapped and a ransom of 5*l.* demanded. This sum not being forthcoming he was killed. Another case was due to an Armenian having had the audacity of competing with certain Kurds for the purchase of the tithes. At the auction the tithes fell to the Armenian. The Kurds could not stand this indignity, and so killed him. In justice to the Kurds, it must be said that they had proposed to the Armenian their buying them jointly, but the Armenian, who had no other object in view except to show the Kurds that he was as good as they were, declined the proposition. The Armenians of this nahié are entirely under the thumb of the agents of the Taschnak Committee.

Mush can probably be said to possess the most corrupt, anti-constitutional, and fanatic administration in Asia Minor. Your Excellency will have been informed of the assassination of eight Armenians in this neighbourhood about three months ago, and on the day of my leaving Mush, on my return journey, a Kurd killed an Armenian in a field by the roadside only a few miles from the town. This murder was said to be due to a dispute about land, though the immediate pretext was a trivial matter. The Armenians say openly that a constitution does not exist, and that they will never fraternise with the Turks. It is a fact that the tribunals are completely under the influence of the local aghas, and that while this condition continues the Armenians can have no hope of ever obtaining justice.

In the mountains of Sassoun an ancient custom survives whereby the Kurd chiefs claim annually from the Armenians a species of tax, called "khafirlik." This right the Armenians have now commenced to repudiate. The Kurd chiefs and aghas have replied by making application to the tribunals (on the counsel of the members of the latter) that the lands of the Armenians be given over to them on the grounds that this "khafirlik" is none other than a sign of vassalage of these Armenians.

(The right of "khafirlik" implied the obligation of each Armenian house to give annually to the Kurd chief of the village 180 kilog. of corn, one sheep, one batman of butter, two pairs of shoes, two pairs of socks, &c. Besides this the entire household was obliged to give twenty to forty days' labour for cutting wood, &c., for the winter. Whenever his agha has a child, the Armenians must offer him a lamb if it be a boy and some chickens if it be merely a girl.)

Kighi is a kaza dependent on the vilayet of Erzeroum. The inhabitants comprise four elements: Turks, Kurds, Kezelbash Kurds, and Armenians. The latter form the great majority, and reside mostly in the town. Here the various races live together in perfect harmony. There were one or two cases of dispute between Raya Kurds and Kurd aghas, in which the former claimed lands from the aghas. The Armenians attribute their immunity from persecution to the fact of their being well armed.

Peri, or Charsanjak.—No Kurds inhabit this kaza. The population numbers 22,000, of which 13,000 are Moslems and the remainder Armenians. Turco-Armenian relations in this kaza are very much strained owing to a land dispute, which, however, differs entirely in its nature to similar disputes between Kurds and Armenians.

The Armenian villages here are owned by a number of beys. In each village there is a house where the bey comes to reside in summer to supervise the gathering in of the harvest, &c. For centuries the Armenians have dwelt in these villages in a state of serfdom. Thus, they had no right of ownership to a single field or even to the houses which they inhabited and which they had built with their own hands on the estates of the beys. Since the constitution the Armenians have claimed the ownership of their houses and gardens, and latterly, profiting by disputes among the beys themselves, have commenced to urge their claims with renewed vigour and sent many telegrams and petitions to Constantinople. The Armenian claim is that forty years ago, after the creation of the system of "tapous," a special commission arrived at Peri and accorded to the Armenians by Imperial firman certain fields and gardens, but that the Hamidian régime supervening the firman in question was never put into execution. The beys, on the other hand, replied to the claim of the Armenians by refusing to allow them to sow the fields this year and by endeavouring to drive them altogether out of the kaimakamlek.

The Armenians have now presented a petition to the Russian consul-general at Erzeroum, stating that they wish to join the Orthodox Church, and hoping thereby to obtain Russian support in their demands. Up to the present the Government have prohibited the eviction of the Armenians by the beys, but otherwise have taken no steps to settle the question.

Kharput is somewhat in advance of Van in matters of trade and agriculture, which is partly due to its superior educational facilities, thanks to the numerous foreign missions established there, and partly to its superior road communications. The fact also that its Armenian inhabitants do not cherish revolutionary ideas also greatly aids progress.

Many of the villagers of this vilayet have in past years emigrated to America and Canada. These are now returning, and have for the most part made considerable pecuniary profit. They now complain much of the absence of modern agricultural methods in the country. I suggested that, since there were many who had now acquired the necessary knowledge and possessed the necessary funds, it rested with them to introduce the necessary modern implements or machinery. However, they said that they had no confidence in the stability of this régime and were afraid to risk their money. This I understood to be the reply to a remark of a Government official some time previously, to the effect that the inhabitants of this country looked to two sources only for everything: first, Allah; second, Hukumet. My general impression as regards public opinion on the results achieved by the constitution is that the Armenians are immensely disappointed and the Kurds disgusted. The Government officials, whatever be their private views, are naturally satisfied with drawing larger salaries than formerly in addition to augmentations by the ancient time-honoured methods. Well-educated Armenians in places like Erzingan, where they have no cause of quarrel with the Moslems, have told me that they (Ottomans) have shown their absolute incapacity to govern, and that they would welcome the reins of government falling into the hands of any European Power.

From what I have seen in the parts of the country I have visited I have become more convinced than ever of the baneful influence of the Taschnak Committee on the welfare of the Armenians, and generally of this part of Turkey. It is impossible to overlook the fact that in all places where there are no Armenian political organisations, or where such organisations are imperfectly developed, the Armenians live in comparative harmony with the Turks and Kurds. This is not to be explained by the supposition that the Armenians, unless instigated by the committee leaders, are content to endure quietly any injustice of oppression, but is due to the fact that the Turks and Turkish officials are not excited against the Armenians by intrigues, imaginary or otherwise, of the Taschnak Committee leaders. In this vilayet the committee agents are very active, and have under their influence a great number of villages. The result is that whenever the Armenians submit a grievance the authorities invariably attribute it to the intrigues of these agents, who have terrorised the villagers and forced them to complain. The Armenian villagers thus suffer.

They also suffer directly at the hands of the agents. The latter are now engaged in enriching themselves at the expense of the villagers. They buy rifles at, say, 10*l.* and force the villagers to buy from them at 20*l.* It is evident that for the prosecution

of this nefarious trade the Armenians should be kept in a certain amount of alarm, either well founded or not. I do not think that they carry their terrorism to the extent that they did formerly—that is, murder those of their countrymen who do not carry out their orders, but the Turkish authorities still think so, or like to think so. The Mudir of Kachigan met a recent complaint of an Armenian having been murdered by a Kurd with the reply: "You have murdered him yourself."

A large number of fedai have now crossed the border nominally to assist the Persian constitutional party. It is to be hoped in the interests of this country that circumstances will not permit them to return.

I have, &c.
MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[43726] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 766.)
Sir, *Pera, October 31, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in reply to the question which you directed me to put to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad in your despatch No. 272 of the 13th instant regarding the increased value of land in that city, I have now received a telegram from Mr. Lorimer in which he states that the rise in value of non-movable property at Bagdad has no connection with the action of the local authorities last year in widening the streets. The principal cause of this increase, which began about ten years ago, and has been especially noticeable during the past five years, Mr. Lorimer considers to be the fall in the rate of interest in investments other than non-movable property and the growth of commercial prosperity, more especially in the Jewish community.

In the meantime I have received both from the Grand Vizier and from the Minister for Foreign Affairs verbal assurances that our claims on this account will be paid here.

I shall not fail to inform you immediately if these promises are carried out.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[43727] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 767.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 31, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting on the situation created in that town by the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 61. Confidential.)
Sir, *Beirout, October 10, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams of the 5th, 7th, and 8th instant on the situation at Beirout caused by the sudden outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Italy.

Owing to the indifferent postal communications and the absence of a daily bulletin of telegrams, the first news of Italy's declaration of war caused great consternation, which developed into bitter feelings against that country, not unmixed with resentment against the other European Powers, especially Germany, for allowing the occupation of Tripoli.

The publication of the manifesto of the Committee of Union and Progress,

enjoining confidence in the Government's intentions to resist encroachments on Ottoman territory and recommending a calm attitude, had a good effect, as also the appointment of Said Pasha as Grand Vizier and the rumoured acceptance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Kiamil Pasha, who enjoys more confidence on the part of Syrians than perhaps any other Ottoman statesman.

The Committee of Union and Progress held one or two public meetings, at which patriotic speeches suitable to the occasion were pronounced, but there was little enthusiasm shown and no excitement. The population evidently is inclined to accept the situation, for which it blames the past bad Governments, but it is willing to help by contributions, more or less forced, towards a special war fund.

On the 5th instant the "Al-Boulagh," the recently founded organ at Beirout of the "Mussulman League," published a most violent article against Italy, which is characteristically described as the champion of the Papacy (*sic*), and against the European Powers in general. It calls on Mussulmans to unfurl the holy standard and wage war on Christians.

A translation of portions of this article is enclosed herewith in case your Excellency should see fit to call the attention of the Turkish Government to its virulent character, with a view to measures being taken to prevent a repetition, which would but cause trouble, especially if, as appears likely, other Moslem newspapers follow suit. Their tone, hitherto calm, has certainly become more bellicose during the last few days.

I am inclined to think that the editor of the "Al-Boulagh" and his financial supporters are more likely to have been animated by a desire to bring trouble and discredit on the constitutional régime than by a real patriotic wish to save Tripoli from the hands of the foreigner. I hear to-day that the acting Governor-General called the attention of the procureur général to the article in question, and that proceedings have been instituted against the responsible editor for publishing such inflammatory matter, and his paper suspended.

On the other hand, it is my impression that, whatever may be the disposition of Moslems in other parts of the Empire, the Arab Moslems of Beirout are not so keen upon sacrificing their lives and their fortunes on a war which they know must end disastrously for them and their country.

In Mount Lebanon the news has been received very calmly, and, at most, probably only revived speculations among many Lebanese as to when their turn would come to be placed under some European administration.

A week ago orders were received for calling out the redifs of the first four bans (*i.e.*, men of the 1319, 1320, 1321, and 1322 classes) of the Beirout district, and among other military precautions, the 2nd battalion of the 14th Nizam regiment was brought from Damascus on the 6th instant to reinforce the garrison at Beirout, a similar force being expected at Haifa too.

The town is being patrolled by soldiers in order to prevent any anti-foreign demonstration, especially against Italian subjects, who still remain here, though they have closed their offices and shops for fear of molestation, and in expectation of being expelled.

I have been given to understand by my French colleague, that the presence of the French war-ship "Ernest-Renan" is for the protection of French interests and of Christians in general.

Notwithstanding all these precautions for their welfare, Christians are leaving in great numbers by every mail-boat, and a good number of Moslems are departing, too, in order to avoid service with the reserves now being called out.

Another important measure on the part of the Ottoman Government, is the embargo laid on all coal, patent fuel, and other articles connected with military transport facilities, whether belonging to foreigners or natives. The three principal coal depôts at Beirout belong to a French citizen, a French protected person, and a British protected person (honorary dragoman of this consulate-general). The effect of this embargo is that no foreign ship of war or merchant-vessel will be able to obtain coal or patent fuel here. I enclose herewith a copy of the official notice as communicated to the press with translation.

The uncomfortable feeling created by the absence of authentic news, either official or private, leads to the circulation of all sorts of unfounded rumours, which do not tend to improve the situation, and your Excellency's kind compliance with my request for news of any important occurrence at Constantinople, or at the seat of war, enables me to allay public uneasiness both in official and public circles without necessarily divulging the source of my information.

General Hushim Pasha, commanding the Beirout (or Haifa) division of the 8th army corps, is in charge as acting vali, and under the circumstances it is perhaps preferable to the duties being performed by a civilian.

General Sami Pasha has also arrived here from the Hauran, and is laid up at the military hospital.

In accordance with your Excellency's instructions, I telegraphed to the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet on the 8th instant, giving him all the military information to date, including the embargo on coal, &c., and I will keep him informed of any further important movements.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

P.S. *October* 11. According to notices published in the local papers yesterday, the embargo on coal, &c., has been withdrawn.

H. A. C.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Extract from "Al-Boulagh" of October 5, 1911.

(Translation.)

To the holy war for the cause of God. War between the Khalifate and the Papal [*sic*] Government.

"RISE altogether and declare the holy war with your properties and lives, for the sake of God. This is better for you if you know!" (Verse from the "Koran.")

"Swearing by God and the Apostles that the enemies will not stand before his revengeful sword."

Their adversaries have never ceased to prepare intrigues against the Moslems. They and we have got tired of this secret enmity, of this false policy which is cloaked by false friendship and by pretended humanity. They encourage the Italian power, which is the power of the Pope, who is the greatest religious chief of the Christians, to surprise unjustly the greatest Moslem power of the Khalifate to occupy the province of Tripoli of Africa, which is a purely Moslem country, and of which the inhabitants sacrifice everything for their religion and their blood in defence of their holy country.

The power of the Pope betrayed the power of the Khalifate for no other reason than ambition and hatred toward the Moslems . . . . .

The adversaries, *i.e.*, the powers of the Cross, since they felt themselves strong and influential, entertained the idea of exterminating the Moslems out of this world, sometimes by promises or threats, at other times by war or by deceit and treachery.

Their delegates, *i.e.*, the missionaries, have never ceased to sow poisonous intrigues among the Moslems, with the view of pushing them to extremities, and the consequence will be a tremendous uprising at which earth and heaven will tremble.

The missionaries of the West say: "We will continue to work until the Cross beats the Crescent. . . . ."

The Europeans, *i.e.*, the adherents of the Cross in other words, desire to exterminate the Moslems by their frequent aggressions and their pressure. Can Moslems stand by and look on coldly at this extermination?

The western missionaries are the heroes of this national tragedy now represented on the scene of the world, and they have no other care than that of blowing out the light of God by their mouths. God will keep up his light in spite of the impious.

Yes, the religion will not disappear, and the Moslems will not be exterminated, as long as the "Koran" is read amongst us, and in it are verses of encouragement for the holy war, for the sake of God, and for death in defence of the country.

We have no doubt that all Moslems have felt very deeply this misfortune which has befallen so heavily on the great Khalifate, and they are waiting for a call from the Khalif to march, sacrificing their lives, their properties, and their children, starting a dreadful war which will spread ruin over the world.

Yes, in times of great calamity the Prince of the Faithful has only to look out of the window of his great palace and cry out with a loud voice which will ring over the whole world, saying: "My Moslem children, the Khalifate is in danger, the Khalifate is in danger." Four hundred millions will run to him with hearts full of love and

faith, zeal and courage. Those who believe in God and the last day need no persuasion to fight for the cause of God, and to sacrifice their lives and properties, and God protects them. But those who need persuasion are the unbelievers who have doubts in their hearts.

Yes, one single word uttered at this time by the Khalif will be enough to make Moslems answer as follows: "Prince of the Faithful, we are ready to obey," and then the surface of the earth will completely change.

We advise the Western Powers not to coerce us into soliciting from the Khalif the unfurling of that great standard which flies over 400,000,000 who disdain life in the cause of glory and victory. God has bought the souls and properties of the Moslems for Paradise, and they will fight for the cause of God till victory or death. Do not call dead those who are killed in the cause of God; they are alive, though they do not feel it.

That is all we now say, believing that the Government of the Khalifate is in a position to repulse the evil intentions of the aggressors. But she needs money, which is the strong shield which protects from harm and humiliation. And we cannot imagine there is one Moslem in whose heart there is a grain of faith who will not sacrifice his life and property in the defence of the greatest Moslem power, which is the power of the Khalifate and religion.

Translation of a paragraph from another Article in "Al Boulagh" of the same date.

The whole nation believes that the Italians are pushed to war by crusading hands, which intend to present anew a time which reminds us of those barbarous days; and we do not know what will be the result—death or life, happiness or misfortune. What we see through the current events is that the Moslem nation will either die or live in this great calamity.

Enclosure 3 in No. 66.

Minister of Interior to Governor-General Cumberbatch, Beirout.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *September* 16 (29), 1911.

AS we are now in a state of war with Italy, all coal, fuel, oil used for machinery, and all war transport necessaries belonging either to Ottoman or to foreign subjects will be taken in case of necessity to our fleet.

In consequence we have decided from to-day's date upon the prohibition of the sale of the above goods to others, and you are requested to inform all those whom it may concern of this decision in conformity with the usual formalities.

[43729] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 769.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, respecting the effect of the war on public opinion at Erzeroum and in the Bitlis Vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, October* 19, 1911.

AS sensational rumours to the effect that large bodies of Russian troops are being massed on the frontier of this province have lately been current among the population here, I availed myself of a recent opportunity to enquire of the vali whether he had any reason to credit these reports which I understood had emanated from a high military quarter. In reply, his Excellency denied absolutely having received any disquieting

information and added that there was all the less ground for anxiety as the Government hoped for a speedy settlement of the Tripolitan question by diplomatic means.

The vali's statement regarding the absence of abnormal military activity in the Caucasus is borne out by the Russian consulate-general here, and there is no indication of any corresponding movement of troops on the Turkish side.

The public of Erzeroum is being fed with war news in the shape of palpably distorted "telegrams" which are eagerly bought up and discussed by all classes, and it is generally considered that Tripoli is lost to Turkey, all interest now being centred on the possible effects of the struggle on the stability of Turkish dominion elsewhere. It is, therefore, but natural that the eventuality of a Russian occupation of these provinces should be uppermost in the minds of the people here, and it may be said that, with the exception of the higher officials, the members of the committee, and the Tashnakists, the prospect arouses neither aversion nor anxiety, while the distress of the official caste is patent. The lower class Moslems, among whom threatening anti-Armenian symptoms were lately discernable, now content themselves with declaring that, had Abdul Hamid still occupied the Throne Turkey would have been spared her present humiliation, and it is commonly remarked that the annexation of Tripoli will be no great misfortune seeing that the inhabitants will continue to live in their "vatan" (motherland), and will (so think the coffee-house politicians) have fewer taxes to pay, besides being rid of the incubus of an incompetent and atheistical bureaucracy.

As far as I have been able to ascertain, depression prevails among the army officers, who say that the only hope for Turkey is a quarrel among the European Powers. They are almost convinced that Germany is at the bottom of the mischief and it is recognised that by their attitude during the last few years, the Government have forfeited all right to trust to Great Britain for support.

As for the Armenians, they are, as your Excellency is aware, irrevocably alienated from the Turks, and, despite the aversion from all discipline which seems to characterise the present generation of Armenians, they have learned to appreciate the solid advantage enjoyed by their race in the Caucasus.

I should add that there is no symptom of anti-foreign feeling observable here at present.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, October* 23, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the effect produced on the public mind in that province by the outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 67.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Bitlis, October* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that there is little change in the conditions prevailing in this vilayet, as described in my despatches Nos. 25 and 26 of the 23rd and 25th September respectively.

In consequence of the unexpected war with Italy, the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress made an appeal to all chiefs and leaders throughout this province, enjoining upon them to keep quiet and order while the Empire was traversing a most dangerous crisis, and thus to contribute to the rallying of the Empire's forces against the enemy.

Owing either to this patriotic appeal, or to the fear of an alleged Russian invasion, the turbulent Kurds have been rather keeping quiet, though the insecurity is as prevalent as before, and the authority of the Government is as weak and crippled as ever.

In the course of the last fortnight, three Armenians and one Kurd have been killed, mostly on political grounds. One Armenian, Leon of Urtab, five hours from here, was killed near the village by his enemy Ismail, an old robber. The Armenian, Kuren, was strangled in his field of millet in Mistra, village in Khizan, by Kurdish nomads of Adian tribe, for having driven out the cattle of the latter from his field. The authorities did not even send some Zaptiehs for holding an enquiry. The Armenian Nado, of Ushud, in Khuyt, was killed by Kurds after being stripped of his money.

The Kurd Bader, of Aghpenis, in the Mush Plain, was killed by the band formed by the notorious Musa Boy, near Mush. Only an innocent Kurd has been arrested for the murder.

There may be some other murders in Sairt, where, it is understood, a pitiable state of things has been prevailing during the last two months.

Robberies of cattle and other thefts on a small scale, on the part of the Kurds, have been reported from every corner of the province. I humbly venture to assert that the Government exists only in name; the prospect, however, of a foreign invasion, in case of serious disturbances occurring here under present circumstances, is apparently being utilised by some committee leaders to curb the lawlessness of the Kurds.

About seventy Kurdish prisoners, arrested in connection with the murder of the eight Armenians of Taghavank in Khuyt, at the beginning of June last, were acquitted a few days ago. As stated in my previous reports, most of these were arrested by the vali on account of other charges. There remain only three notorious criminals, including Haji Amaré, who were directly responsible for the above-mentioned murders.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[43730] No. 68

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 770.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Aleppo submitting notes upon general affairs in Aleppo district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Acting Consul Young to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Aleppo, October 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following notes on affairs in this district during the past four months:—

1. *Baron Oppenheim.*—Baron Oppenheim left Aleppo with a caravan of over 100 animals towards the end of May, moving east, and as he almost immediately left this district the Aleppo consulate had no further official concern with his movements. But on the 7th August the Russian consul stated that he had good information to the effect that the Baron was trying to buy land "for purposes of colonisation," and, in this connection but with all reserve, the following extracts from private letters addressed to myself may be of interest:—

"As regards Baron Max Oppenheim we are able to give you a little information. He has visited Mardin, where he remained a month or so securing timber for houses and workmen to dig at Tel Helaf, which is about three-quarters of an hour north-west of Ras-el-Ain. He has already uncovered considerable findings at that mound. He is putting up a 'dobe' house for himself and his staff, and he expects to be about two years in completing his task. I think he also contemplates establishing there an experiment station for analysing the various soils in that region, and testing the cultivation of different varieties of cereals, cotton, and other marketable products which will be in demand, and furnish freight for the Bagdad Railway. Such a programme will require two years, at the least calculation, to make the results satisfactory. But whether the object of all this is to get the natives to enter upon the extension and improvement of their agricultural pursuits, with improved agricultural implements

made in Germany, or whether the purpose of it all is to see if it would be worth while to have a German colony of agriculturalists settled on the banks of the Khabur for the development of the country and in the interests of the Bagdad Railway, I am not able to say, but I have an opinion that the latter is more probable than the former. Of course, what I may write to you about the Baron and his movements now or later will be of the same nature as the communications I used to make to you at Diarbekir—to do with as your judgment shall dictate."

Another correspondent describes the construction by the Baron of a house containing thirty-one rooms, and mentions that, when complaints were made to Constantinople of his entering certain mosques, &c., word came back that he was to be allowed to do as he liked.

2. *Coronation.*—The Coronation was celebrated with a ball at the consulate for the British colony, the local authorities (civil and military), the consular corps, and the leading native families, about 170 persons being present. By courtesy of the commandant, Muzaffer Pasha, forty selected musicians from the Aleppo division performed in the courtyard during the evening. The approaches were kept by police and gendarmerie. The gardens were illuminated.

3. *Bagdad Railway.*—The work is being pushed on with vigour; a special train runs constantly between Tripoli and Aleppo with material. There are understood to be now over 200 Germans on the register of the consulate. A German school is being opened and a hospital, for which some nurses have already arrived. The best hotels in the town are full of German engineers and commercial travellers. A house and garden belonging to a Levantine English family (Barker) has been recently leased from them and converted into a German "casino."

Meissner Pasha, on his return from Bagdad, spent a few weeks in Aleppo, and has since gone to Constantinople. He is expected to return here before definitely taking his departure for Bagdad for the winter.

4. *Navigation of Euphrates.*—The resident of Bagdad has reported the apparent failure of Nazim Pasha's "fantastic scheme" of employing motor-boats for regular service on the Euphrates. It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Lorimer is of opinion that all such schemes on the Euphrates are likely to end similarly owing to physical difficulties, or whether Nazim Pasha's ill-success is not rather due to the circumstances of these particular boats having been rashly ordered out from England by natives who were too ignorant or careless to realise and describe to the builders the conditions of navigation for which they were required?

At the moment of writing (24th October) a much larger boat, constructed by Messrs. Boyes, Shilston, of Cairo, is undergoing her trials at Meskene. She is intended by the native syndicate, to whose order she was built, to transport merchandise, rather than passengers, between Meskene and Felugia.

An experiment which, so far as I am aware, has not yet been tried is that of a powerful tug to take "chelkturs," or other flat-bottomed craft, in tow. I am inclined to think something of this kind might prove more feasible than either motor-boats or steamers.

5. *Prospecting.*—Messrs. Holmes and Sons of the "Syrian Exploration Syndicate" have paid several visits to the Aleppo district during the summer and have found sufficiently encouraging indications to induce them to apply for concessions.

6. *Aleppo Boil.*—Kenyon, of the London School of Tropical Medicine, spent July, August, and part of September here studying the Aleppo Boil. The results of his investigations are likely to be published.

7. *Sir J. Maxwell.*—Major-General Sir J. Maxwell, commanding the troops in Egypt, paid a sort of semi-private visit to Aleppo from 7th to 11th September.

8. *Jerablus.*—It is understood that the operations of Dr. Hogar's archæological mission will be resumed at Jerablus in the autumn.

9. *Professor Garstang.*—Professor Garstang's visit to the borders of the Adana and Aleppo vilayets is referred to in No. 29 of the 12th instant. On general grounds it seems a pity that the professor's movements, as indeed those of any English traveller, should have been, though probably by accident, at first shrouded in mystery.

10. *Sadun Pasha.*—Sadun Pasha, who, as reported by His Majesty's resident at Bagdad, the 4th September, was sent under an escort to Aleppo, duly arrived, and is being detained awaiting his trial, which it is understood will take place here.

11. *Change of Valis.*—As reported by telegraph, Hussein Kiazim Bey, who was appointed Vali of Aleppo in September of last year, left somewhat furtively on the 21st July for Constantinople. It was not generally known until afterwards that he had been recalled. His administration does not seem to have been in any way worthy of

note, but it is only fair to add that the brief and uncertain tenure of office, which has become almost the rule under the Constitution, allows small scope for initiative, or, indeed, for any but the most commonplace qualities in a governor. This, coupled with the new craze for ignoring all outward symbols of authority which are so natural in the East, seems to have deprived the valis of the last vestige of their former prestige among the populace.

12. *Mezhar Bey.*—During the interval after the departure of Hussein Kiazim Bey the vilayet was in charge of the defterdar, an amiable nonentity during whose *gérance* all official business was at a standstill. The new vali, Mezhar Bey, arrived on the 21st September, after sunset, which, by the way is considered an unfortunate omen. It is early to judge of his Excellency's qualifications, but in personal relations, at least with this consulate, he has so far shown himself businesslike, obliging, and friendly.

13. *General.*—The general state of the city and district would appear to call for no special remark. The vice-consul at Alexandretta reports "no progress," and elsewhere things seem much as usual, neither better nor worse, and, apart from a serious brawl in the prison beneath the Seria on the 18th August (all the prisoners in one ward took part, and only desisted when actually fired upon by the gendarmerie, one man being killed and seven badly wounded) there have been no extraordinary incidents. A somewhat arbitrary and puritanical order closing all places of amusement, forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquor after sunset, and the suppressing all but a few favoured houses of ill-fame may possibly fall short of its intending calming and edifying effect if carried out abruptly.

14. *The War.*—The news of the declaration of war by Italy excited lively interest for about ten days and considerable bitterness among the Turkish officials, but the promptness of Italian action and the apparent certainty of the upshot seem to have left the population as a whole cold and resigned. They regard themselves as in presence of a fact ("nesib"), and, having no friends or interests in Tripoli, seem ready to consider another chapter of Turkish history closed. Were any hope felt of a protracted and successful resistance on the part of the Tripolitan garrison, very different sentiments might in all likelihood easily be aroused.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[43906] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 6, 1911.*

TURCO-ITALIAN war.

Please refer to my despatch No. 748 of the 24th October.

I have received following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem:—

"I have received request from British residents at Jaffa begging for the immediate despatch of a war-ship there, as they consider its presence would overawe Moslems and reassure Europeans and native Christians.

"I consider this most desirable in view of fact that in Jaffa and neighbouring towns demonstrations have occurred of an increasingly anti-Christain nature."

[44015] No. 70.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, November 6, 1911.

Sir,

WE have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of letter from our Bagdad agents, dated the 30th September, regarding the running of our reserve steamer.

We have, &c.
T. H. ROBERTS, *Acting Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 70.

Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co. to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Reserve Steamer.

SEVIAN BEY called yesterday and informed me that he had mentioned the conversation, reported in my confidential note "B" with letter of the 25th instant, to his Excellency the vali; and that he could not make any progress in regard to the proposed arrangement to run the reserve steamer on terms similar to those proposed in your telegram of the 14th instant.

His Excellency declines to permit us to run the steamer, but suggested that we should agree to loan the Idara Nahrieh the reserve steamer to bring up their accumulation and they should lend us a steamer to bring up our accumulated cargo on mutual terms.

This proposal is put forward by the vali in order to support the principle that we should not be allowed under any circumstances to extend our privileges on the river, while endeavouring to show the mercantile community that he is trying to facilitate the transport of their goods from Bussorah.

Neither Sevian Bey nor I consider this proposal a serious one; moreover, we do not think any workable arrangement can be made, as we should not get the loan of a suitable steamer, nor should we be disposed to trust their officers and crew with the carriage of cargo belonging to our shippers.

Under these circumstances I have agreed with Sevian Bey to let the matter rest for the present, or until the vali is more reasonable in his views of the whole question.

Mr. Whittall's letter of the 23rd August addressed to the company, a copy of which I have just received with your note "A," letter of the 1st instant, confirms my opinion that Djmel Bey is not straightforward in dealing with the matter.

He emphatically stated to me that he recognised the necessity of improving the facilities of transport on the rivers, and I know from excellent authority that a petition signed by all the most influential merchants in Bagdad has been presented to him, pointing out the disabilities under which business is now carried on. The accumulation of cargo at Bussorah fell to 2,700 tons with us and 1,700 tons with the Idara administration on the 11th instant, and has now risen to 3,200 tons with us and 3,500 tons with them. Obviously a total of 6,700 tons of accumulated cargo at Bussorah, while the steamers can only carry light loads, and are much delayed *en route* with navigation difficulties and twenty-four hours' quarantine at Bagdad, proves the urgent necessity of employing all the steamers available to bring it forward.

In the course of conversation I reminded Sevian Bey that a permission had been granted to Agha Jaffar to run steamers on the Tigris, and that it was generally believed that the permit would be used to the detriment of the steamers now running on the river by creating unnecessary competition in freights.

I further reminded him that we could not reconcile the position taken up by the local Government, in view of the fact that they gave permission to a comparative stranger in the country, backed up by foreign capital, on the one hand, while, on the other, they refused permission to us, with a record of half a century of progressive work in the development of Mesopotamia, in spite of our willingness to work on the same conditions as any other Ottoman subject.

Sevian Bey said that a very strong protest had been made at Constantinople by his superiors against the granting of the permission to Agha Jaffar, and he expected it would be withdrawn.

The conversation turned to the transport of the Bagdad Railway material, and I mentioned that the railway administration had the intention of applying to the Turkish Government for permission to carry general merchandise as well as railway material if they put their own steamers on the river.

He said that permission has been asked from the local Government, but he did not think there is the slightest chance of it being granted either locally or at Constantinople.

I confirm my telegram of to-day's date, advising you of the failure of negotiations with the vali in regard to the reserve steamer, as per translation attached.

FRED. W. PARRY.

Bagdad, September 30, 1911.

[44048] No. 71.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,*
November 6, 1911.

Sir,

REFERRING to our letter of the 29th September and to your despatch of the 14th ultimo, we have the honour to enclose copy of letter received from our Bagdad agents, under date of the 2nd October, on the subject of the demolition of our premises at Bagdad.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.

Enclosure in No. 71.

Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co. (Bagdad) to Messrs. Lynch Brothers (London).

Bagdad, October 2, 1911.

THE Vali of Bagdad, Djemal Bey, has announced his intention of carrying out the road improvement schemes commenced by Nazim Pasha, but he has not offered any information as to his intentions with regard to the claims for compensation made for expropriations, and as far as we can ascertain the local authorities will not hear any evidence or listen to any complaint in connection with property taken or houses demolished previous to the arrival of Djemal Bey.

We can find no means of getting any sort of redress for our grievances here, and as the winter is rapidly approaching it is essential that we secure other offices for occupation during the cool season. The summer quarters (Sard-abs) are uninhabitable during the winter, and available rooms on the upper floors are not large enough for the staff.

[43906] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 7, 1911.

DISTURBANCES in connection with Turco-Italian war.

See your telegram No. 301 of yesterday.

You should make enquiries of His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem as to whether anything has occurred in his district to necessitate the urgent dispatch of a war-ship since he wrote his despatch No. 70 of the 14th October.

[44320] No. 73.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 8, 1911.

UNREST at Jaffa.

I have repeated your telegram No. 411 of the 6th November to His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, from whom I have received following reply:—

"At Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramleh, demonstrations took place on Friday, the 3rd November. They showed anti-Christian tendency, though they were officially described as being on account of Turkish victories. Christians, particularly at Lydda and Ramleh, were much alarmed, and, fearing massacre, took refuge for three days in Latin convent. There is no doubt that the effect on all parties of the visit of a man-of-war would be most salutary."

[45109] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1911.

THE Christians at Jaffa and other places in Palestine appear to be alarmed as to their safety, and British residents at Jaffa are asking for a ship of war to proceed to that port. Please enquire of French Foreign Office whether they have received any disquieting news from those regions. We hesitate to meet request unless really necessary.

[44765] No. 75.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

Sir Edward Grey,

THE Turkish Ambassador came to-day to say that the Ottoman Government wished to relight the lights in the Red Sea during the passage of the King. I gave him the necessary dates, and asked him to convey to his Government our best thanks for this courteous act, which would be highly appreciated.

I have informed the Admiralty by telephone, but I think we should do so by letter to make sure. The period during which the lights will be relit is the 22nd to 27th November, inclusive.

A. N.

Foreign Office, November 11, 1911.

[44795] No. 76.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 776.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from acting British consul at Jeddah, reporting on the state of affairs in the Hedjaz. I have also informed the resident at Aden that there seems no reason why cargoes of food-stuffs should not be sent to Jeddah and Hodeidah in neutral bottoms, they not having been declared contraband.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Acting Consul Abdur Rahman to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Jeddah, October* 16, 1911.

WITH reference to the affairs in Hedjaz I have the honour to report that after the declaration of war between Turkey and Italy two sambuks, one named "Sharq" and the other "Assad," both carrying Italian flag, were captured in the harbour of Jeddah by the local Turkish authorities. The owners of these sambuks are Italian subjects residing in Massowah.

The sambuk "Sharq" was bound for Confudah, and part of the goods on board was property of one British Indian merchant named Abdul Cadir Habibullah. I am in correspondence with the local Turkish authorities for the recovery of the goods belonging to the British Indian merchant named above.

On the 7th instant two Turkish gun-boats, "Aintab" and "Ordou," and one torpedo destroyer, "Paik-i-Shevekat," arrived here from the south. Next day all three left the port, and their destination is not known here.

On the 8th October, 1911, four big guns arrived from Taif, each was drawn by six camels. These guns were afterwards placed on the provisional sand embankment on the sea coast near the non-Mahommedan cemetery.

The garrison of Jeddah was strengthened on the 8th October by the arrival from Taif of 238 soldiers with the kaimakam of the forces in the Hedjaz.

Munir Pasha, the commander of the forces in the Hedjaz, also arrived here on the 15th instant from Taif.

I may mention that the Italian consulate here was closed at the request of the local Turkish authorities on the 2nd October, 1911, and my Russian colleague, in his capacity as acting Austrian vice-consul, is in charge of the Italian interests.

A telegram was received by the local agent of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company on the 10th instant, which reads as follows:—

"Steamers carrying food-stuff, Hodeidah Jeddah, liable capture by Italian warships. British resident, Aden, ordered Humayun Naseri discharge Jeddah cargo. Arrange take delivery Aden."

On the receipt of this telegram a sort of scare spread all over the place, and the price of the food-stuffs went up considerably.

On the following day a meeting of the local merchants was convened under the auspices of the municipality, and a schedule of rates of food-stuffs was agreed upon, which is to run unchanged for fifteen days.

The following is the statement of the rates of the principal articles of food as agreed upon by the meeting as compared with the rates current previous to the receipt of the telegram containing news of the prohibition of food supply of Jeddah and Hodeidah:—

Names of Articles.	Price agreed.	Old Prices.
Rice, Rari	T.P. 120 per bag.	T.P. 100 per bag.
,, Bahan	,, 124 ,,	,, 120 ,,
,, Mezza	,, 126 ,,	,, 124 ,,
Barley	,, 50 ,,	,, 45 ,,
Flour	,, 140 ,,	,, 134 ,,
Sugar	R.U. 14 per cwt.	R.U. 12 per cwt.
Ghee (clarified butter)	,, 54 ,,	,, 48 ,,

The prices agreed upon by the municipal meeting are only on paper, and the merchants who are masters of the situation sell their goods as best as it suits them.

The state of the country, which depends entirely on food-stuff, can better be imagined than described on the receipt of such startling news, especially at this time of the year, when there are thousands of pilgrims of all nationalities chiefly from vast British dependencies. It was in the interests of British Indian residents and the pilgrims that I ventured to telegraph to your Excellency on the point.

The foolish people here, misunderstanding the orders of the resident at Aden, think that it is the British Government who had stopped the supply of food-stuffs.

The food-stuffs are always sold here at famine rates, particularly in the Haj season, and what will be the rates this season, with no supply from abroad, it is hard to realise.

I have, &c.
S. ABDUR RAHMAN.

[44796] No. 77.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 777.)
Sir,
Constantinople, November 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from acting British consul at Jeddah, reporting on state of affairs in Najd and Bin Saoud.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Acting Consul Abdur Rahman to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39.)
Sir,
Jeddah, October 11, 1911.

WITH reference to the affairs in Najd, I have the honour to report that by the order of the Grand Shereef of Mecca all communication between Najd and Mecca is stopped. It appears that the relations of Bin Saoud and the Grand Shereef have again become unfriendly.

It will be remembered that at the time of his last expedition in the year 1910 against Bin Saoud a sort of truce was patched up between the parties. The success of that expedition of the Grand Shereef, like his recent expedition against Soyyid Mohamed Idrissein Assyr, was considered very doubtful. There are people who believe that the Grand Shereef, not finding himself strong enough to face Bin Saoud and from fear of being entrapped, hastened retreat towards Mecca. It is certain that the conditions on paper—the so-called treaty between the Grand Shereef and Bin Saoud—was never carried out.

It is said that Bin Saoud is now levying taxes on Oteiba tribe, which is the mainstay and backbone of Shereef's authority in the country, and this is the reason why the Grand Shereef has issued the above-mentioned order that any goods sent to Najd or coming from there to Mecca will be looted without any responsibility on his part.

It was also rumoured, before the declaration of war between Turkey and Italy, that the Grand Shereef was arranging an expedition against Bin Saoud again.

I have, &c.
S. ABDUR RAHMAN.

[43944] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 779.)
Sir,
Pera, November 3, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 206 of the 17th September in which I expressed the opinion that it would be wiser not to take any action with the idea of inducing the Turkish Government to discontinue their obstruction to the fulfilment by Messrs. Lynch of their contract with Sir J. Jackson (Limited) for the transport of material to the site of the Hindieh barrage, and to your despatch No. 280 of the 17th October, I have the honour to report that as Sir J. Jackson's agent here has earnestly requested me not to take any steps for the present, I have agreed to do so pending further instructions from yourself.

Mr. Eady has informed me that he has been told by the Minister of Public Works repeatedly and in the plainest language that, if the good relations which Jackson's have hitherto enjoyed with the Turkish Government are to continue, the contract with Lynch must be cancelled, and Mr. Eady being convinced that to obtain the consent of the Turks to the contract on any conditions whatever will very seriously jeopardise the good prospects of his firm in Mesopotamia, has urged his principals in London to annul the contract even if it entails considerable loss. Sir J. Jackson's, however, influenced by the representations of Mr. Lynch, have somewhat reluctantly, it would seem, declined to follow Mr. Eady's advice and have instructed him to lay before the Turkish Government a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company giving an undertaking that the vessels to be employed under the contract will not be used for any other purpose, &c., an undertaking which they have been induced by Mr. Lynch to believe will bring the Turkish Government to waive their objections. This Mr. Eady is now about to do, very much against his own judgment, as he believes that his firm have been led by Mr. Lynch to form an incorrect opinion of the situation here, and I am constrained to say that an examination of the statements made by Mr. Lynch both to your department and to Sir J. Jackson (Limited) in London, as reported by them to Mr. Eady, brings me to a similar conclusion. A statement of this nature is a serious one, and I therefore think it incumbent on me to give one or two instances of loose statements in Mr. Lynch's account of the position which appear to me calculated to mislead.

1. In his letter to you of the 27th September Mr. Lynch stated that the Idareh Nahrieh declined to undertake transport at all, i.e., either by the Euphrates or by the

Tigris. This appears to me to be incorrect, for the Turkish Company's refusal referred to the Euphrates only (Sir J. Jackson to the Vali of Bagdad, 3rd May, 1911), and they appear indeed never to have been invited to undertake the transport by the two rivers alternatively.

2. In his letter to you of the 13th September Mr. Lynch says that the Turkish Government raise no objection to the contract, a statement which a month later (Jackson's to Mr. Eady of the 13th October) is "expanded" into an agreement by the Turks to the contract. Now a comparison of dates shows that the Turkish authorities had no reasonable opportunity to raise objections, for on the 9th May the Vali of Bagdad was informed by Jackson's representatives in Bagdad that satisfactory arrangements were being made in London for chartering vessels, no names being given, and on the 11th May, only two days later, the arrangement between Jackson's and Lynch was practically concluded.

3. In an account, dated the 20th October, of a conversation with Mr. Lynch, Sir J. Jackson (Limited), informed Mr. Eady, that "Mr. Lynch said that he had heard from the Foreign Office that when the Turkish authorities were made aware of the fact that craft would not be used for any other purpose excepting for transporting the plant and material for the use of the Mesopotamian work up the river, that [*sic*] they would have no further ideas of wishing to cancel the arrangements with Lynch." I find it difficult to believe that anything can have been said to Mr. Lynch at the Foreign Office which would warrant him in making the above statement, which is so directly at variance with my own opinion of the Turkish Government's attitude and feeling towards the Lynch Company, and I, therefore, feel confident that Mr. Lynch has been "expanding" a "could have" or "should have no objection" into a "will have no objection."

Other circumstances tend to show that Sir J. Jackson (Limited), in London, are conscious that they are being "rushed" by Mr. Lynch. Your first instructions to me on this question (Foreign Office telegram No. 337 of the 14th September) were sent at Mr. Lynch's request and without the knowledge or consent of Sir J. Jackson (Limited), who were annoyed that their sub-contractor should have approached you on his own authority and, writing to Mr. Eady on the subject on the 28th September, they say, "it is a little annoying, but, we think, Mr. Lynch now understands that anything of this description (*i.e.*, applying for official action by the embassy) that is done must be done through us. Moreover, Colonel Picot's letters to Mr. Maxwell of the 8th and 10th October, tend to show that Mr. Lynch had doubts as to Sir. J. Jackson (Limited), agreeing to the letter of the 27th September to your department.

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, although Sir J. Jackson (Limited), have been inveigled, by the somewhat inaccurate representations employed by Mr. Lynch, into agreeing to endeavour to persuade the Turkish Government to allow the contract to stand, they have considerable misgivings as to the wisdom of that course from which they have been and are still being strongly dissuaded by their local representative who must be in a better position than his principals in London to judge of the effect which it may have on their relations with the Ottoman Government in future, and I have, therefore, thought it more prudent and more fair to Sir J. Jackson, whose interests must take precedence of those of his sub-contractor in this matter, to suspend action until we know the result of Mr. Eady's last recommendations to his firm, who will then, no doubt, inform you of their wishes.

In my own opinion, Mr. Eady takes a just view of the situation, viz., that the hitherto friendly attitude of the Turkish Government to Sir J. Jackson (Limited), is likely to undergo a complete change if the Lynch contract is forced on their acceptance.

(Very confidential.)

To speak quite frankly, the very name of Lynch is offensive to the Turks, partly, no doubt, for political reasons connected with the flying of the British flag and because of his successful competition with the Idareh Nahrieh, but still more because they think that the business of the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company is not conducted in the straightforward manner that all over the east is expected from an English house, and are inclined to suspect him of having ulterior motives in the present case. To show that I am not alone in this view, I may mention very confidentially that Mr. Whittall's reasons for resigning the Lynch agency were mainly that he recognised that to be identified with the Lynch Company must compromise his other interests in Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[44802] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 784.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Aleppo, reporting on Bagdad Railway and the British excavations and interests at Jerablus (Charchemish).

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Acting Consul Young to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, October 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 23th instant a rumour reached me to the effect that the Bagdad Railway was likely to traverse the precise spot at Jerablus (Charchemish) where Dr. Hogarth and his companions were lately excavating, and that the site itself, with whatever it contains of interest, was threatened with destruction.

I have no information of Dr. Hogarth's plans, but I heard privately a few days ago from Mr. T. E. Lawrence that some members of the party were likely to return to Jerablus to resume operations this autumn. I have also heard vaguely that part of the land in the neighbourhood in question is British property.

Some six weeks ago the German consul here, Herr Rossler, wrote to me privately protesting against a statement contained in an anonymous letter, which appeared in the "Times" of the 9th August, to the effect that the Bagdad Railway was likely to demolish Charchemish and Tel Ahmar. I mentioned the matter to Meissner Pasha, and explained to him and to the consul that it was not possible for me to contradict the statement complained of or to communicate in any way with a newspaper.

Yesterday I called upon the German consul; and, referring to his letter, inquired whether after all there was some truth in the rumour of which he had previously complained. M. Rossler replied that "he feared that part at least of the site was in danger of being interfered with, but that, so far as he was aware, the danger was not immediate, and that nothing was doing at the moment, as the plans were still under consideration in Germany." He said he was convinced every care would be exercised not to infringe British rights, and he added a suggestion that it "might be well for Dr. Hogarth (or whoever is concerned) to have a representative on the spot to protect any property from injury by natives or other untoward accident."

As stated above, I have no information as to what, if any, British interests are threatened, but it seems right to report the matter to your Excellency for communication, should you see fit, to Dr. Hogarth or others.

The tour proposed in my No. 36 of the 24th instant, and on which I hope to start on the 30th (*vide* my telegram of the 27th), could be made to include a visit to Charchemish, the result of which I should hope to report to your Excellency in due course.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[44803] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 785.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Aleppo, submitting observations suggested by local state of affairs.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Acting Consul Young to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)

Aleppo, October 28, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the state of affairs in this district since the declaration of war by Italy has been, so far, unmarked by any excitement. Turkish officials and such Arab notables as are brought into frequent contact with them—*e.g.*, the deputies from this and the neighbouring constituencies—have spoken in my presence with the bitterness (real or assumed) which was to be expected of "this unprecedented act of brigandage on the part of a European Power" [*sic*], &c., but, notwithstanding the efforts of an inflammatory press, the population as a whole would appear to be almost unmoved.

There are probably several reasons for this :—

1. There is no link whatever of race, knowledge of each other, or commercial interest to connect the people of Aleppo with their fellow-subjects in Tripoli.

2. Contempt, dislike, and mistrust of the Turks are as strong here as in any part of the Empire, and may not unlikely have suggested to the Arab mind the possibility of the Constantinople Cabinet having been "bought" by Italy before the *coup*—in short, a suspicion that "Turkey has merely sold another province, and that she is now trying to cover her tracks by raising a handsome sum of money by public subscription for the purpose of a campaign which, however, will not and cannot take place."

3. People here, as elsewhere, are quite alive (perhaps a little enviously) to the fact that Tripoli, like the other lost Ottoman provinces, is likely to be more prosperous under European administration than ever under the Turks.

4. Though reliable information of what is going forward is unobtainable in Aleppo, the impression is general that Tripoli has, to all intents and purposes, ceased to be part of the Ottoman Empire, and "there is no undoing what is past."

5. It is a platitude that patriotism is non-existent in the Ottoman Empire, and religious enthusiasm, which in certain circumstances might conceivably do more than take its place, is in the present case and for the practical purpose of saving Tripoli for the Turks a negligible quantity.

It is probable that some such considerations as the above account in large measure for the attitude of calm disinterest which has fortunately been noticeable hitherto in this district. So far as Tripoli and the Turks are concerned there seems to be no feeling in Aleppo, and the danger of any disturbance here would seem to lie rather in the risk of the Government making a more direct appeal to the population—*e.g.*, by the forcible raising of money and troops, or an attempt to excite religious fanaticism against Europeans (and, incidentally, against the native Christians) in general. Of this, however, there is happily no indication at present.

It must be added that the vali has so far maintained a perfectly correct attitude, and even done something towards curbing the extravagance of the local press.

Business has naturally suffered greatly from the uncertainty of the political outlook, and the Italian colony, which is numerous and includes the wealthy and respected family of the Marcopoli (established in Aleppo for many generations), is at the moment of writing in a state of painful anxiety.

I have, &c.

H. E. W. YOUNG.

[44808] No. 81.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 790.)

Constantinople, November 7, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting visits to that place of engineers engaged in surveys for the Sivas–Erzinjan–Erzeroum Railway.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 87.)

Erzeroum, October 27, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that M. Vronetski and a party of engineers in the service of the Vitalis Railway Syndicate recently arrived at Erzeroum, having made a preliminary inspection of the country through which it is proposed to construct the Sivas–Erzinjan–Erzeroum Railway. I am informed that the Russian Government having vetoed the commencement of building operations at more than one part on the Black Sea, there can be no question of work being undertaken at Trebizonde in the immediate future, and M. Vronetski, who states that owing to the formidable engineering obstacles on the Sivas–Erzinjan *tracé* it would be impossible to finish the line between Sivas and Erzeroum in less than seven years, also says that a beginning cannot be made until the completion of the Samsun–Sivas section along which the necessary fuel and building materials would have to be conveyed.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[44818] No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 800.)

Constantinople, November 8, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting the arrival of troops at Mitylene and Rhodes.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 81.)

Smyrna, November 2, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report, on the information of Mr. Vice-Consul Hadkinson, that about 2,000 troops with 140 cases of ammunition have been brought over from Dikili to Mitylene.

Of these, 1,600 are redifs (regiment not stated) and 400 are regulars of the 2nd battalion 18th Regiment, IIe Corps d'Armée.

The fortress of Mitylene having been dismantled some time since there is no accommodation for so large a force, and Mr. Hadkinson states that the authorities are obliged to make use of churches, schools, and the Greek consumption sanatorium. If so, it is to be presumed that a large number of the troops are Christians.

Mr. Biliotti reports that, on the 24th instant, 130 soldiers and 50 gendarmes came over from Marmarice in sailing boats.

He does not state whether the men were regulars or reserve men.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[45022] No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th November, 1911, relative to Bagdad.

India Office, November 11, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 83.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November 7, 1911.*

BAGDAD.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 12th ultimo.

Foreign Office have confined themselves to giving Sir G. Lowther instructions to urge settlement of outstanding claims at Bagdad very strongly on Turkish Government at first favourable opportunity. They consider that it would be unwise at this juncture to present anything in the nature of an ultimatum.

Enquiry is made by Foreign Office as to what measures for vindicating our position are proposed. It would be well if you could prepare definite plan in consultation with naval commander-in-chief.

[45114] No. 84.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 315.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 13, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 396 of 25th October.

English officers are now attached each to his own special department to assist in general work, and usual winter instruction will commence as soon as possible. Their present work is only temporary, and it is doubtful whether, in the event of war being prolonged, it could be continued till end of officers' contracts.

[43944] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 422.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 14, 1911.*

HINDIEH barrage.

Jackson wishes you to postpone action, and Lynch concurs in this.

Refer to your telegram No. 779 of the 3rd November.

[45362] No. 86.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

[By Post.]

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 14, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 184 of the 13th instant.

French Government state that French consul-general at Jerusalem reports that at present only small manifestations easily dispersed have taken place in Palestine, and that the Turkish authorities seem determined to maintain order.

[45357] No. 87.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 14, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 405 of 1st November and my telegrams Nos. 293 of 26th October and 311 of 11th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether fresh appeal cannot be made to Italian Government, conditions same as those mentioned in my telegram No. 293, except that Porte would undertake to repatriate troops without arms in hospital ships. Humanitarian reasons make such an arrangement very necessary.

[45109] No. 84*.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 184.) [By Post.]

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 13, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 298 of 10th November.

French Government state that they have not received any information pointing to danger to Christians at Jaffa and in Palestine. French consul-general at Jerusalem will be asked by telegraph for report.

French Government, having learnt that French citizens and protégés at Beirout, in Syria and Lebanon, feared outburst of Mussulman fanaticism, sent a war-ship to Beirout. It is proceeding to Saida and Haifa, and will probably go on to Acre and Sur, where French representatives have reported apprehension among the Christians.

[45362] No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 424.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1911.

LET me have your views on Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 185 of the 14th instant, relating to demonstrations in Syria.

I think that, unless we receive further information, it will be unnecessary to send one of His Majesty's ships.

[44560] No. 89.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, respecting the proposed survey in the Persian Gulf.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the opinion expressed in paragraph 3 of the Admiralty letter dated the 31st October, 1911, and also that he is prepared, as soon as he is in possession of details as to the cost and duration of operations, to advise the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury that, in his view, the cost of employing a vessel of the Royal Indian Marine for the purpose of the survey should be borne jointly by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[45779] No. 90.

Count Metternich to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Translation.)
Your Excellency, *German Embassy, London, November* 6, 1911.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 12th August last, I have the honour to state as follows:—

According to that note the Imperial consul at Bushire has informed his British colleague that the firm of Robert Wönckhaus and Co., of Lingah, propose to ship further consignments of iron oxide from the island of Abu Musa. Meanwhile, a communication on the subject has reached the Foreign Office in Berlin from the consul at Bushire. The Imperial consul was previously generally instructed to support the firm of Wönckhaus in shipping iron oxide so long as these shipments consisted of oxide already mined, lying partly in the vicinity of the shore, partly near the mines.

These instructions correspond to our agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, as concluded in connection with our first memorandum on the subject of December 1907. At the time His Britannic Majesty's Government did not concur in our request that influence should be brought to bear on the Sheikh of Shargeh in order that the exploitation of the iron oxide mines might as quickly as possible be allowed again. On the other hand, they proposed in their memorandum of the 10th January, 1908, that the firm of Wönckhaus should be allowed to ship the oxide already mined. Further negotiations then took place, in the course of which it was expressly emphasised on our side that shipment of *all* the oxide lying at Abu Musa should be allowed. By their attitude the Imperial Government met to a great extent the wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government, being only led to do so on the assumption that the main point would be settled in a satisfactory manner in the shortest time. His Britannic Majesty's Government, on their side, informed us in the *note verbale* of the 14th July, 1908, of their answer to our modified wishes, and expressed in the following unambiguous words the view they then held in regard to the shipment question:—

" . . . . The British resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed on the 9th April to make arrangements for transporting *all* the oxide already mined to the shore, in order that it might be ready for shipment by Messrs. Wönckhaus."

In another place in the same *note verbale* it is stated: "There remain on the beach some 400 tons of oxide, and, according to the estimation of Hassan Samaigeh, about 3,000 tons of saleable quality near the mines. These amounts are at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus . . . ."

The negotiations at that time in regard to this aspect of the matter were brought to a final conclusion by the above-quoted declarations of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

As a matter of fact, Messrs. Wönckhaus have made several shipments of iron oxide from the island of Abu Musa, and, in view of the assurance given by His Britannic Majesty's Government, they could reckon on undertaking further shipments at any time without meeting objections until the exhaustion of the amount already mined. The Imperial Government, on their side, thought they would assume, after the issue of the general instructions to the British consul-general in Bushire by His Britannic Majesty's Government, that the question of separate shipments would easily be settled between the two consular authorities on the ground of the understanding arrived at at the time without a fresh discussion between the two Governments being necessary in each case.

In view of the above-mentioned assurance of His Britannic Majesty's Government and of the negotiations which preceded it, it is difficult to understand how the idea can have arisen that permission to ship could be issued to Messrs. Wönckhaus only in connection with their contracts, and should be to some extent dependent on the latter. In this connection reference must be made to the German note of the 26th July, 1910. When His Britannic Majesty's Government, in their communication of the 22nd August, 1910, call attention to the fact that, in their memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, they pointed to a connection between shipments and contracts of Messrs. Wönckhaus, the untenability of this point of view is made clear at once from the course of the negotiations definitely concluded *before* this memorandum. Moreover, the legal position thereby created is expressly confirmed both in the *note verbale* of the 23rd July, 1908, and in the negotiations conducted in the year 1909. Finally, in paragraph 7 of their communication of the 22nd August, 1910, His Britannic Majesty's Government themselves admitted that the view of the Imperial Government was in accordance with the text of the agreement reached.

According to this explanation of the matter, the Imperial Government consider themselves entitled to expect that further shipments by Messrs. Wönckhaus of iron oxide already mined will meet no difficulties in the future. This solution is absolutely equitable, as Messrs. Wönckhaus have suffered large losses by the stoppage of the mines—losses which, in consequence of the continuation of the condition of affairs arising from the dispute at Abu Musa, are perpetually increasing, and which entirely exclude the possibility of any "unfair" advantage to the firm over British competitors.

In this connection, it is necessary to revert to another observation in His Britannic Majesty's Government's communication of the 22nd August, 1910, to the effect that, in the spring of 1910, some 400 tons of oxide already shipped still remained unsold at Hamburg. Enquiries have shown that this is not a case, as His Britannic Majesty's Government appear to assume, of an excess over the quantity which Messrs. Wönckhaus were under contract to deliver to other firms; the fact is that this oxide, which formed the greater part of the shipment by the steam-ship "Louise," remained unsold owing to depreciation in value. This depreciation was caused by the fact that, owing to the expulsion by the Sheikh of Shargeh of the workmen who had made all preparations for a fresh shipment, the oxide had to lie for a long time on the shore and suffered both in quality and colour by being exposed to the weather, especially the action of the sea water driven over it by the violent winter storms, so that it was no longer up to sample and was refused acceptance. In consequence of the great interruption in the working of the mines Messrs. Wönckhaus have not been able to fulfil their contracts, but have had to repudiate them at a heavy loss.

I have been instructed by my Government to request that instructions may be issued in order that the shipment proposed by Messrs. Wönckhaus and any further shipments, in so far as iron oxide already mined is concerned, may now be carried out without delay.

I am, at the same time, to give renewed expression to the desire of the Imperial Government that a final solution may soon be found to the Abu Musa dispute, and I should be grateful to your Excellency for an intimation of when we may expect a reply to our last memorandum of December 1909.

I have, &c.
P. METTERNICH.

[46184] No. 91.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 805.)
Sir,
Pera, November 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty the Sultan has recently conferred upon the Sheikh of Koweit the decoration of the first class of the Medjidié. In the warrant issued in this connection and dated the 5th November, 1911, the sheikh is described as Mubarek-us-Sabah "Pasha." I do not know whether he has hitherto enjoyed this title.

From private enquiries which I have caused to be made at the Sublime Porte, it appears that the decoration has been granted in recognition of a gift of £T. 500 for the victims of the Stamboul fire of last July.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[46194] No. 92.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 815.)
Sir,
Constantinople, November 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting on a journey from Sana'a to Hodeidah, viâ Taiz and Mokha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)
Sir,
Hodeidah, October 20, 1911.

AS telegraphed from Mokha on the 17th instant, I returned here this morning.

I left Sana'a for Hodeidah on the 27th September, travelling in the direction of Mokha and touring in the eastern districts of the vilayet *en route*.

At the time of my departure from the capital, I had not the faintest idea that the relations between the Italian and Turkish Governments were strained or that war was imminent.

I learnt from the authorities on my arrival at Hbb on the 2nd instant that Italy had declared war, and later the same day my *locum tenens* at Hodeidah, Mr. Tayar, communicated that fact to me by telegraph.

My stay in Sana'a extended just over six weeks, during which I was treated with remarkable civility by the authorities and was very hospitably received by his Excellency General Izzet Pasha, now in administrative civil and military charge of the vilayet.

No objection whatever was raised to my travelling in Eastern Yemen, which I believed at the time and afterwards found to be in a state of perfect tranquillity.

On the contrary, Izzet Pasha and the civil and military officials concerned accorded me every facility and assistance during my journey.

I was provided with an escort of thirty cavalry under the command of a captain that accompanied me from Sana'a to Mokha. Infantry detachments were detailed in addition to escort me between the various outposts.

Thanks to his Excellency Izzet Pasha, I was most cordially received by the officials, sheikhs, and tribesmen at every town or village I passed through on my journey.

I reached Taiz on the 3rd instant and was the guest of the mutessarif there for three days.

Owing to the outbreak of hostilities and the excitement incidental thereto amongst the Arabs, who were immediately informed of that event, and in view of the "jehad" proclaimed by the Imam Seyyid Yahya and other tribal chieftains, a whole battalion of infantry was ordered to accompany me to Mokha, which I reached in safety on the 9th.

No untoward event occurred *en route*; in fact, my arrival at the various places

was made the object of friendly and enthusiastic demonstrations on the part of the villagers and tribesmen.

I was unfortunately delayed for eleven days at Mokha, as in the exceptional circumstances prevailing no ship was available to convey me to Hodeidah, although I had made arrangements previously to embark immediately on arrival there.

I now propose to leave for the Camaran lazaretto in a few days, but I consider my presence here very necessary at the present juncture.

The pro-consul, Mr. Mirza Mahmud Sultan, who has been at Camaran since the opening of the pilgrim season there, reports that everything is working very satisfactorily at the lazaretto.

Before concluding, I would most respectfully request that your Excellency will be so kind as to send an acknowledgment to the Ottoman Government for the extreme courtesy and kindness shown to me by General Izzet Pasha during my visit to Sana'a, and for the assistance afforded during my sojourn in the interior of the vilayet.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[46201] No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November 20.*)

(No. 822.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting on events in that vilayet during the four months ended the 31st ultimo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Van, October 31, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency an account of events that have occurred in this vilayet during the past four months.

During this period the doings of the outlaws Mir Mehe and Said Bey have continuously occupied the attention of the Government and the population.

The former brigand, after killing last winter Oban Effendi, a notable of Shattakh, a few months ago killed an Armenian police agent named Archag Effendi. Since then he has pillaged numerous caravans, and rendered the route between Van and Shattakh quite unsafe for travellers. Three months ago a number of gendarmes were sent against him, who, far from doing him any hurt, surrendered to him sixteen rifles.

Said Bey cannot be reckoned as an ordinary brigand. He is in rebellion against the Government, and confines himself to attacks against representatives of the same. However, his financial necessities oblige him to make frequent money perquisitions from the villages, and he is said during the last three months to have seized sums amounting to 1,000*l*. He has now from fifty to seventy mounted followers, all well-armed. Recently he paid a visit to Vostan, the seat of a kaïmakam, and six hours from Van. Naturally, there was considerable alarm in the town. Said Bey, however, only demanded three sheep to be cooked for him, and after his meal retired from the neighbourhood, taking with him three gendarmes' rifles. After this exploit troops were dispatched from Van, and they succeeded in surrounding him near Mouks. The vali himself repaired to the spot, but his presence did not seem to have the desired stimulating effect on the troops, as they allowed Said Bey and his men to pass through the cordon unharmed.

There is no doubt that both Said Bey and Mir Mehe reckon a large number of sympathisers among the troops and gendarmes, and the remainder who are not actively sympathetic see nothing heroic in risking their lives in the interests of the good order of the vilayet.

Such are the difficulties which the Government have to contend with, added to the fact that these brigands have always a harbour of refuge in Persia, where they cannot be pursued. The Government is accused by the Christian section of the population

of not wishing to suppress this brigandage. But this is obviously an unjust accusation, at least, as regards these two particular brigands.

As reported in my despatch No. 20, the Nahie of Kachigan is in a state of unrest on account of the aggressiveness of the Kurds headed by one Moussa Bey. Since the murder of three Armenians in this Nahie it has been impossible to get firewood from Bagh Iskele, the port of the Nahie, as the Van boatmen, who are all Armenians, refuse to go unless their safety is guaranteed.

In the neighbourhood of Bashkale also pillage by the Kurds has become more frequent.

In my despatch No. 17, I reported to your Excellency the raid by Kurds on the Nestorians of Ashita. Three thousand sheep have now been returned to the Nestorians and two Kurds arrested. No attempt was made to disarm the Kurds, impose a fine on them, or punish them in any way which would seem befitting so serious a breach of the peace. The authorities attribute the ill-feeling existing between the Kurds and the Nestorians to the influence exerted on Mar Shimun by the English missionaries at Kudshanis. The influence of the latter is, however, entirely directed towards restraining Mar Shimun from acts of hostility or reprisal and in alleviating the evil effects produced by the Kaïmakam of Julamerk, who pursues a policy towards Mar Shimun intended to belittle him in the eyes of his countrymen. This policy of wounding has the natural effect of driving Mar Shimun to desperation.

The state of affairs on the Persian frontier appears to have gone from bad to worse. Constant conflicts between Kurds and Turkish troops are reported. The principal offenders appear to be "Simko," a chief near Serai, and a Maku khan. A serious conflict recently took place between Ottoman troops and a large band of Simko's men, who endeavoured to pass into Turkish territory by the high road between Khoi and Serai. Simko was driven back, but the troops suffered considerable losses. The local authorities complain bitterly that Russian diplomacy prevents them taking any effective measures against these frontier brigands and putting an end to the existing state of affairs.

Jabir Pasha is now in temporary command of the Army Corps. He and the vali are now on good terms; their friendship having been brought about by their successful joint action against the ex-Ferik Moukhlis Pasha. This nauseous intrigue is unfortunately typical of the spirit which animates the officials, either civil or military, of this vilayet. Soon after his arrival, Moukhlis Pasha reported adversely on his subordinate, Jabir Pasha. Then followed the representations which led to the downfall of Moukhlis Pasha, which, according to Jabir Pasha, were as follows: After Moukhlis Pasha had refused to give military aid for the suppression of troubles at Shmoudinan, it was discovered (according to his accusers) that he had ambitions of becoming Vali of Van. With this object in view, he had entered into relations with the Persian brigand Simko, who was to be allowed to enter Van and commit barbarities; the situation was then to be saved by Moukhlis and the troops. The incapacity of the vali and the capacity of the military chief were thus to be simultaneously demonstrated. The statement that Moukhlis Pasha was scheming to become vali was further strengthened by the assertion that the former had approached my Russian colleague with a view to obtaining his influence to this end, and promising in return to be the faithful tool of Russia. Jabir Pasha told me that the Russian vice-consul had told him this, staking his honour on its truth. On the other hand, my Russian colleague states that Moukhlis Pasha made no such proposition, though he had given him to understand that he would like to be appointed vali.

Thus, the vali and Jabir Pasha posed as being the patriotic avertors of a diabolical plot.

The Turkish officials here do not seem to have reached that state of liberality of mind whereby they can contemplate with equanimity the holding of high Government or military posts by persons of any race other than their own. Notwithstanding principles of equality, the Ottoman race must always remain the ruling one. The vali does not seem to be pursuing any definite policy with regard to the government of this vilayet. He is the obedient servant of the committee—a rôle which suits his capacity. The object seems to be to avoid as far as possible the occurrence of events of a disturbing nature, without, however, entering upon any clearly-defined line of action which might involve the opening up of any new question, such, for instance, as a Kurd or Armenian question. It is difficult to gauge the feelings of Turks, but my impression was that the mass of the people were not much affected by the news of the declaration of war by Italy. They seemed quite resigned from the first to the loss of Tripoli. It must, of course, be remembered that the Turkish inhabitants of Van are almost entirely

of Kurdish origin. The Kurds, who have never been in sympathy with the constitutional Government, rather welcomed the war, though Abdul Kadir offered to raise 50,000 volunteers among his people. As regards the Armenians, the majority made no effort to conceal their joy at the misfortune which had befallen their country and the Government. It is quite evident from this, if further evidence were necessary, that they have not a vestige of patriotism. They justify themselves by saying that they have gained nothing by the constitution, which is not in fact a constitution, and that they welcome any hope of a change of Government or of European interference. The leaders of the Taschnak party offered to aid the Government with volunteers, probably more with the hope of some political gain than with the desire to render service to their country.

Sixty Armenian Taschnakists from Van recently went to Tabreez and enrolled themselves in the Persian Government's forces.

M. Zarzecki, the new French vice-consul, has arrived here.

A branch of the Ottoman Bank is about to be opened here and also an agency at Bashkale.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[46753] No. 94.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

India Office, November 22, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you in reply to your letter dated the 27th September last, enclosing the draft of a second memorandum for the German Government regarding the claim of Messrs. R. Wönckhaus and Co. in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

In accordance with the observations made by the Government of India in the telegraphic correspondence, of which copy has been communicated to the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, the following modifications should be inserted in the draft:—

1. P. 2, line 11. For "Shargah" read "Abu Musa island."

2. P. 17, last line. Omit sentence beginning "His jurisdiction" and ending with the words "never done" in line 7, on p. 18; also insert in line 17, on p. 18, after the word "right," the words "the concessionnaires who at the time of the cancellation were all."

3. On p. 41, Appendix 8, print: "Ali-Bin-Abdullah-Behzad, of Keis."

Further, the Secretary of State is disposed to think that, if Sir E. Grey agrees, the paragraph headed "3" at the bottom of p. 5 might advantageously be modified in its wording so as to run as follows:—

"If this objection means that His Britannic Majesty's resident, with the object of strengthening the case, deliberately induced the two sheikhs to make statements which he and they knew to be untrue, His Majesty's Government cannot entertain any such suggestion."

On p. 9, line 2, the verbal alteration seems required of the words "the latter," instead of "that account."

Subject to the foregoing remarks, the Secretary of State concurs in the draft memorandum.

As regards the draft note suggesting the terms of a compromise, the Secretary of State concurs in the proposal to transmit it, in the form proposed in your letter, simultaneously with the memorandum above referred to. Two slight modifications will, he presumes, be made, necessitated by the lapse of time since the note was drafted, viz.: "about four years" for "more than three years," in paragraph 2, and "31st December, 1914," for "31st December, 1913," in paragraph 5.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[46694] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.*

ITALIAN bombardment of Okaba.

Protest has been received from Turkish Government against action of Italian cruisers, which have bombarded Okaba. You should instruct Governor of Sinai peninsula to ascertain whether bombardment is a fact, and report.

[47157] No. 96.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 829. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an interesting report by His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout on the various religious elements in Syria, their conflicting interests and numbers. To judge from Mr. Cumberbatch's report, it would seem as though the advent of the foreign missionary element, especially the Catholic and Orthodox, had unfortunately done little to soften the discords among the Christian sects.

As regards Zionism, I think that Mr. Cumberbatch rightly describes the Government as now being strongly hostile to the movement. You will remember, however, that in the earlier days of committee domination, the Jewish element of that organisation ventured, perhaps scarcely more than tentatively, to obtain official encouragement or at least recognition of Zionism, but that the idea met with such a hostile reception that its authors at once denied any intention of political Zionism, and for some time very little has been heard of it here. Occasionally, however, articles have appeared in the local press intended to refute the accusations of political aims, but if Mr. Israel Cohen's pamphlet, "Zionist work in Palestine," published this year in London, correctly represents the aims of the movement, it is clear that the original goal of Herzl to found a Jewish "State" is still kept in view, though it is recognised that present circumstances in Turkey are not favourable to an open avowal of it.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 64. Confidential.)
Sir, *Beirout, November 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the religious forces contending against each other in Syria, which may be found of some interest at the present moment, in view of the close connection that exists in the Ottoman Empire between religion and politics.

The total population of Syria, within the area of which I include the Vilayets of Beirout, Damascus, and Aleppo, and the Mutessarifflik of Mount Lebanon, but exclude the Mutessarifflik of Jerusalem, can be roughly estimated at 2,893,400, and divided among the various sects and religions as follows:—

Mohammedans	1,614,200
Latins	10,300
Maronites	308,300
United Greeks	140,400
„ Syrians	45,600
„ Armenians	18,200
„ Chaldeans	17,800
Syrian Jacobites	45,600
Orthodox Nestorians	15,300
„ Greeks	288,100
Gregorian Armenians	23,100
Protestants	20,900
Jews	50,500
Druzes	151,800
Nusairiyeh	119,700
Ismailieh	9,500
Foreigners	13,900

The five great religions at work are:—

1. The Roman Catholic.
2. The Orthodox Greek.
3. The Protestant.
4. The Jewish.
5. The Mahommedan.

1. *The Roman Catholics.*

The Roman Catholic forces all over the Ottoman Empire are too well known as to their number and their organisation to need any special remarks of mine.

The Maronites of Mount Lebanon, who have been compared to the peasantry of Spain in their subjection to the priesthood as well as in their fanatical hostility to the Protestant and other Christian sects, are the largest Catholic community, and, by themselves, equal the Orthodox Greeks in number. The Jesuit Fathers and the Papal delegate lead the van in the rest of Syria, followed by several patriarchs and a host of bishops, priests, monks, and nuns. They would appear to have important supplies of money, men, and women. They have bought land and erected buildings in almost every town and in many villages throughout Syria. Beirout is full of their fine establishments, the College of St. Joseph of the Jesuit Fathers being the most conspicuous. They all glory in the protection of France, and the French consular authorities openly and untiringly support the Papal campaign under the form of religion or of education.

The policy of the French Government in expelling the Jesuits and other religious societies from France, whilst befriending them as political agents and educators in the Levant, is as active in Syria as elsewhere, and though this "protection" may have cooled off since the passing of the "May laws" and the consequent abrogation of the "concordat," there have been signs recently of a revived interest in their protégés, due, no doubt, in a great measure to the growing political and commercial activity of Germany in Asiatic Turkey, and to Russian religious and educational activity among the Orthodox Greeks of Syria, which suggests the remark that, whatever may be the strength of the Franco-Russian political alliance, it does not appear very forcibly in these lands, where the struggle of Latin against Greek, and of French monks and nuns against Russian priests, inspired by jealousy and ecclesiastical hatred, is maintained as energetically as ever.

The French consuls are as assiduous as ever in their official attendance at the Easter services held in each of the numerous Catholic churches holding allegiance to Rome, and in assisting at the annual speech-day of every school, large or small, under French protection. At Beirout the consul-general last Easter week attended five services, *i.e.*, at the Latin Parish Church, the Maronite Cathedral, the Greek Catholic Cathedral, the Armenian Catholic Church and the Syrian Catholic Church, and in July he attended, in person or by proxy, over twenty schools under French protection on their speech days.

The relations between the French consulate-general at Beirout and the Maronite Patriarch in Mount Lebanon had of late years become strained, but they have somewhat improved since the arrival of the present consul-general, and the visit last spring of the councillor of the French Embassy to the Patriarch during his tour in Syria was taken advantage of to accentuate the more friendly state of things by extending to him a most cordial reception at Bekorké, the Patriarch's winter residence, on which occasion the speeches pronounced contained pointed allusions to the political benefits expected from France, which would not have been pleasant reading for the Ottoman Government.

The prompt arrival of a French war-ship to protect French citizens and Christians in general on the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey is another indication of the rôle the French Government is prepared to play in Syria under certain eventualities.

In Beirout the success of a newly instituted lay college under French non-religious auspices has caused considerable annoyance and harm to the Jesuit College of St. Joseph, and in Mount Lebanon the Maronite Patriarch has to deal with the development of a powerful anti-clerical party, chiefly recruited from the Masonic lodges in the mountain, so that the French consulate-general must be frequently placed in an awkward position when called upon to interfere, officially or unofficially, on behalf of one or the other of the conflicting parties. Preference is given to the Clerical party, the argument being

that the Patriarch is the officially recognised head of the Maronite community, and that those who become Freemasons, *ipso facto*, sever themselves politically from his Beatitude's jurisdiction in the same way as Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Druze converts to Protestantism.

As in Smyrna and other large centres, the activity of Italy in late years in assuming the protection over Italian religious societies, hitherto enjoying French protection, is visible in Syria, too, and the latest instance of their propaganda, which also includes the opening of schools and clubs, was the transfer by the Carmelite Fathers of Alexandretta of their allegiance from the French to the Italian flag in July last.

There are also several German Catholic institutions in Syria, which are included in the general protection of German Catholics in the East held out by the German Emperor in 1908. The best known are the hospice and school of the Catholic Sisters of St. Charles Borromée at Haifa and the hospice of the German Catholic Holy Land Society for lodging pilgrims and for agricultural pursuits at Tabgha (? Capernaum) on the Sea of Galilee.

2. *The Greek Orthodox.*

The Greek Orthodox element is not so very powerful, owing to the divisions that exist between the native Syrian Greeks—who are the rank and file of the Church—the foreign Greek party, and the so-called Russian Church party, backed by the Russian Government and actively supported by the consular authorities in resisting the aggression of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches on the Greek Orthodox constituency. The Russian Government have for some years past been trying to save the Greek Church in Syria from disintegration by opening schools and pushing the work in all directions. Among other things they have introduced in all their schools the scriptures in Arabic, as published by the American press at Beirout. They oppose the Greek Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, and aim at securing, wherever possible, native Syrian patriarchs and bishops in place of Greek monks. They have been active in buying land and erecting buildings, and do not entirely abstain from mingling political with religious considerations in most of their operations, striving apparently to thwart the schemes of the Roman Catholic Church as supported by the French consuls.

An instance has recently come to my knowledge where, not being able through want of funds to open an Orthodox school at Ras-el-Metn (Lebanon) to compete with the successful educational work of the English Friends Mission, the Russian consul-general at Beirout concluded arrangements for the opening of a school there under the auspices of the director of the French Laic College at Beirout.

In my despatch No. 4 of the 20th March, 1911, to His Majesty's Secretary of State, I had occasion to refer to the appointment of a paid Russian vice-consul at Haifa, which fact is taken as evidence of a desire on the part of the Russian Government to increase its activity in Galilee not only in connection with the assumption of the protection of the numerous Russian Jews in that district, but also the more effectively to support the agents of the Imperial Palestine Society of Moscow, the president of which is the Grand Duchess Sergius. This society, under pressure of national public opinion, has agreed to hand over to the control of the Russian Government its 160 schools in Syria and Palestine.

The principal scholastic centres are Beirout, Damascus, Nazareth, Tripoli (and Jerusalem), and the sum of 25,000*l.* is expended annually for their support.

3. *The Protestants.*

Protestantism in Syria is represented by English, Scotch, American, German, and Danish missions. It has become a recognised and established element in the Ottoman Empire, and does not suffer greater disabilities than the other Christian sects.

According to a recently published "review" of the Protestant educational work in Syria (which does not include Palestine), the number of native Protestant adherents is estimated at over 20,000.

England has always stood forth as the protector of Protestantism and of religious liberty in Turkey, and still continues to do so to some extent, though consular interference on behalf of native Protestants is usually officious and not official. The altered political relations between His Majesty's Government and that of the Sultan naturally brought about a change of attitude on the part of the Turks towards England and threw a shadow over the Protestants all over the Empire, as they were

supposed to be in sympathy with England. Nevertheless, Protestant educational institutions have kept their way growing in number and influence, and the number of pupils in Protestant schools has increased steadily. In some places the free tuition and books granted by Jesuits and Russians have enticed children away from Protestant schools, which adopt the principle of "self-help," but the more thorough teaching provided by them generally brings the pupils back again.

The extent of the work carried on by the twelve British institutions in this consular district can be estimated from the full report transmitted by me in my despatch No. 22 of 14th March, 1911.

The principal American institutions are—

1. The American Presbyterian Mission, with head-quarters at Beirout. It has 107 schools, gathering 6,000 pupils, besides which the members of the mission give theological instruction to candidates for the ministry.

2. The Syrian Protestant College, which is claimed to be the largest American educational institution in the world outside the United States. The eighteen buildings accommodate a staff of seventy instructors, and nearly 900 students, comprising Orthodox, Christians, Protestants, Moslems, Jews, and even Behais.

3. The reformed Presbyterians in North America (Covenanters), working principally among the Nusairieh, with head-quarters at Lattakia. They have twenty American missionaries with forty-eight native helpers working eighteen schools, with 640 pupils. The language of instruction is English, as in the mission schools.

The German Evangelical missions embrace—

(*a.*) The deaconesses of Kaiserswerth, thirty-one of whom serve the hospital of the Knights of St. John at Beirout, where they also have a large orphange and a school with 320 children. At Haifa two deaconesses serve as visiting nurses and kindergarten teachers.

(*b.*) The hospital of the Knights of St. John at Beirout, served by the Kaiserswerth deaconesses, superintended by a medical staff composed of British, American, and German physicians.

(*c.*) The Syrian orphanage of Jerusalem, commonly called "Schneller's," after its founder. It has agricultural departments at Bir Salem (Plain of Sharon), and near Nazareth.

(*d.*) The Jerusalem "Stiftung" operates schools and maintains chaplaincies at Beirout and elsewhere.

(*e.*) The Templars school at Haifa.

(*f.*) The Evangelical school at Haifa.

The Danish Mission to the Orient in the Damascus vilayet has eight Danish and seventeen Syrian workers, with 450 pupils, and has plans for extensive medical and church work under way.

The whole number of Protestant societies now operating in Syria is thirty-five, with 500 foreign workers, of whom about 200 are from Great Britain and 150 from America, and the pupils in Protestant schools number over 20,000. Medical missions are carried on in twenty-eight towns, with more than forty physicians, and twice as many trained nurses.

All these forces of Protestantism were held to have been brought to the front and given greater dignity in the eyes of the Moslems by the visit of the German Emperor to Syria in 1898, to the detriment of Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy, though at the same time His Imperial Majesty puffed up the Moslems to a new sense of their own importance by his famous Damascus speech.

In estimating the strength of Protestantism in Syria, especially of the German element, account must be taken of the colony of German "Templars" at Haifa of about 500 souls, mostly agriculturists, with their church, schools, and sanatorium, &c.

4. *The Jews.*

Notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of the Ottoman Government and the local fellaheen in general, who regard the steady influx of foreign Jews as a menace to their own rights and privileges, the modern Jewish element, backed by the Rothschild colonisation scheme and the Zionist movement, continues slowly to buy land and to erect buildings with a view to getting control of land comprised within the

limits of Palestine, parts of which are administratively under the control of the Beirout vilayet.

The Anglo-Palestine Company and the Deutsche Palestine Bank, especially the former, have for primary object the financial assistance of Jewish colonists in Syria and Palestine, and the Banque de Salonique, which has recently established a branch at Beirout, being a Jewish concern, will no doubt help in the same direction.

The majority of the 50,000 Jews in Syria are Ottoman subjects, most of the Russian Jews having relinquished their claim to Russian protection.

In my despatch No. 4, Confidential, of the 20th March last, referred to above, reporting the establishment of a Russian vice-consulate at Haifa, I pointed out the change of policy of the Russian Government in its relation to these Russian Jews, and I mentioned the preference for British protection evinced by these former subjects of Russia.

As your Excellency no doubt is aware, His Majesty's Government in 1850, in agreement with the Russian and Ottoman Governments, extended its protection to the Jews that were driven from Russia and had emigrated to Palestine. They were divided into two classes.

The first were accorded protection to themselves personally for life. The second enjoyed British protection till 1890. There are now only thirteen of the first class left in that portion of Palestine, i.e., Galilee, included in the Beirout vilayet.

Most of those who ceased to enjoy British protection in 1890 became automatically Ottoman subjects, because the Russian Government did not then claim them, nor had they any desire to revert back to Russian protection, for obvious reasons.

There are, however, 362 British Indian Jews, principally in Galilee (Beirout vilayet), and twenty-one Jews who have been naturalised in the United Kingdom or in British colonies.

Now that the Russian protection is held out to the Russian Jews they are tempted to accept it, especially if they are not subjected to military service in Russia, as they will be in Turkey under the new order of things.

As regards Jews from Austria, of which there are several hundreds, two years ago, when the Turkish authorities commenced enrolling Christians and Jews in the army, a great number of Jews in Galilee who had emigrated from Galicia and other parts of Austria-Hungary, but who had omitted to register themselves at the Austrian consulate, appealed to the Austrian Government to be recognised as Austro-Hungarian subjects, and after some difficulty with the Ottoman authorities, a special Austro-Turkish Commission was sent to Safed to decide the question once and for all. A list was drawn up of all those who could produce documentary evidence of their Austro-Hungarian origin, and about 100 families were added to those already under the protection of the Austrian consulates.

5. *The Mahommedans.*

The Mahommedans naturally enjoy the special favour and protection of the Ottoman Government. Where they find themselves in the majority, as at Damascus and Aleppo, they do not trouble themselves to molest Christians or Jews, though they look down upon them with a feeling of haughty superiority. Where they are in the minority, as in Beirout, the lower classes are insolent and offensive in their attitude towards Christians, and are often permitted to use personal violence with little fear of punishment, owing to the leniency of the authorities, who on all occasions display the grossest partiality in disputes that arise.

The general resuscitation of Mahommedan *esprit de corps* which took place under the Sultan Abdul Hamid had its repercussion in Syria, and local newspapers preached a Pan-Islamic alliance. The false teachings of the Mahdi and his khalifa were at the time singled out as necessitating special attention, as likely to tend eventually to the Soudanese being won over to Christianity by the kindness and medical services of Christian medical missions; and whereas, previous to 1882, Turkish journalists could not say enough in praise of everything British, since that period the occupation of Egypt has from time to time come in for its share of adverse criticism. Their affections have been gradually transferred to Germany, whose Emperor, silent and sympathetic during the Armenian massacres in 1895 and 1896, active and helpful during the Greco-Turkish war, demonstrative and effusive in 1898, has constituted himself the avowed "friend" of their Government ever since. The assumption of the protection of Italian interests in Turkey during the present hostilities has, however, somewhat shaken the confidence of the people in His Imperial Majesty's sincerity, and reminds them of the

time when England's friendship was proved on more than one occasion to be more than platonic.

The events in Tripoli have no doubt caused a recrudescence of Mahommedan feeling against Christians in general, but it is difficult to tell how far the Arabs of Syria will stir themselves, should they be called upon to do so, on behalf of the present Ottoman Government, to which they are by no means attached, owing to its policy of "Turkification," which they resent. Their grievances are being aired in the press, and, if the Committee of Union and Progress maintains its anti-Arab policy, there is every likelihood of the conflict between them and that party, under the leadership of Shoukry Effendi El-Arabi, member for Damascus, assuming grave proportions.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[47159] No. 97.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 831.)

Sir, *Pera, November 17, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 645 of the 20th September last, on the subject of Messrs. Lynch's navigation rights on the rivers of Mesopotamia, I had the honour to report that the Sublime Porte had addressed to me a "notice" informing me that the Imperial Government had decided to allow the second barge until the 3,800 tons of cargo accumulated at Bussorah had been forwarded, and that the necessary instructions had been sent to the competent authorities. I had, however, taken exception to this "notice," which went on to say in the second paragraph that, inasmuch as this permission was accorded in exceptional circumstances, it could not constitute a precedent, the words "et que les susdits bateaux ne pourront point se servir d'allèges après le transport des marchandises précitées" seeming to apply a denial of Lynch's right to tow even one barge.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, when their attention was called to this, replied that the privilege granted in 1899 was only provisional, and pointed out that His Majesty's Embassy had never answered the Sublime Porte's *note verbale* No. 16 of the 10th March, 1902, which complained of the continued use of the barges. It must, in fact, be admitted that some doubt exists as to the real scope of the permission granted by the Sublime Porte in 1899, but in view of the language used in Sir N. O'Conor's notes of the 1st September and the 25th October of that year, and of the fact that the use of the one barge has continued ever since apparently, His Majesty's Embassy feel justified in maintaining that the right to tow one barge must be considered as a permanently acquired right. To the point of the Sublime Porte that no answer was ever made to their *note verbale* of the 10th March, 1902, it was replied that no attempt was made to enforce the contention put forward in that *note verbale*, and that under the conditions prevailing under the old régime that fact sufficiently explained and justified the embassy's failure to answer the note. It was further pointed out that the Sublime Porte had equally failed to reply to Sir N. O'Conor's notes of the year 1899.

After a considerable amount of further discussion on the subject, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs has at last been induced to agree to suppress the phrase in the "notice" to which His Majesty's Embassy had taken exception. The amended version, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, differs from the original one only in its omissions at the end of paragraph 2 of the words already quoted. The Minister would not go so far as to admit categorically the right of Messrs. Lynch to tow the single barge, and the result of the substitution of this for the original notice is therefore to leave the *status quo* untouched as regards the single barge, but to allow the use of a second barge to work off the accumulation of cargo.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Note by Sublime Porte.

CONFORMÉMENT au désir exprimé dans l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 25 juillet dernier, le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé d'autoriser, cette fois encore, les bateaux de la compagnie Lynch à prendre à leur remorque deux allèges, afin d'assurer le transport de 3,800 tonnes de marchandises accumulées à Bassora.

Il est bien entendu que cette autorisation, n'ayant été accordée qu'à titre exceptionnel, ne pourra constituer un précédent pour l'avenir.

Des instructions en conséquence ont été données à qui de droit.

Sublime Porte, le 6 septembre, 1911.

[47532] No. 98.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 255.)

Sir, *Rome, November 23, 1911.*

I HAD the honour to receive in your telegram No. 254 of the 16th instant a repetition of Sir Gerard Lowther's telegram No. 318 of the 14th, in which his Excellency stated that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked whether a fresh appeal could not be made to the Italian Government on the subject of the neutralisation of the Red Sea.

As I was not instructed to make any further communication to the Italian Government officially, I have not done so. But from such conversations as I have had with the authorities here, I do not anticipate that I should find any disposition to be accommodating. At the beginning of hostilities, when there seemed reason to believe that the Turkish opposition in Tripoli itself had broken down, the Italian Government were ready and even anxious themselves to confine the area of hostilities to the smallest possible compass. Now that they have realised what a difficult task lies before them, they are evidently unwilling to relinquish any instrument which might avail them for bringing pressure to bear on the Turkish Government to accept the situation and end the state of war.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[48311] No. 99.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 855.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 711 of the 14th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the French scheme for the working of the lignite deposits in the province of Erzeroum.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, November 15, 1911.*

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my despatch No. 78, Confidential, of the 1st ultimo on the subject of French mining enterprise in this province, I have the honour to report that M. Roussel, the French geological expert, having completed his tour with entire satisfaction as regards the lignite deposits in this province, has now left for Paris, accompanied by Dikran Effendi Srabian, the dragoman of the French vice-consulate, who represents, as my French colleague informs me, nearly all the holders of *permis de recherche* in the district.

According to the statement of M. Destrèes, the French vice-consul, this undertaking enjoys the official support of the French Embassy at Constantinople, and there is every prospect of a contract being signed within the next few weeks between Dikran Effendi and the syndicate represented and mainly financed by the Comte Redon de Colombiers; and M. Destrèes is of opinion that mining operations may be begun early next summer—a sanguine view not generally held here, if only on account of the entire lack of means of communication and the very poor quantity of the coal hitherto offered for sale.

I am informed that M. Roussel's verdict on the mineral resources of this province in general was that, in view of its tertiary geological formation there was no likelihood of copper or other metals existing in sufficient quantity to ensure remunerative working. He is also said to have expressed the opinion that the lignite, although abundant, was too poor in quality to use for export or railway purposes.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[48321] No. 100.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 866.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 320 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting the visit of a French cruiser to Jaffa.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, November 18, 1911.*

IN confirmation of the information contained in my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the French cruiser "Jules Ferry," Captain de Spitz, arrived at Jaffa on the morning of the 16th instant, and left again in the afternoon for Suda Bay. The captain called on the local authorities and visited the various French institutions.

The visit of this war-ship was intended to reassure the inhabitants of Jaffa by showing them that they had not been forgotten, and that, in case of need, a man-of-war could appear at short notice. It cannot fail to have a beneficial effect, although it would have been better if it could have been prolonged over Friday, a day which is always looked forward to by the non-Moslems with some nervousness.

The situation at Jaffa and its neighbourhood is quiet, and the authorities seem to have realised the necessity of putting an end to demonstrations, however peaceable their object.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[48322] No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 867.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 26, 1911.*

ASSIM BEY spoke to me yesterday about the counter-proposals regarding the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf questions which His Majesty's Government had communicated to the Turkish Ambassador in a memorandum on the 29th July last.

It would not appear that the Cabinet has as yet devoted much study to the question, for the memorandum has not yet been translated into Turkish, nor was Assim Bey in possession of the agreements and treaties respecting Koweit which you had sent to Tewfik Pasha on the 2nd instant at his request.

His Excellency said that he would like to talk over some of the points with me, but I suggested that, as Tewfik Pasha had authority to discuss the general question, it would be better that the Turkish Government should decide on the amendments to our proposals which they desired to suggest, and send them to his Excellency. He said, however, before doing so he would prefer to discuss some of the points academically, and proceeded to say that the Ottoman Government were very much opposed to the participation of Russia in the final portions of the railway, and would like to suggest that the Russian share should be divided up between the other four participants, thus giving to each 25 per cent., and he was of opinion that Turkey should also provide the president of the board. I observed that in the Bagdad Railway Turkey only had 10 per cent., and in view of the fact that the line was an Ottoman one and in Ottoman territory, there did not appear to be any necessity for her to require a share equal to the others. The Minister did not relish the reference to the Bagdad Railway, which he said was an unfortunate legacy of Sultan Abdul Hamid's, and should not be taken as providing a precedent.

I understand from another quarter that the suggestion that the Ottoman Government are likely to put forward is the elimination of Russia and the retention of 20 per cent. for Turkey, the remaining 80 per cent. to be divided between the three other Powers.

His Excellency then observed that he did not quite see the object of any group of capitalists having the majority vote on the board of such a railway. If the interested Powers were represented in any form it was clear that preferential rates could not be established. Moreover, though he declared he had refrained from showing the German Ambassador the text of our proposals, he had asked him whether it would be possible to apply preferential rates, and whether this ever occurred on the Anatolian line. The Ambassador had obviously replied in the negative, and Assim Bey asked me whether I could produce specific cases of such preferential rates being given. I said that at present I could not, but there were undoubtedly ways in which advantages could be given which were not apparent, and that it was the general view that this did occur.

Assim Bey then went on to say that he did not understand why the idea of Koweit as a terminus had been abandoned in favour of Bussorah. I said I imagined that as both places would require considerable works to transform them into a suitable harbour, and that Bussorah was already a town of considerable importance with merchants and their warehouses established there, it would seem to have certain advantages over Koweit. Moreover, the long stretch of railway line over the desert would add somewhat to the cost of transport. To my enquiry why the Turkish Government appeared to prefer Koweit the Minister furnished no very definite reply, but merely said that such a line as that to Koweit might be the beginning of a railway system which would be of use to Turkey in quelling disorders among the Arab tribes of those regions.

With the other proposals contained in the memorandum Assim Bey did not deal, but I understand that other members of the Cabinet consider that it would be very difficult to obtain the acceptance of the Chamber of a measure for removing the existing veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt if presented by itself, although it might perhaps be possible to do so if it formed part of a general proposal for the settlement of all outstanding difficulties with Great Britain, a settlement which the present Cabinet express themselves as most anxious to bring about.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[48323] No. 102.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 868.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch sent to the Government of India by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad with regard to the British post-office in that town.

I have the honour to state that I concur in Mr. Lorimer's view, and would propose, subject to your approval, to so inform him.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 102.

Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bagdad, October* 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith copy of a letter and enclosure, dated the 20th September, 1911, which I have received from the Postmaster-General, Bombay, relating to a proposal made by the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in Turkey.

2. The present arrangements regarding mails at Bagdad are known to the authorities in India, and need not be described here. Certain closed mails are exchanged between the British and Turkish post-offices at Bagdad, but these contain neither letters and parcels from abroad for Bagdad and its suburbs, nor letters and parcels from Bagdad and its suburbs for abroad. Letters and articles belonging to these two classes form, of course, much the larger and more important part of the British mail, and to transfer them to the closed mail service would be to do away with the bulk of the British post-office's business by making it over to the Turkish post-office.

3. The object of the Turkish proposal is evident; it is to abolish the British post-office here in so far as this can be done at a single step. Under the Turkish proposal the incoming mail would be taken to the Turkish post-office instead of to the British, and would be distributed by it. (It may be remarked, in passing, that even the residency official mail, besides private and commercial correspondence in general, would thus pass through Turkish hands prior to delivery. It would be delayed, and might be tampered with.) The only function remaining to the British post-office at Bagdad would apparently be to dispatch to the Persian Gulf, India, and Europe such communications as were still entrusted to it in preference to the Turkish office by senders, and it cannot be doubted that the Turkish postal authorities would soon draw attention to such an "anomalous survival," and request its abolition. If this further demand were conceded the British post-office at Bagdad would cease to exist, or at least would have no regular postal work to do.

4. It is probably unnecessary that I should devote time or space to proving that the abolition of the British post-office at Bagdad would be a mistake, and little or nothing short of a calamity.

The present state of Turkey as regards political disorganisation and the inefficiency of the public services is a matter of common knowledge. I have very recently had occasion to remark on the unsatisfactory working of the Turkish post-office in this very province (see summary of events for September 1911).

On the other hand, it is no idle boast to say that among the few stable and efficient public institutions at Bagdad are the British residency and its connected establishments, among which the post-office is perhaps the most generally useful. The British post-office at Bagdad is patronised to a large extent by the foreign consulates and foreign firms at Bagdad, who, even in correspondence with Europe, often prefer it, because of its accurate and reliable working, to the more rapid but less certain Turkish overland mails viâ Damascus and Aleppo. Any interference with it would be widely deplored, and would unfavourably affect trade.

5. It should be mentioned that there is no delay in distributing the British mail at Bagdad. The British mail-steamer's approximate time of arrival is known beforehand; she whistles on arrival, and the mail is sorted for delivery immediately, if the hour permits, otherwise the next morning. If the Turkish post-office were to be brought into the matter there would be no acceleration of delivery it is safe to say, but the reverse—at least in the case of those for whose use the British post-office primarily exists. Similarly there is no delay in dispatching the British mail from Bagdad after the advertised hour of its closing.

6. To touch at all on the political aspect of the question would be superfluous. The surrender of a long-enjoyed privilege without compensation, to the general detriment and for no valid reason at all, would be unjustifiable from the national standpoint.

The maintenance of the British post-office at Bagdad is now more than ever essential as a set-off to the German Bagdad Railway and the advantages for Germany which it will bring in its train.

A better case could probably be made out for the abolition of the British post-office at Constantinople, where the Turkish administration is more efficient than here, and the means of communication with places abroad are more speedy and numerous;

but, unless I am much mistaken, any such subversive proposal would be rejected, *in limine*, as inconsistent with the prescriptive rights of the British Government in Turkey.

7. I am advising the Postmaster-General, Bombay, by means of a copy of this letter, that he should not in any way entertain the Turkish proposals without orders from the Government of India, the question raised being of political importance.

It will be observed that the Turkish Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs has endeavoured to snatch a favourable decision from the Postmaster-General, Bombay, as if the matter were one of detail merely, instead of addressing himself to the chief postal authority in India, or—as with still greater propriety, in view of the transparently political character of his proposal, he might have done—causing the matter to be raised in a diplomatic manner at Constantinople.

It is also significant that the Turkish Director-General's letter contains no reference to the subsidies at present paid by the Government of India for the carriage of the mails on the Bombay–Bagdad line, in regard to which, if the British post-office at Bagdad were abolished, modifications would have to be made.

It was evidently intended, I venture to think, that the scope of the Turkish proposals should not be perceived until they had been accepted.

8. I am instructing the postmaster, Bagdad, not to make any change in the procedure now followed here without my assent, which will not be given without orders from the Government of India.

9. The letter of the Turkish Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs to the Postmaster-General, Bombay, might, in the first case, perhaps, be left unanswered. If a reminder should be received from him it might be replied that his proposal does not commend itself to the Government of India, who foresee no advantage from its adoption. The Turkish Director-General would then be obliged either to drop his proposal altogether or to commit it to diplomatic channels.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, *I.C.S., Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

Postmaster-General, Bombay Circle, to Consul-General Lorimer.

Sir, *Bombay, September* 29, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a letter, dated the 24th August, 1911, from the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, Turkey, and to request that you will kindly let me know whether there is any objection, from a political point of view, to the acceptance of the proposal made by the Turkish Post Office. In the meantime, the Indian postmaster of Bagdad has been instructed to take your orders regarding the disposal of any closed mails addressed to Bombay that may be received by him from the Turkish post-office at that place.

2. In connection with this question I beg to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with your office letter, dated the 6th July, 1887, addressed to my office.

I have, &c.

E. A. DORAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 102.

Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, Turkey, to Postmaster-General, Bombay.

Constantinople, August 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that communications originating in India intended for Bagdad and its neighbourhood are enclosed in the closed mails from your office at Bombay for the British office at Bagdad, and are transmitted by the latter to the Turkish office at that place for being delivered or forwarded onward to their destination. Those coming from Bagdad and neighbourhood intended for India are likewise transmitted by the Turkish office at Bagdad to the British office at the same place for being forwarded onward to their destination.

You will concur with me, I think, in considering that the intervention of the British post-office at Bagdad in exchange of these communications is quite useless, and only tends to make them suffer delay.

With a view to obviating such delays, my administration has decided to shortly have closed mails from the Turkish office at Bagdad made up for the office at Bombay, and to enclose therein all the mails intended for India and the Far East. I shall be obliged if you will be so good as to instruct, on your side, the office at Bombay to make up at the earliest date possible the reciprocal closed mails for the Turkish office at Bagdad, and to enclose therein the communications intended for Bagdad and beyond.

I trust that you will favourably dispose of my proposal, and will let me know the date from which the Bombay office will dispatch direct mails to the Turkish office at Bagdad.

[48326] No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 871. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1911.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the apparently well-founded anticipations of the article in the "Gazette financière," which I had the honour to transmit to you in my despatch No. 636 of the 18th September last, the Chester scheme has so far revived once more as to come up for discussion in the Ottoman Chamber on the 20th, 22nd, and again on the 27th instant.

The decision of the Chamber to waste its time in discussing this ill-fated scheme is all the more remarkable in that Mr. Chester, who left here, as he said himself, for good last July, worn out by obstacles and delays, has, from what my American colleague tells me, no further wish to carry the project through, and has withdrawn the "caution" money which he had deposited with the Ottoman Government. There seems to be a wild idea among the few Turks who still support the scheme that, if only the Chamber will pass it, in the eleventh hour Mr. Glasgow, or some other concessionnaire, will come forward, armed with the necessary financial backing, and take it over in its present form.

The attitude of the Government in the debate was remarkable. The three or four deputies who are interested in the scheme were preparing to give it their special support during the discussion, and sounded Houloussi Bey, Minister of Public Works, as to his attitude, and were informed by him that they might save themselves the trouble, as he would himself give it all the necessary support. As Under-Secretary in the department, Houloussi Bey had been a warm advocate of the scheme, and his support therefore seemed natural. His method of fulfilling his promise however was to emphasise all the objections he could think of to the scheme, and finally to suggest its return to the Public Works Commission in the Chamber for further modifications. His first objection was that the right granted to the concessionnaire to discover and exploit mines for a distance of 20 kilom. on either side of the proposed line might not be in accord with the provisions of the new mining law, though Mr. Chester had, I believe, explicitly undertaken to conform in all respects to the requirements of this measure.

His Excellency next commented on the fact that the proposed railway was to be narrow gauge. This, he said, from the military point of view in particular, was a grave objection, as both the Northern Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, which it was intended to link up, were normal gauge. Yet, if the Chamber accepted Mr. Chester's subsequent offer to make the gauge a normal one, the Minister brought forward a host of figures to prove that this would practically end in the Government paying a kilometric guarantee of 4,226 fr. per kilometre. Mr. Chester had stipulated in his convention that any excess expenditure over 160,000 fr. per kilometre which might be involved in constructing a normal gauge would have to be borne by Government, but he had offered them a way out of the difficulty by offering them a loan to cover such expenditure, the Government merely paying interest and sinking fund on the loan. Houloussi Bey therefore maintained that the payment of this interest and sinking fund was tantamount to the payment of a kilometric guarantee of 4,226 fr.

Finally the Minister drew attention to the fact that the company had the option at the end of the two years granted to them for surveys, &c., to accept or reject the

concession, and claimed that the Government should be allowed a similar option when the surveys were completed and the scheme had taken more definite shape.

The Minister's views met with considerable criticism in the discussion on the 27th instant. He endeavoured to prevent any discussion in the House by reiterating his conviction that in the country's interests the railway must be broad gauge and the Government must have a right of option; said he would not change his opinion even if the scheme were, as was proposed, returned to the Council of Ministers for reconsideration, and that he would rather resign than give way on the subject.

The proposal to send the Bill back to the Council of Ministers was accordingly dropped, but the discussion continued. The reporter of the Commission of Public Works pointed out that no concessionnaire would accept the suggestion put forward by the Minister that the Government, who required the railway in principle, should have a right of option when surveys, &c., had been completed. He then proceeded to attack the Minister for his change of front, which was to be attributed to the fact that he had come under foreign influence. The German-Russian agreement had divided up the middle east into spheres of influence, in which American capital now had no place, and, if it were ousted in the present case, the whole of Anatolia would come under German control. Similar attacks were made upon other officials in the Public Works Department, notably, Moukhtar Bey, the Director of Railways, whose pro-German inclinations are notorious. They are, I believe, not without foundation, for I understand, from private information received, that the Germans have for the past two months been pressing the Government here to allow them to change the *tracé* of the Bagdad line in such a manner as to tap the oil-fields which the Chester scheme aims at acquiring, and also to reach Bagdad viâ Khanikin. It is therefore much to their interest to wreck this scheme.

The debate, which had to be discontinued on the 27th owing to the Minister's presence being required in the Senate to defend the German convention relative to the extension of the Anatolian system from Ada-Bazar to Bolu, has now been adjourned, probably until after the approaching Bairam festival.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[48327] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 872.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 286 and 287 of the 24th October, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British acting consul at Bussorah respecting matters connected with the Bagdad Railway.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

Acting Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Bussorah, October 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 148 and 149 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that Mr. C. Darby, the local manager of Messrs. Strick, Scott, and Co. (Limited), of London, informed me on the 23rd instant that the vali had requested him to tender for the dredging of the bar at the entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab. The vali told Mr. Darby that he would obtain a concession for him, and spoke of purchasing two dredgers at a cost of 50,000*l.* each. He stated that a company would have to be formed in accordance with Turkish law and registered at Constantinople, but that there would be no difficulty about this. The vali did not press for an immediate reply, and Mr. Darby has reported the vali's conversation to his London office.

The proposal is interesting, as showing that the Turkish Government is still preoccupied with the bar. It may be mentioned here that a dredger, brought out some years after Midhat Pasha's achievements in the Gulf region, has been rusting for thirty years on the left bank of the river, opposite Bussorah.

It has been reported for some time past that Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., the local agents of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, are endeavouring to acquire land in Bussorah on behalf of the Bagdad Railway Company. I am now in possession of reliable information that this firm has been in negotiation with Abdul Wahab Pasha, one of the deputies of Bussorah (my despatch No. 53 of the 18th ultimo), for the purchase of a plot of ground on the river between Maghil and Ghermet Ali, owned by the Zuhair family. When Bagdad Railway material arrives in Bussorah a depôt will be necessary for storing it, pending its dispatch to Bagdad. Abdul Wahab Pasha departed for Constantinople on the 28th instant, and it is stated that no sale has been effected, but I am without definite information on this point.

A German engineer of the Bagdad Railway, who passed through Bussorah a few weeks ago, stated that the company would shortly send out twelve steamers and twenty-four barges to convey railway material from Bussorah to Bagdad. I am informed that Emin Bey, the local agent of the Idareh-i-Nehrieh, states that the Bagdad Railway Company has arranged to send out six steamers, which will work in connection with the Idareh steamers. According to Emin Bey, three of these steamers will ultimately become the property of the Idareh. Possibly no definite arrangements have been made yet.

I transmit herewith a translation of the decision of the administrative council of the Bussorah vilayet of the 19th August, 1911, respecting the proposed sale for £ T. 180,000 of the "Senieh" date-gardens at Dawasir to Jasim-bin-Ibrahim, a member of a pearl-dealing firm established in Bombay. I am informed that before applying for this land Jasim-bin-Ibrahim took the precaution of having himself registered as an Ottoman subject in the Turkish consulate at Bombay. The decision not to sell this land was mainly due to the "patriotic" efforts of Jelal Bey, the then Vali of Bussorah. An article, said to have been inspired by Jelal Bey, was published on the 18th August in a local newspaper, "Ar-Reshad," denouncing the proposed sale of the Dawasir date-gardens.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Decision of the Bussorah Administrative Council, No. 804 of July 28, 1327 (August 10, 1911).

(Translation.)

THE telegram of the Ministry of Finance of the 19th July, 1327 (1st August, 1911), and the observations of the official of "transferred lands" have been read. The date-gardens of Dawasir and Aradah include a large tract of 4,000 jeribs under cultivation and 150 jeribs uncultivated. According to the sums paid for its lease for the thirteen years ending with the year 1329, a yearly revenue of £ T. 5,249 is obtained in addition to tithes. In this district the value of land is gradually increasing, and it is certain that the value of the date-gardens in question will be doubled or trebled. The question whether this land should be disposed of or not contains considerations of extraordinary importance and nicety. The land is situated near the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, and, apart from the increased value which it will acquire in the future, it is a set-off to the land on the opposite bank, in the Jezirat-al-Khidhr, called Abadan, which is in the possession of foreigners. If sold, no matter to whom, there is no doubt that it would ultimately pass into foreign hands; that it would cause political and administrative dangers; and that it would have far-reaching effects upon the future affairs not only of the vilayet of Bussorah, but of all Irak. Therefore its remaining in the control of the State is essential, and a reply shall be sent to the Ministry of Finance that the application of the aforesaid customer, who formerly resided in Bombay, involves the dangers mentioned, and has been rejected.

Decision given, the 28th July, 1327 (10th August, 1911).

(Seal of Administrative Council.)

[48330] No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 875. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul reporting generally on the events in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Mosul, November 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency on current events in this district as follows:—

1.—The War between Italy and Turkey.

The officers of the XIIth Army Corps have offered to contribute a month's salary towards the expenses of the war, and to forego 1 per cent. of their salaries as long as it lasts.

The official paper of this vilayet, the "Mosul," states that the chiefs of the Rania tribe have offered to furnish a fighting contingent. Their offer was probably prompted by Colonel Refik Bey, the Ottoman frontier commissioner. A subscription for the Ottoman navy was opened several weeks ago, but it resulted in practically no donations. Energetic efforts are now being made to raise funds for this purpose, and methods of semi-compulsion may produce a fair sum. Few, even of the Moslems, have responded with any alacrity. It is believed that about 1,000 liras have hitherto been collected. There is talk of increasing the "temettu" tax.

The people of Mosul remain indifferent to the war. The absence of any attempt on the part of the influential Moslems to kindle fanaticism is due to the fact of Tahir Pasha, who is believed to have the support of all the higher military officers. 'Asuf Effendi, the reactionary editor of the "Nijah" paper, has been warned that attempts to cause disturbance will not be tolerated. There has been no move on the part of the "Hur-i-Mu'tedil." At the same time, the influence of the local Committee of Union and Progress is steadily decreasing, and there is great reticence with regard to the committee generally on the part of the officers and officials, whilst the notables are almost unanimously outspoken in condemnation of it.

The authorities are daily circulating reports of Italian reverses, some of which emanate originally from the Brousa branch of the Committee of Union and Progress. Official indignation is directed at least as much against Germany as Italy. It is understood that the Mosul deputies have been instructed to use their influence against German enterprises. The vali observed to me a few days ago that there may be surprises when the plans of the Bagdad Railway Company are submitted to the Porte for approval in a few months.

During the past few days reports have been circulated to the effect that the Imam Yahya is on his way to Tripoli with a large force of Arabs to help the Turks, that the Italians have been driven out of Tripoli with great loss, and that England, France, and Russia are intervening on behalf of Turkey. The authorities made every effort to provoke a display of popular satisfaction at these tidings, but failed completely. Officers and officials here are declaring without reserve that the friendship of England will in future be sought by Turkey, and that they are now alive to the worth of German support. The "Nijah" recently quoted an article from the "Ikbal," which is printed in Beirout, ascribing the outbreak of the war to the policy of England and France in northern Africa. I am informed that the vali sent for 'Asuf Effendi, the editor, and requested him to abstain from publishing articles of the kind.

The landowners of the Erbil district are complaining of the diminishing export of wheat owing to the war.

A translation of a telegram, which has passed through Mosul, from the Muntafik deputy to the Muntafik Arabs, is given in the annex to this despatch.

II.—Military and Frontier Information.

Movements of Officers.

(*a.*) Is'ad Pasha, commandant of the XIIth Army Corps, left Mosul on the 31st October for Kerkuk and Suleimania. A tour of inspection is given out as the purpose of his journey. There is, however, reason to anticipate that his tour will be extended to the frontier districts lying between Pesswa and Khanikin.

Colonel Refik Bey, the Ottoman frontier commissioner, when last heard of was at Suleimania.

Liwa Tevfik Pasha, commandant of the 36th Division (Kerkuk), has left for Constantinople—nominally on leave.

Movements of Troops.

(*b.*) There is talk of dispatching a battalion, or even two battalions, from Mosul to Khanikin.

(*c.*) The Russian vice-consul for Mosul, Lieutenant-Colonel Kirsanov, whose movements were last reported on in paragraph 11*t* (*c.*) of my despatch No. 33 of the 12th October, arrived here on the 19th October after a tour of nearly four months, in the course of which he visited Van, Urmi, and Tabreez. He returned to Mosul by way of Shuou, Naghirdeh, Pesswa, the Genishin Pass, Rayat, Ravanduz, and Erbil. He states that he found the following troops of the XIIth Army Corps at the following places :—

Naghirdeh.—The staff of the 107th Regiment; the cadre of the same regiment, comprising forty or fifty men; one old-pattern 6-gun mountain battery and forty-five men; eight gendarmes.

Rahdaneh or Rikhta.—(Near Naghirdeh, but not indicated on the War Office map); 120 men of the 2nd battalion of the 107th Regiment; the staff of the 2nd battalion of the 107th Regiment.

Pesswa.—Two companies of the 107th Regiment (battalion unknown).

Ravanduz.—A force of 150 men, described as the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 104th Regiment; 40 to 50 gendarmes.

Erbil.—40 to 50 gendarmes.

He found no troops between Pesswa and Ravanduz. The Turkish authorities at Naghirdeh gave him zaptiehs to escort him as far as Ravanduz. He met with repeated signs of lax discipline amongst the Turkish soldiers in the frontier posts.

The vice-consul was for ten days the guest of this vice-consulate, and then left for Bagdad.

(*d.*) It is said to be the intention of the Turkish authorities to gradually replace by gendarmes the troops on the frontier.

(*e.*) A captain named 'Aouni Bey has been appointed "administrative officer" (idaré me'mourou) at Sulduz.

(*f.*) A notable of Suleimania named Seyyid Ahmed Baba Resoul has been appointed "administrative officer" at Serdesht.

III.—Public Works.

Kerkuk Irrigation Scheme.

(Last reference—paragraph 11 of my despatch No. 24 of the 10th July.)

(*a.*) I am informed by an Englishman,* who was recently at Altun Keupri, that an attempt to drive a canal from a point on the Lesser Zab, about nine hours east-north-east of Altun Keupri towards Kerkuk has failed after three months' work. The failure was due to the hilly nature of the land north of Kerkuk. It was foreseen by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad when he visited the Kerkuk district last year.

A canal is now being cut from Molla, a point on the river about 12 miles south-east of Altun Keupri, towards Kerkuk; 200 men are employed at wages ranging from 7 to 10 tariff piastres per diem. Great difficulty is being experienced in obtaining sufficient labour, and a strike of the workmen with a view to better pay is threatened.

* Mr. Mills, who has recently come to Mosul as the representative of Messrs. Macandrew and Forbes' Euphrates Company.

The partially obliterated remains of an ancient canal, running in the same direction as the present work, exists. It is not being utilised.

In the Erbil and Kerkuk districts the general feeling is that much money will be spent and very little accomplished.

Improvements on the Mosul–Kerkuk and Mosul–Ravanduz Roads.

(*b.*) 300 liras have been assigned towards modifying the slope leading from the ground-level to the highest point of the old bridge at Altun Keupri.

The construction of the bridge over the Greater Zab at Kelek is being hurried on. The chief engineer of this vilayet has recently made several journeys to Kelek to inspect the work. The stone piers destined to carry the approach to the bridge over the extensive swamps on either bank have reached the channel on both sides.

The local authorities have bought for this work of Messrs. Lynch's agency in Mosul a pump for 140 liras, and of another British firm in Bagdad 800 barrels of Portland cement.

It is announced that a road is shortly to replace the rough track between Erbil and Ravanduz.

(*c.*) A bridge is being built over the Dakuk Son at Dakuk. According to all accounts very little has yet been done.

(*d.*) The other public works in the district, which have been reported on from time to time by this vice-consulate, are in abeyance.

IV.—Tel 'Afar District.

On the 21st October a party of merchants travelling from Aleppo to Mosul were robbed near Tel 'Afar of goods of an alleged value of 250 liras.

During the past few years lawlessness in the immediate neighbourhood of that town has been steadily on the increase, and of late scarcely a week has passed without some incident.

It was usual to attribute these depredations to the Shammar Arabs. It is, however, impossible to hold them responsible for the present robbery, as most of the tribe has moved south of the Mosul Vilayet owing to the high prices of barley and wheat resulting from a poor harvest in all parts of this province except the Shammuk district.

The real robbers are probably a gang of Turcomans in league with certain notables of Mosul and of Tel 'Afar itself. It has at last been decided to establish guard-houses for the protection of caravans at two spots where these outrages have been most frequent.

V.—The English Missions.

The Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission.

(*a.*) This mission is being reinforced by a clergyman and a dispenser. The dispenser, Mr. Reed, has spent the past year in England qualifying for his present work. He previously served for several years in the mission at Urmi, Koshannes, and Van. It is proposed to open in Amadia itself a small dispensary for the Moslems, and this will do much to enhance the influence and popularity of the Englishmen at Bibaydi. Dr. Wigram's brother, who is an architect, is also expected shortly. He will superintend the building of the premises at Bibaydi. Although no "firman" has yet been received, the vali has at last sanctioned on his own responsibility the building of residential quarters for the mission. No attempt will be made to build a church or school until the "firman" arrives.

In view of the Russian overtures to Mar Shimun mentioned in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 32 of the 26th September, Dr. Wigram is visiting Koshannes.

The Church Missionary Society.

(*b.*) Miss Martin, who has been in England since May, is expected here in a few days. She has secured the services of a doctor and his wife, who is a trained nurse. The doctor will first proceed to Constantinople to obtain an Ottoman diploma. There is now every probability of the medical work of the mission, which is its most useful branch, being at last established on a worthy footing.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

VI.—The Bagdad Railway.

(Last reference—my despatch No. 30 of the 12th September.)

The party of engineers who were surveying under M. Aublé, chief of the third section of the line, between Hegna and Mosul, have returned to this town, having completed that portion of their work. They are likely to remain for the present here, drawing up a report of the survey from Nisibin to Mosul.

Two more young engineers recently arrived from Aleppo, an Armenian named Sérovpé Hurmuz, and a Greek named Karydas. The former has had experience of railway engineering in the Congo, the latter has served in a land company in Egypt. They are surveying from Mosul towards Bagdad. They have hitherto remained in close proximity to the river.

They are one of four parties, who are carrying out the survey between Mosul and Bagdad. None of the other three parties, who are working in the opposite direction, have yet entered this vilayet.

There are indications that instructions have been received to complete the survey and draw up the plans for submission to the Porte as speedily as possible. I gather that alternate plans will be made in case of the Porte rejecting any part of those first submitted. M. Aublé tells me that 350 kilom. remain to be surveyed between Mosul and Bagdad. There is now no further room to doubt that the main line will pass through Mosul, and that the stretch between Hegna and Mosul will be part of the main line.

The railway station will be at the southern extremity of Mosul.

In a recent conversation, M. Aublé told me he has no further news of the Englishman who applied for service on the Bagdad Railway. A German engineer, who was present, observed that Englishmen are generally specialists in some one branch of engineering, and for that reason they rarely combine the knowledge of surveying and construction, which the company requires.

Meissner Pasha is expected here in about a fortnight.

M. Aublé's wife and family will arrive with Meissner Pasha, and all the engineers are making preparations for living some years in Mosul.

VII.—Foreign Consular Officers.

(*a.*) Herr Ebert, the German vice-consul for Mosul, returned on the 3rd instant after a tour of four months, in the course of which he visited Van, Sairt, and Bitlis.

(*b.*) M. de Sandfort, the French vice-consul for Mosul, is transferred to Tabreez. He will be replaced by a vice-consul from Scutari (Albania).

VIII.—The Vali of Mosul.

Towards the end of October there were persistent rumours that Tahir Pasha was about to become Minister of the Interior. He himself denied them, but it is generally believed that they were not entirely without foundation. Very friendly relations are said to exist between him and Said Pasha.

Tahir Pasha's son, Jevdet Bey, who was recently kaimakam at Novrokop (Salonica Vilayet), has been appointed Mutessarif of Hakkiari at Bash-Kala'a (Van Vilayet). The vali tells me that the lack of energy displayed by the Julamerk authorities in connection with the recent raid near Asheetha is a cause of the removal of the late mutessarif.

This appointment is likely to be eminently acceptable to Mar Shimun, the Nestorian patriarch. It will also be welcomed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's mission.

IX.—The Liquorice Trade.

Messrs. Macandrew and Forbes, of New York and Smyrna, who have for some time exported liquorice from this district through a native agent, have now sent Mr. Mills, an Englishman, to represent them in Mosul. The nature of his business will necessitate his travelling in many parts of the vilayet, and he may be able to supply His Majesty's vice-consul with valuable information.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

Telegram sent from Constantinople on the 2nd November, 1911, to the Chiefs of the Muntafik Tribe by Abdul Muhsin-el-Sa'doun, the Muntafik Deputy.

(Translation.)

AS you know, the Italians, who are the bitterest enemies of our religion, have attacked Tripoli, an important part of our empire. Its inhabitants are both Sunnis and Shi'as. They have for nearly a month fought energetically against the unbelievers (kafereen) in order not to be cut off from the Khalifate and the Ottoman Government. They are still fighting and—thanks to God!—they have defeated the unbelievers and inflicted great loss on them. They have also retaken most of the places captured by them in Tripoli. According to the Sheri'at, all Moslems are bound to help in the struggle with their money and persons, for the sake of God. Therefore, obedient to the faith and its laws, you—like other Moslem communities—should contribute funds. Otherwise—which God forbid!—foreigners and unbelievers will rule over you, and you will be deprived of your religion and homes.

[48331] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 876. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, November 29, 1911.*

IN his despatch No. 35, Confidential, of the 5th ultimo, copy of which I had the honour to transmit to you in my despatch No. 875 of to-day, His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul informs me that he considers there is now no further room for doubt that the main line of the Bagdad Railway will pass through Mosul, and that the stretch between Hegna and Mosul will be part of the main line.

From enquiries made here it would appear that the representatives of the company are working here with a view to the adoption of that *tracé*.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[48494] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 4, 1911.*

I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna informing me that a British vessel struck a mine going into Smyrna escorted by a pilot boat. The mine apparently only broke propeller and did not explode.

A strong protest has been entered by Mr. Barnham.

[48595] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 333.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 4, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah telegraphs under yesterday's date, that Sheikh Said was bombarded on the 30th ultimo by the Italian cruiser "Dogali," which then proceeded to Perim. It is reported that the fire from the Turkish fort had disabled her.

On the 30th November, Mokha was bombarded by the "Aretusa." A dhow was sunk and several huts set on fire; one killed and four wounded among Turks on shore.

Khoka, a port south of Hodeidah, was destroyed on the 1st December after an all-day bombardment by the "Aretusa." Many casualties on the Turkish side.

The "Aretusa" has evidently been looking for the Turkish gun-boat flotilla, and has appeared several times at Camaran, having shown great activity in those waters during the last week.

Should a bombardment of Hodeidah be begun, Turkish military authorities have decided to reply.

[45779] No. 109.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a note, dated the 6th November, from the German Ambassador,* asking that, so far as the oxide already mined at Abu Musa is concerned, instructions may be issued to the effect that any further shipments by Messrs. Wönckhaus may take place without impediment.

After a full consideration of all the circumstances, and of the terms of former notes on the subject to the German Embassy, Sir E. Grey considers that His Majesty's Government should accede to the German Government's request on this point, and that it would hardly be dignified to contest it.

The oxide already mined has, as you are aware, apparently been damaged by exposure, so that no great commercial advantage would accrue to Messrs. Wönckhaus over British competitors if the whole amount of oxide mined were placed at that firm's disposal.

Subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, Sir E. Grey accordingly proposes to inform the German Ambassador that the whole of the oxide already mined is at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus, and that immediate instructions are being issued to Colonel Cox to facilitate exportation at the convenience of the German firm.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[48494] No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 444.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 331 of 4th December.

Express earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that every possible precaution, in the interests of neutral shipping, will be taken to prevent the recurrence of such accidents as that which befell the "Saidieh" at Smyrna, and emphasise the importance of instituting an efficient service of pilots, both at Salonica and Smyrna.

[48807] No. 111.

Tewfik Pacha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments au Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté des Affaires Etrangères et a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence que des navires de guerre italiens ont récemment bombardé le port de Moka, dans la Mer Rouge, et détruit les habitations et les voiliers de la population.

Le bombardement d'une ville ou d'une localité qui n'est pas fortifiée et ne possède pas de garnison est non seulement universellement reconnu comme contraire aux principes du droit international moderne, qui régit les actes d'hostilités permis aux belligérants, mais peut aussi avoir pour conséquence de pousser à la vengeance les tribus indigènes, qui ne peuvent faire de distinction entre les diverses nationalités étrangères.

Bien que le Gouvernement Impérial ait pris toutes les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir et empêcher une explosion d'indignation de la part des tribus arabes en question, il croit cependant utile d'attirer la sérieuse attention du Gouvernement de Sa

* No. 90.

Majesté britannique sur l'iniquité de l'action italienne contre des villes telles que Moka et Akaba, qui non seulement sont dépourvues de toute fortification, mais ne sont même pas le siège d'une garnison.

Sans parler de la question humanitaire, il y a lieu de songer à la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers de diverses nationalités qui se trouvent dans ces régions, et qui pourrait être compromise à un moment donné, si des actes d'hostilités continuent à être commis sur des points non défendus et où une attaque de l'ennemi paraît, par conséquent, le moins probable.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 5 décembre, 1911.

[46753] No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to refer you to my note of the 6th December, forwarding a memorandum advancing arguments in reply to your communication of the 4th December, 1909, on the subject of the claim of Messrs. Wönckhaus in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

I am confident that the German Government will not fail to appreciate the cogency of the considerations urged in this memorandum in support of the attitude assumed by His Majesty's Government throughout the discussion of this question. That attitude is, in their opinion, completely justified by the facts elicited in the course of the further investigations which have been carried out since the receipt of your Excellency's communication above referred to. They have, however, no desire to protract a discussion which has already lasted about four years, and thus still further to prolong the interruption which an important commercial enterprise has already suffered.

His Majesty's Government have been animated from the first by a desire to approach this subject in the friendliest manner, and it is in conformity with the spirit which they have wished to display throughout that they desire to suggest to the German Government that a compromise should be reached on the following lines:—

1. His Majesty's Government, recognising the desire of Messrs. Wönckhaus for some compensation on account of the interruption of their business as a result of the inability of Hassan Samaiya to carry out his contract with them, are willing to facilitate the attainment of that object. They would accordingly suggest that the firm should be asked to submit, through the German Government, a statement of their claim under this head. As to the amount of the losses so incurred, His Majesty's Government have so far received no precise information, though some light is thrown on the subject by the facts mentioned in paragraph 5 of my note of the 22nd August, 1910.

2. Recognising further the desire of the firm to be restored as far as possible to the commercial position which they occupied at the moment when their operations were interrupted, His Majesty's Government will use their influence with the Sheikh of Shargah to procure from him the grant of a new concession to suitable persons to continue the working of the mines, and will endeavour to arrange that the contract of the 1st June, 1906, should be allowed to run for a further period equal to that during which it was interrupted. That period was from the 10th October, 1907, to the 1st June, 1910. The contract might, for example, run from the 1st May next to the 31st December, 1914. If Messrs. Wönckhaus are reinstated in their contract as here proposed, the only losses sustained by them under head (1) would appear to be those due to the delay in receiving their profits on account of the interruption of the working of the mines. It should be explained that in spite of any clause contained in the present contract, the parties shall not be bound, after its expiration, to conclude any new agreement.

3. Maintaining in the fullest manner the point of view which they have already expressed that the Sheikh of Shargah, as an absolute Sovereign, acted within his rights in cancelling the concession, His Majesty's Government must insist on the principle that neither they themselves nor the Sheikh can be considered to have incurred any liability for the losses suffered by Messrs. Wönckhaus, whose claim lies solely against Hassan Samaiya. His Majesty's Government undertake, however, to use their best endeavours to ensure that the firm should receive such sum in compensation as may finally be fixed.

His Majesty's Government have every confidence that the good intentions which have prompted this offer will be appreciated by the German Government, and that they will see their way to co-operate in the satisfactory settlement of this protracted controversy by recommending to the firm concerned the acceptance of the proposed compromise.

I have, &c.

E. GREY.

[35934] No. 113.

SECOND MEMORANDUM OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE CLAIM OF MESSRS. ROBERT WÖNCKHAUS AND CO. IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHIPMENT OF RED OXIDE FROM ABU MUSA.

[The marginal references are to the German text of the Second German Memorandum.]

HIS Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the memorandum drawn up by the German Government relating to the occurrences on the island of Abu Musa, which was forwarded by the German Ambassador on the 4th December, 1909. In view of the nature of the arguments and evidence contained in that memorandum, it has been found necessary to cause further enquiries to be made in the Persian Gulf, and, although every effort has been made to avoid unnecessary delay, it has been found impossible to prepare the observations of His Majesty's Government upon such arguments and evidence at an earlier date.

For convenience of exposition, the conclusions arrived at by the German Government, as summarised on pages 27–29 of their memorandum, are set forth each under a separate heading and printed in italics; the observations of His Majesty's Government upon such conclusions, and upon the arguments and evidence by which they are supported in the body of the memorandum, are subjoined in ordinary type. Copies of all documents referred to, except such as have already appeared in previous communications, are annexed in the appendix.

His Majesty's Government desire first to offer a few preliminary remarks on some of the facts which are enumerated on page 3 of the memorandum of the German Government as not being disputed.

p. 3. His Majesty's Government agree that Sheikh Sagar was prevented by the British resident from driving Sheikh Salim out of Abu Musa by force. There is no doubt that Sheikh Sagar, supported as he was by all the tribesmen, was in a position to treat Sheikh Salim, who had no means of defending himself, in any way he pleased, and it was only because Sheikh Sagar loyally submitted to the warning of the British resident that there must be no breach of the maritime truce that Sheikh Salim was allowed to remain in in Abu Musa Island at all, and that arrangements were made for his maintenance.

p. 4. His Majesty's Government would observe that Abdul Latif, father of Esa, was not the British "consular agent," but Residency agent.

p. 4. With regard to the statement that "the rent was paid regularly, and received by Sheikh Salim," His Majesty's Government would point out that the German Government have omitted all reference to Sheikh Sagar's statement that, on being informed by Sheikh Salim of the concession that he, acting as Regent, had granted, he voluntarily set aside the amount of the rent, as forming part of the revenue of Abu Musa, for Sheikh Salim, in order to make up his allowance to the original sum of 600 dollars, or more (see Appendix 5 to First British Memorandum).

p. 4. His Majesty's Government would also point out that the statement that the share of Sheikh Sagar was on the 10th October, 1907, sold by Hassan Samich to Thomas Brown is somewhat misleading, if unaccompanied by any reference to the fact that such sale took place eight months after the cancellation of the concession by Sheikh Sagar, and a week after the delivery of the final order that all work was to cease.

p. 4. His Majesty's Government cannot agree that the summary of the terms of the contract between Hassan Samich and Herr Robert Wönckhaus is accurate, and would refer to the terms of such contract as set out in Annex 5 to the First German Memorandum. Similar observations apply to the summary of Sheikh Sagar's letter of the 21st February, 1907, to Hassan Samich (Annex 12 to First German Memorandum).

With reference to the statement that Sheikh Sagar on the 3rd October, 1907, again ordered that the work should cease, His Majesty's Government would suggest the addition of the words "and that he should remove his coolies and gear within ten days." Similarly after the words "Thereupon, about the 20th October, 1907," the words "Hassan having taken no notice of this warning" should be inserted to render the statement complete. p. 4.

His Majesty's Government are unable to concur in the account given by the German Government of the attempted landing on Abu Musa by two employés of the firm of Robert Wönckhaus and Co. The facts of the case are that Mr. Brown and several employés of Robert Wönckhaus and Co., who, His Majesty's Government contend, had no right on the island at all, attempted to land, and persistently ignored warnings that were given. Finally, as they disregarded all friendly attempts to deter them from landing, a few shots were fired over their heads (Appendix 28). Mr. Brown has never made any complaint to the Residency on the subject. p. 5.

His Majesty's Government now proceed to the consideration of the conclusions arrived at by the German Government.

I.

(a.) *Sheikh Salim is owner of the island of Abu Musa;* pp. 27, 28.

(b.) *and therefore, according to the commercial law prevailing on the Persian Gulf, had a right to lease the oxide mines there to the mining company, Hassan-ibn-Ali and Co., in his own name. According to the Mohammedan religious law he could not conclude the lease agreement; according to that law, however, the company would have acquired the exclusive right to the produce of the mines simply by the fact of working them.*

It will be convenient to consider the above statements under two heads (*a*) and (*b*).

(*a.*) Before considering the new arguments and evidence put forward, His Majesty's Government would point out that the allegation contained in the Second German Memorandum that the British pps. 5, 6.

memorandum is inaccurate in stating that Sagar granted to Salim the revenue of the island, including that derived from the mines, is not warranted by the facts; nor is it accurate to say, as the German memorandum does, that "Sakur in his own account only speaks of having assigned to Salim the amount of the rent of the oxide mines." Sheikh Sagar's statement was as follows: "Seeing that Sheikh Salim had ceased not to complain that the sum of 400 dollars was not sufficient for his subsistence, I voluntarily set aside the amount of this rent for him, that it might make up his subsistence, so that the total of what came in to him yearly might be 600 dollars as before, and over, and that no cause of soreness might be left to him on account of the paucity of his allowance. I have absolutely not given him any deed in connection with the island nor in regard to the mines therein; all I did was to relinquish the income to him in the way of financial assistance from me to him, and it was done voluntarily and at my own discretion" (First British Memorandum, Appendix 5). The words "I have absolutely not given him any deed *in connection with the island nor in regard to the mines therein*" show clearly that the word "income" which follows refers not only to the income from the mines, but to the whole income derived from the island. And Sheikh Salim states: "You were kind enough to place the island of Abu Musa under my supervision, so that I might cultivate therein and reap from it the means of subsistence" (First British Memorandum, Appendix 1). There can be no doubt that Sheikh Sagar permitted Salim to enjoy all revenue that might accrue from the island. In practice the only substantial revenue was derived from the oxide mines; the other sources of income mentioned in the Second German Memorandum will be discussed later.

The question at issue being whether the island of Abu Musa is the property of Sheikh Salim or of Sheikh Sagar in his capacity as Sheikh of Shargah, His Majesty's Government brought forward as evidence in support of their contention declarations by both the suggested claimants, each of whom stated in the clearest possible way that the island is the property of Sheikh Sagar (First British Memorandum, Appendices 1 and 5). Evidence of so cogent and convincing a nature

can seldom, if ever, have been brought forward in a case where the title to land was in question, and His Majesty's Government can only express their surprise that the German Government should decline to accept such evidence. The p. 6.
objections suggested to such evidence seem to be as follows:—

1. The statements were made by interested parties.

2. They were made while the case was in progress and steps were being taken to collect evidence.

3. Major Cox was at Shargah at the time when they were made.

4. They are out of harmony with the former attitude of the two sheikhs.

1. It may be conceded that the statement of Sheikh Sagar (the date of which should obviously be, as suggested in the Second German Memorandum, 1908 instead of 1898) is open to the objection which may be taken to the evidence given by any claimant in support of his own case. But how it can be suggested that Sheikh Salim is "interested" in disproving his alleged title to the island His Majesty's Government are entirely unable to understand. The effect of the cancellation of the contract by Sheikh Sagar has been that Sheikh Salim has lost a considerable portion of his income, and the suggestion that the latter would be ready to give false evidence in support of the contention that Sagar had a right to take the step which has had such unfortunate results for Salim is one which cannot be maintained for a moment. The statement of Sheikh Salim's (to which he still absolutely adheres) is a declaration entirely against his interest, and is conclusive.

2. His Majesty's Government agree that these statements were made after the question of the ownership of the island had been raised, and when evidence on the point was being collected. His Majesty's Government do not attach much weight to this objection, which would apply with at least equal force to much of the evidence contained in the annexes to the Second German Memorandum; they would remark that there would obviously be no reason for making such statements (especially that of Sheikh Salim) before the question of title had arisen.

3. If this objection means that His Britannic Majesty's Resident, with the object of strengthen-

ing the case, deliberately induced the two sheikhs to make statements which he and they knew to be untrue, His Majesty's Government cannot entertain any such suggestion.

4. This point will be discussed later.

His Majesty's Government also produced, as further evidence of Sheikh Sagar's ownership of the island, two letters written by him in 1884 to the British resident (First British Memorandum, Appendices 3 and 4). It cannot of course be disputed that these letters were written long before the question of title had arisen, but the p. 6.
German Government deny that they can be relied on as evidence of Sagar's ownership.

p. 6. His Majesty's Government are unable to accept the German Government's account of the circumstances under which these letters were written. These circumstances have been explained above. At the time of Salim's deposition Sagar had all the tribesmen at his back, while Salim had no following at all; the only question was whether Sagar should forcibly remove Salim from the island, which course would involve a breach of the maritime truce. Sagar informed the British Resident on the 17th May, 1883, that he proposed to adopt this course, and was informed in reply that in order to avoid a breach of the truce he ought to arrange a peaceable settlement (First British Memorandum, Appendix 6). This was accordingly done; but had not Sagar been anxious to comply with the wishes of the British Resident there can be no doubt that Salim would have been forcibly and permanently removed from the island, in which case no question as to his title to it could ever have arisen. As it was, however, an agreement was arrived at, and Salim, who at the time of his deposition was at Abu Musa, was permitted by his successor to reside there. The agreement, however, did not work satisfactorily. Under these circumstances Sagar writes to the British resident to the effect that three courses are open: (*a*) that Salim should give a guarantee that he will do nothing to disturb the maritime truce; (*b*) that the British Government should remove him from the island; (*c*) that the British Government should stand aside while Sagar dealt with Salim as he thought fit. In both letters he states

clearly that the island is his property as Sheikh of Shargah. His Majesty's Government cannot accept the contention of the German Government that all Sagar claimed was that Abu Musa was "politically a dependency of Shargah." p. 6. There would be no object in Sagar's making such a statement to the Resident, who was well acquainted with the fact, and such an interpretation would render the letters meaningless, as there was never a suggestion of Salim's setting up an independent state in Abu Musa. The meaning of the letters is clearly that if Salim is to be allowed to live on the island, instead of being forcibly ejected, his occupation must be distinctly understood to be without prejudice to Sagar's rights as owner, and the peace must be kept.

His Majesty's Government would remark, with reference to the use of the words "I," "we," "my," "our," in the above letters, that in the original Arabic the plural forms are used throughout.

His Majesty's Government are also unable to accept the contention of the German Government p. 6. that when Sagar uses the words "our" or "my island" the meaning is "the island belongs politically to the territory of Shargah," while the same words in the mouth of Salim mean "the island is my private property." The cases in which Salim uses the words "my" or "our island" are considered below, but it may be remarked that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government no evidence of ownership can be derived from the use of such words by an occupier; every man who pays rent for the house he lives in speaks of it as "my house," but that does not mean that he is the owner.

With regard to Sheikh Sagar's letter of the 11th October, 1902 (First British Memorandum, Appendix 7), the German Government remark: "In order to understand the letter, it would be p. 7. interesting to know the purport of Kemball's enquiry, to which Sakar's letter was an answer, and which is not printed in the memorandum." The letter from Colonel Kemball referred to was in the following terms:—

"A report has reached me that you wish to grant a concession to Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh for excavating and exporting red oxide

from the island of Sir Abu Nuair. I have therefore the honour to inform you that it would be advisable for you to let me see the draft of the concession before concluding the arrangements.

"I shall also be glad if you will let me see a copy of the concession granted to Haji Nakhoda Ali for working the red oxide mines on the island of Abu Musa."

pp. 7, 8. It will thus be seen that the arguments based by the German Government on conjectures as to the words used by Colonel Kemball fall to the ground. Colonel Kemball's only object was to offer advice to the sheikh (as it was his duty to do) as to the terms of any concession he might propose to grant. This was the more necessary as Nakhoda Ali was a person of doubtful character (see Appendix 9). The sheikh replies that Colonel Kemball was mistaken in supposing that Nakhoda Ali was one of the concessionnaires, and states quite accurately the circumstances of the grant, including the fact that Salim made it as Regent. His Majesty's Government are unable to agree p. 8. with the German Government that "it cannot be inferred from this letter that Salim was acting only as Regent"; the fact is stated in the plainest terms, and strong corroboration is derived from the phrase used in Esa's letter to Sheikh Sagar dated the 20th February, 1907 (Appendix 27)—"the lease which I and two partners acquired *from the Government of Shargah* relating to the extraction of red oxide from *your island* of Abu Musa." With regard to the suggestion that p. 8. the statement that Salim cultivates in the island implies that he was the owner of it, His Majesty's Government would only remark that if this contention is correct every tenant is the owner of the land he holds. No inference can be drawn p. 7. from the quotation from the Administration Report on the Persian Gulf, which appears to be based on incomplete information. The locality of the mines is not stated, and the erroneous statement is made that Nakhoda Ali was the lessee, while it is expressly stated that further enquiry will be made.

With regard to the statement alleged to have p. 8. been made on the 28th November, 1907, by Sagar on the subject of the treaty of 1892, the account of the conversation which the sheikh gave to His Majesty's Government soon after it took place does not tally with that contained in

the Second German Memorandum, and His Majesty's Government cannot accept the latter as accurate.

As the German Government are no doubt aware, and as will be shown later, the dragoman Mirza Hussein has now been shown to be a person on whose statements no reliance can be placed; further, he could not speak Arabic, and the interpreter was Abdullah-bin-Hassan-Samieh, Hassan Samieh's son, a person who was interested in putting such a statement into the sheikh's mouth.

His Majesty's Government are disposed to agree p. 8.
that the meaning of the sentence in the sheikh's letter "and the lease has remained up till now" is probably that Sagar acquiesced in the concession when he returned from Mecca, as is stated by both the sheikhs (First British Memorandum, Appendices 1 and 5). At the time the letter was written nothing had occurred to make Sagar consider the cancellation of the concession advisable.

His Majesty's Government cannot agree that pp. 8, 9.
Sagar's statement that he voluntarily assigned the rent of 250 French reals to Salim is "an *ex parte* statement for which there is no proof"; it is evidence of the best kind, and is supported by Salim's statement, "When I leased the mines of Abu Musa I was officiating on your behalf, and the concession was given by proxy for you" (First British Memorandum, Appendix 1), which shows clearly that Salim would not have received the rent from the mines if it had not been granted him by Sagar. The alleged facts with which the p. 9.
statement is said to be inconsistent are considered below. His Majesty's Government would point out that the phrase "the amount previously p. 8.
promised *or to a little over that amount*" is an incorrect reproduction of Sagar's words; the Arabic is "wa ziyadeh," i.e., "and over" or "and more."

The suggestion made by the German Govern- p. 9.
ment that Sheikh Sagar's right to pasturage on Abu Musa may be merely a servitude to which the private property in the island is subject is entirely unsupported by evidence, and is not borne out by Major Cox's report (First British Memorandum, Appendix 6), to which reference is made).

p. 9. The German Government enquire why, under the arrangement of 1884, the revenue of Sir Abu Nuair was given to Salim to increase his pension, and not that of Abu Musa, which would have been more convenient, as he resided in the island. The suggestion is that the revenue of Abu Musa already belonged to Salim as owner. The answer is that it would have been useless to give Salim the revenue of Abu Musa, because at that time the island produced no revenue at all. This is shown by an extract from a letter written on the 14th October, 1880, to the British agent by the Residency agent, who, speaking of Abu Musa, says: "Its water has altogether become salt, and the trees have died away. He" (the Sheikh of Shargah, then Sheikh Salim) "does not get anything from the place, not even a 'gaz'" (a small copper coin).

It is now proposed to consider the fresh evidence adduced by the German Government in support of the contention that Sheikh Salim is the owner of Abu Musa.

p. 9. It is asserted that "Salim has always exercised the right to wreckage on Abu Musa."

His Majesty's Government are not concerned to enquire whether the statement made is adequately
pp. 9, 35. supported by the citation of two cases in which such a right has been claimed, because, even assuming the statement to be correct, it furnishes no evidence whatever of the ownership of Salim. The right to wreckage, or jetsam and flotsam, is exercised in the Persian Gulf by the inhabitants of the place where the wreckage is cast up, and if the ruling chief comes to hear of it he is entitled to a share, which he exacts or not as he sees fit. In the case of Abu Musa the right to wreckage was exercised not by Salim alone, but by him in conjunction with the other inhabitants of the island, so that any argument in favour of Salim's ownership, based on the right to wreckage, would be an equally good argument in favour of the ownership of all the inhabitants. In support of this statement the following documents are adduced:—

Letter dated the 17th May, 1894, from the Residency agent, Shargah, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, relating to the stranding of a Bahrein boat on Abu Musa (Appendix 1).

Replies to above, 22nd June, 1894 (Appendix 2).

Letter dated the 14th April, 1907, from the Residency agent, Shargah, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, relating to the stranding of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Bulimba" on Abu Musa (Appendix 3).

These letters show clearly (*a*) that it was "the islanders," and not Salim alone, who claimed the right to wreckage; (*b*) that it was the Sheikh of Shargah whose position and responsibility in the matter were recognised.

On the general question of the incidence of the right to wreckage, and the position and practice in regard thereto, the following evidence is submitted:—

Letter dated the 1st March, 1895, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Assistant Resident, Bunder Abbas (Appendix 4).

Statement by Sheikh Sagar, dated the 25th March, 1911 (Appendix 5).

Questions put to, and replies received from, the following sheikhs and notables of the coast:—

Muhammad-bin-Tahnoon, agent of the Sultan of Muscat at Lingah (Appendix 6).

Sheikh Saleh-bin-Muhammad-el-Ali, Chief of Charak.

Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Merbakh and Mugam, of the Arab tribe of Hammadi.

Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Muhammad-el-Ali, Headman of Keis Island, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Al Ali.

Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Majed-el-Marzooki, Headman of Bustaneh, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Marzuk.

Sheikh Khalfan-bin-Misbah-el-Ali, Headman of Dourvan, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Al Ali.

Sheikh Sultan-bin-Ahmed-Marzooki, Chief of Moghu, of the tribe of Marzuk.

Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Abeideli, Chief of Armeki and Cheeroe, of the Sunni Arab tribe of Obaidli.

Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Kelat, of the Hammadi tribe.

Haji Ali-bin-Abdullah, a well-known merchant of Keis.

Haji Isa-bin-Saleh, a well-known and reliable merchant of Keis.

Haji Muhammad-bin-Hydar, a well-known merchant of Keis.

Haji Isa-bin-Hussein-Jannam, a well-known merchant of Keis.

Muhammad-bin-Ahmed, a well-known merchant and notable of Keis.

Ali-bin-Muhammad-Abdul-Wahid-el-Marzooki, a notable of Bustaneh.

Haji-Abdullah-bin-Ali-el-Marzooki, a notable of Hasineh.

Sheikh Hassan-bin-Abdul-Rahim, Chief of Hasineh.

Ali-bin-Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Marzooki, a notable of Hasineh.

Haji Muhammad-bin-Hassan-el-Meithoomi-el-Marzooki, a leading merchant of Bustaneh.

(Appendices 7 and 8.)

The effect of this overwhelming body of evidence is to show clearly that the right to wreckage is exercised by the inhabitants of the locality, subject to the right of the chief to claim a share if he sees fit to do so. No evidence of Salim's ownership can therefore be deduced from the fact of his exercising such a right; if Salim claimed and exercised the chief's right to a share, it would be by virtue of Sheikh Sagar's permitting him to occupy the island, and any income which he derived from such a source would form part of the revenue of the island, which he was permitted by the sheikh to enjoy. It may also be remarked, with reference to the terms of Salim's letter of the

p. 21. 23rd March, 1898 (Second German Memorandum, Annex 6), that at that time Salim was acting as Regent, and probably wrote the letter in that capacity.

pp. 9, 10. The German Government next refer to a version
pp. 35–37. of the oxide agreement (Second German Memorandum, Annex 7), dated the 6th April, 1898, which was cancelled four days later, and for which another agreement (Second German Memorandum, Annex 8) was substituted. This first agreement contained the words "So long as I, my children, and my brothers live, no one shall have a right to raise objections to it." These words were omitted from the second agreement, and it is suggested that the use of such words clearly shows that Salim was the owner of the island.

The position is thus as follows:—

An agreement is drawn up.

It is immediately cancelled, and a fresh one substituted.

Certain expressions which appear in the first agreement are not found in the second.

His Majesty's Government consider that the irresistible inference to be drawn from such facts is that the omitted expressions were objected to as inaccurate or misleading, and that for that reason the agreement was cancelled. His Majesty's Government are in a position to show that such was the case. Abdul Latif has explained (Appendix 9) that the original agreement was drafted by Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh, and was shown by him to Abdul Latif, who at once objected (*a*) to the use of the expression now under discussion; (*b*) to the inclusion of Nakhoda Ali as a signatory. The draft was accordingly cancelled and a fresh agreement drawn up, in which the objectionable expressions were omitted. The original draft was never seen by Sheikh Sagar until it was shown to him a short time ago (Appendix 5).

So far, then, from the use of the expressions referred to being evidence of Salim's ownership, their omission from the second agreement is strong evidence against it.

Reference is also made to the clause in the second agreement providing for a payment for the trade in "mother-of-pearl and canary-seed."* It is suggested that this is "inconsistent with Sheikh Sagar's statement that he had granted to Salim only the rent of the oxide mines." p. 10.

It has been pointed out above that Sheikh Sagar has never made the statement attributed to him; what he did say was that he had granted to Salim the revenue of the island, which of course included this payment in connection with oysters.

Nor can any inference be drawn from the fact that the agreement under which Sagar became a partner provided that he should be responsible for a proportional part of this payment. The syndicate derived their rights from the document of the 10th April, 1898, under which both the annual rent and this special payment were secured, and any person entering the syndicate

* It may be observed that the Arabic word translated "canary-seed" more probably refers to a kind of oyster.

would of course be as responsible for his share of the second as of the first. Sheikh Sagar, having assigned the revenue from this source to Salim, naturally, on becoming a partner in the syndicate, had to pay his proportion of it to him; but it is impossible to conclude from that fact that "Salim had a right to the enjoyment in his own name of all sources of profit to be derived from Abu Musa, and that he could exercise this right even as against the ruling sheikh." He had the right because it had been granted to him by the ruling sheikh, and when the ruling sheikh became a partner in a syndicate which was under contract to pay rent, which rent had been granted to Salim, he was of course bound, in his capacity as such partner, to pay to Salim his proportion of such rent. Even if the rent had been payable to himself, his share of it would of course have been debited to him in the partnership books. The object of the insertion of the clause in question was no doubt to make it clear that the liabilities of the other partners were proportionately reduced. p. 10.

The German Government also rely on the fact that on the 26th December, 1898, Salim granted a lease of the mica deposits on the island. The fact is not disputed; it is clear that the lease was granted after Sheikh Sagar had relinquished to Salim the revenue of the island, and it appears from Sagar's statement (Appendix 5) that Salim consulted him about it, and that in pursuance of his declared policy he allowed Salim to keep any payments made on account of the mica as part of the revenue derived from the island. Sagar would no doubt welcome any arrangements which would increase Salim's income and prevent his making applications for money. Little attention has been paid to this transaction, because it was soon discovered that no mica existed on the island, and the concession accordingly became a dead letter. When Sagar wrote his letter of the 22nd February, 1908, he had no doubt, as he states (Appendix 5), forgotten all about this concession, granted ten years before, and long since abandoned. pp. 10, 37.

The draft memorandum of association sent by Abdul Latif to Hassan Samieh on the 6th January, 1899, will be considered later.

The fact that Salim stipulated in the mica lease that only keshkeshuh trees should be cut is no evidence of his ownership. He was admittedly in occupation of the island, and was therefore p. 11.

entitled to see that acts of waste were not committed thereon.

With reference to the letter dated the 12th November, 1898, from Abdul Latif to Hassan Samich (Annex 15 to Second German Memorandum), in which reference is made to a dispute between the two sheikhs about the island of Sir, the position (which, indeed, is obvious) is explained by Abdul Latif (Appendix 10). Under the 1884 agreement between Sagar and Salim (see Appendix 6, First British Memorandum) the revenue of Sir was assigned to Salim. The island, however, failed to produce any revenue, and in the 1889 agreement (see Appendix 6, First British Memorandum), no mention was made of it, the revenue of Abu Musa being subsequently transferred to Salim in its place. When the possibility arose in 1898 of Sir producing some revenue, Salim put in a claim to it under the agreement of 1884, to which Sagar not unnaturally replied that the 1884 agreement had been superseded by that of 1889, in which Sir was not mentioned. Thus arose the dispute referred to. Abdul Latif was naturally unwilling to conclude the Sir agreement until the dispute had been adjusted; he would have no hesitation about Abu Musa, not because he knew that Salim owned it, but because he was well aware that Sheikh Sagar was allowing him to enjoy its revenue. p. 11.

Finally, the German Government state that the opinion prevailing among the most respectable natives is that Abu Musa is the private property of Sheikh Salim. In support of this assertion there are quoted the opinions of three merchants of Lingah, two of whom are also stated to have asserted verbally that everyone who has any knowledge of affairs on the Arabian coast is of the same opinion. p. 11.

His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to attach the slightest weight to the opinions of the persons in question.

Abdalmuhsin-ibn-Ahmed Ahmishari is a petty trader of Bahrein origin. He earns a precarious livelihood by speculating in pearls with borrowed money.

Abdurrahman-ibn-Muhammed-ibn-Kazim is a Persian of Bastak. It is true that he was at one time French consular agent at Lingah, but in 1909 he was dismissed by the French consul, who had had occasion to complain of him. In 1907 he was proceeded against by the Customs for smuggling a large quantity of tobacco, and he has recently been complained against for unlawfully flying the French flag on a dhow.

Hamd-ibn-Khalifa Al'uyuni was a petty merchant, but went bankrupt, and afterwards endeavoured to make a living as a news-writer by writing gossip to various notables in the Gulf, and getting occasional presents from them. He recently died insolvent.

As against testimony of this nature, His Majesty's Government bring forward the evidence of nineteen sheikhs, merchants, and notables of the Persian Gulf, who are familiar with the affairs of the district. The names of these persons have been given above, and their statements are set out in Appendices 6, 7, and 8. They state that the owner of Abu Musa is the Sheikh of Shargah, now Sheikh Sagar.

His Majesty's Government agree that Salim, with the consent of Sheikh Sagar, exercised (from the date of the arrangement made after the grant of the oxide concession) the full right of disposal of the usufruct of the island. This right was derived from the permission granted to him by the owner, Sheikh Sagar. It is denied that he exercised the right "as against" Sagar, except in so far as the latter, while a partner in the syndicate, was responsible for the payment of his proportion of the rent. p. 11

Finally, His Majesty's Government would enquire how it is suggested that Salim obtained his title to the island. His right to it as Sheikh of Shargah was lost when he was deposed; and if the contention is that he had any other title there should be in existence documents of title or other evidence showing whence it was derived. No such evidence has been produced.

Having thus examined the objections raised to the evidence brought forward in support of Sheikh

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Sagar's title, as Sheikh of Shargah, to the property in the island, and having considered the further evidence and arguments adduced in favour of the claim made on behalf of Sheikh Salim (though not endorsed by him), His Majesty's Government are compelled to adhere to their conclusion that Sheikh Sagar is the owner of Abu Musa.

(*b.*) Salim not being the owner of Abu Musa, pp. 27, 28.
and the revenue of the island not having been transferred to him at the time of the grant of the concession, he had no right, either according to commercial or Mahommedan or any other system of law, to grant a lease of the oxide mines, except in his capacity as Regent. The lease having been acquiesced in by Sheikh Sagar when he returned and took up the reins of government, he succeeded to the position occupied by Salim with regard to the agreement, except that he allowed Salim to receive the rent as part of the revenue of Abu Musa. The question of the validity of the lease will be more conveniently discussed under the next head.

II.

The owner of the island, whoever he may be, has p. 28.
no authority, either according to the lease agreement (which is to be judged by commercial law), or according to religious law, to revoke or terminate the rights of the mining company or to hinder the company in any other way from working the mines.

His Majesty's Government are unable to accept p. 12.
the contention of the German Government that Sheikh Sagar had no right to terminate the agreement. Quite apart from the terms of the concession, he had, as ruling sheikh, absolute power to cancel it at any time he thought fit. If this were not so, the words used by Salim, in his capacity of Regent, in the agreement of the 10th April, 1898, "Should I at any former date have made any contracts they are not valid, only this contract, which is written in two identical copies, holds good" (First German Memorandum, Annex 2) would be meaningless, and any previous contracts

would be valid as against the present concessionnaires. His Majesty's Government maintain that Sheikh Sagar's right to determine any concession granted in his dominions (a right which would exist even if the island were the private property of Salim) could not legally be questioned, and, indeed, this is admitted by the statement on p. 14 of the Second German Memorandum that "the reigning Sheikh of Shargah is the absolute ruler of his country." If by a high-handed and unfair use of this right the concessionnaires, who at the time of the cancellation were all British subjects, had suffered loss, they could only obtain redress by an appeal to their Government, in which case the matter would be solely one between the sheikh and His Majesty's Government.

This being the case, it is unnecessary to discuss further the meaning of the terms in the agreement. His Majesty's Government find it difficult p. 12.
to decide what was the reason for omitting the time limit of twenty years in the second agreement, as the meaning of Abdul Latif's statement (Appendix 9) that he "saw no object in inserting any fixed period of time" is not clear; but they would remark that if the effect of the agreement really was that the lessees were entitled to put an end to the lease at any time, while the lessor was bound to allow them to work the mines in perpetuity, should they so desire, in return for a rent of 20*l.* per annum, the arrangement was most inequitable.

For the same reason His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the case is not one to which the principles of either the commercial or religious law can usefully be applied. But as the German Government produce evidence of this nature on which they rely in support of their contention that the lease was valid and could not be cancelled, it is proposed to deal with the point.

pp. 13, 14, 42–45. The German Government produce opinions given by "the leading merchants at Lingah and Bussorah," who state that the lease is good and

valid, and cannot be terminated without the consent of the lessees.

His Majesty's Government are unable to agree as to the weight to be attached to the opinion of these merchants; their reasons for considering that no importance can be attached to the opinions of Hamd-ibn-Khalifa Al'uyuni, Abdarrahman-ibn-Muhammed-ibn-Kazim, and Abdalmuhsin-ibn-Ahmed-ibn-Mushari have been explained above. With regard to the other merchants whose opinions are quoted, His Majesty's Government cannot from the information at their disposal accept the description of them given in the German Memorandum. Abdullah Muhammed Hassan-al-Khodja is a member of a family which is ill-disposed to the authorities, and his testimony is open to suspicion. Abdullah-ibn-Hassan-Kalladari is a close friend of Hassan Samieh, and agent of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. The signatories of the document which appears as Annex 24, are Turkish subjects from Bussorah, whose views on such a matter are of little weight, and as they erroneously state that the "agreement was concluded in the land of Persia," their opinions appear to be founded on a wrong assumption.

p. 27

p. 44.

In refutation of this evidence the opinions are submitted of ten representative merchants from different parts of the littoral (Appendix 11), who are unanimously of opinion that the lease is void, because it lacks both the specification of period and the pronunciation of the legal formula of proposal and acceptance, which are essential features of such documents.

With regard to the contention that by religious lawsurfaces mines are the common property of all Mahommedans, and that an indefeasible right is acquired by the mere fact of working them, His Majesty's Government are somewhat surprised that such an argument should be seriously put forward at the present day. It may be that the clergy of Islam continue in theory to support this ancient tenet, but it is a matter of common knowledge that it is now entirely disregarded, and no attempt could possibly be made to give effect to it in practice.

pp. 14, 45-49.

His Majesty's Government would remark, with reference to the opinions of the clergy submitted by the German Government, that it will be seen that several of them, on their attention being called to the grounds on which His Majesty's Government contend that the lease is invalid, declared that such a contention was correct. His Majesty's Government submit a body of evidence from distinguished members of the clergy (Appendices 12, 13, and 14), including the chief priests of Lingah and Bushire, both Sunni and Shiah. The effect of this evidence is to show clearly:—

1. That the lease was invalid for several specific reasons:

   (*a.*) The failure to insert the usual formula of proposal and acceptance.

   (*b.*) The failure to specify the period of the lease.

   (*c.*) The failure to specify the amount of profit to be derived by the lessee (Appendix 12).

2. That the lessor is therefore entitled to cancel the lease and eject the lessee (Appendices 13 and 14).

His Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion—

1. That Sheikh Sagar had, as ruling sheikh, an inherent right to cancel the concession, if he saw fit to do so;

2. That if the principles of either commercial or religious law are to be applied to the case, the lease was invalid, and could therefore be annulled.

pp. 14, 15.

The German Government are mistaken in stating that "The British memorandum further remarks that the principal object of Sagar was to administer justice as between the partners of the company on the strength of his 'sovereign rights of jurisdiction.'" The statement made in the First British Memorandum (p. 26) was "The principal motive of the Sheikh of Shargah *in cancelling, in accordance with the exercise of his sovereign rights of jurisdiction*, the lease granted in his behalf by the Regent in 1898 was evidently

a proper and natural desire to administer justice as between the partners of the company . . . ."

The contention of His Majesty's Government is, and always has been, that the sovereign rights of jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Shargah gave him the right to cancel the concession. The word jurisdiction was not meant to imply judicial jurisdiction, but the right of government. The questions therefore whether the sheikh "had p. 15.
authority to decide as judge the dispute between the partners of the mining company," "whether the decision arrived at was justified by law," and "whether he had power to cancel the lease at his discretion in the interest of the administration of country" are strictly irrelevant.

In view of the careful consideration, however, given in the Second German Memorandum to these points, they will be dealt with in their proper place.

III.

(a.) *Hassan Samaih had authority, as manager of* p. 28.
the mining company, to conclude agreements like that with Mr. Wönckhaus, signing in the name of the company, without consulting the other partners. Such agreements at once become binding on the other partners;
(b.) *in the case under consideration, however, their approval was also signified.*

This point will be conveniently considered under two heads, (*a*) and (*b*).

(a.) The German Government argue that the p. 21.
wide dispersal of the partners rendered it necessary that one of the partners should have authority to act for the others. His Majesty's Government agree that it is not unlikely that such an arrangement would be made as regards the ordinary incidents of business, although there is nothing to show that such an arrangement was made, or, if it was, that Hassan Samieh was the partner selected to act on behalf of the others; but the question now at issue is whether Hassan Samieh had authority, without consulting his partners, to conclude an agreement such as the present, which disposed of practically the whole output of the mines, at a fixed price, for four years, with an option of renewal, and limited the annual output of the mines to a maximum of 5,000 tons and the further small amount which was allowed to go to

India. Such an agreement was entirely outside the ordinary incidents of the partnership business, and it would require strong evidence to show that Hassan was in a position to enter into it without the knowledge or consent of his associates, especially as there was no need to carry matters through in a hurry, and the short delay necessary to enable the other partners to be consulted would not have prejudiced the conclusion of the agreement, provided that they had raised no objection.

p. 21. The principal evidence on which the German
pp. 39, 40. Government rely consists of an unsigned document (Annex 14 to Second German Memorandum), purporting to be a memorandum of association between the lessees, the first clause of which is alleged to give power to Hassan Samieh to conclude sales on behalf of the partnership. This
p. 21. document is said to have been drawn up by Abdul
pp. 38, 39. Latif, and sent by him in a letter dated the 6th January, 1899 (Annex 13 to Second German Memorandum), to Hassan Samieh, with a request that all the partners at Lingah should sign. It
p. 21. is further alleged that the document was signed by Hassan Samieh, Abdullah, and Nakhoda Ali, who added a clause providing for the purchase of boats, and returned the document to Abdul Latif. On the 21st January, 1899, Abdul Latif wrote a
pp. 56, 57. letter to Hassan Samieh (Annex 40 to Second
pp. 21, 22. German Memorandum), in which he objected to the purchase of boats. Hassan Samieh then replied agreeing to the cancellation of the boats, and thereupon the arrangement is said to have become operative.

No evidence, except Abdul Latif's two letters, is produced in support of the statements made.

It appears from Abdul Latif's second letter that when Hassan Samieh and his partners at Lingah returned the document to Abdul Latif with the additional clause about the boats they made certain other suggestions in a covering letter. Abdul Latif objected to these suggestions as well as to the provision about the boats, and there is no ground for alleging that the arrangement became operative merely because Hassan agreed to waive the provision about boats.

It is not suggested by the German Government that the memorandum was ever signed by the other partners, Sheikh Sagar, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, and Mr. Malcolm, who, as stated on p. 12 of the Second German Memorandum, was a partner in the company, but who had entered it, not "two

years after the conclusion of the lease agreement," but on the 27th December, 1898 (see Appendix 16). It is hardly necessary to remark that no such document could be binding on the partnership unless signed by all the partners, and that therefore the document is valueless. The mere fact that clause 6 of the memorandum, to which Abdul Latif objected, and which Hassan Samieh, according to the Second German Memorandum, p. 21. was willing to cancel, was never struck out, but appears in the document as now produced, shows conclusively that the memorandum was never completed or executed, and consequently never came into operation. This is also shown by the fact that no accounts have ever been rendered to the partners who were not at the mines (see Appendix 17), whereas under clause 9 of the alleged memorandum this had to be done every four months.

A further statement by Abdul Latif is annexed (Appendix 15) which shows clearly what occurred. After Abdul Latif's letter of the 21st January, 1899, objecting to several of the suggested provisions, the matter dropped. The document was never completed or signed by the remaining partners, and was never even shown to Sheikh Sagar. It has never been seen by Nejef (Appendix 22). Mr. Malcolm states (see Appendix 17) that, to the best of his belief, he never saw or heard of the so-called memorandum, and certainly never signed it.

In any event, even if the document were taken as being in force, there is nothing in its terms which would justify Hassan in entering into contracts, other than ordinary sales, without consulting his partners. The contract with Wönckhaus cannot be regarded as an ordinary sale, because (apart from the small shipments to India) it prevented the sale of oxide to any other person, and because, in effect, it would necessarily have limited the output to the amount taken by Wönckhaus and the purchasers in India.

This document, then, having never come into force, the only agreement governing the affairs of the partnership was that dated May 1898 (First German Memorandum, Annex 2), under which Hassan Samieh had no such powers as suggested.

The manner in which the affairs of the partnership were conducted is shown in Mr. Malcolm's statement (Appendix 17). It is, of course, not

disputed that Hassan did attend to part of the p. 23. business of the company, as did some of the other partners, but that fact has no bearing on the question whether he had authority to make the contract in question. The same comment may be pp. 57–59, made on the letters from Mr. Malcolm to Hassan, p. 23. on which reliance is placed by the German Government; in fact, the first two letters are clear evidence that Hassan did not consider himself entitled to act without consulting his partners. The third letter is specifically addressed to the firm, and not to Hassan, and there is no evidence to show how it was dealt with. His Majesty's Government are unable to agree that the proposed p. 23. contract was "very similar to that with Wönckhaus," but do not consider the point worth detailed discussion. No inference in favour of the contention of the German Government can be drawn from these letters.

Esa's letter to Sheikh Sagar, dated the 20th February, 1907 (Appendix 27), shows that he did not consider that Hassan possessed the authority now claimed for him, and four letters from Hassan Samieh are annexed (Appendix 18), which show that Hassan considered himself under an obligation to consult his partners, and know that they were entitled to complain if he failed to do so. The phrase in Hassan's letter of the 21st January, 1908, "You know what friendship existed between us and your father, Haji Ali, deceased, who did nothing except after consultation in our business," suggests that, if one partner was more prominent than the others, it was Nakhoda Ali, and not Hassan.

Hassan's own contention throughout has been, not that he had authority to conclude the contract without consulting his partners, but that they approved of it. In his letter to Abdul Latif (Annex 11 to First German Memorandum) he says: "You are the Lord of the Learned; you know that I did this knowing that you were agreeable to it." In his letter to Salim (Annex 18 to First German Memorandum) he says: "As you know, all the contracts and correspondence from the beginning till this day have been done by knowledge and approval of the British political agent, Abdul Latif, and all of you." This shows that at the time he did not claim for himself the right which is now attributed to him.

In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would remark that, if Hassan really possessed the right

to conclude the contract without consulting his partners, it is difficult to understand his attempts to conceal it from them, and to deceive them as to its terms.

(5.) The German Government also contend that all the partners expressly approved the agreement. p. 16.

The persons concerned (omitting Abdullah, who may be assumed to have supported his father) are Esa, Malcolm, and Nejef, son of Nakhoda Ali. p. 16.

The German Government dispute that Nejef was a partner, arguing that Nakhoda Ali "had a share on the strength of his engaging to superintend the work at the mines, without putting capital into the concern," that his partnership was connected with personal services, and therefore ceased at his death. This contention is not supported by the terms of the document under which he became a partner (Annex 2 to First German Memorandum), which placed him in precisely the same position as the other partners. Moreover, as it is pointed out on p. 18 of the Second German Memorandum that the only partners who put any capital into the concern were Hassan and Malcolm, it follows, if the contention of the German Government is correct, that the other partners, who neither put capital into the concern nor superintended the work at the mines, had no claim to their shares at all. The suggestion that Nakhoda Ali was not a partner, but only an "employé of the company with a share in the profits," is plainly untenable, in view of the provision in the document under which he became a partner (Annex 2 to First German Memorandum) that he was to bear his share of the expenses—an unheard-of provision in the case of an employé. It appears from Malcolm's statement (Appendix 17) that Nakhoda Ali was originally the most important member of the firm; and reference may also be made to the sentence quoted above from Hassan's letter to Nejef, dated the 21st January, 1908. The suggestion made by Abdul Latif, that it might be possible to extinguish Nakhoda Ali's share at his death on the grounds indicated, must have come to nothing, judging by the later documents as if the surviving partners had thought it possible to get rid of the share in such a way, they would certainly have done so. p. 17. p. 17. pp. 17, 50.

It may be that Hassan and Abdullah now consider it advisable to deny that they considered Nejef a partner, but their letters written at the time (Appendices 18 and 19) show clearly that they did so consider him. The letters of Hassan, in particular, which are set out in Appendix 18, are conclusive on the point. Particular attention is also called to the letter dated the 24th December, 1907, from Malcolm, annexed in Appendix 20, which shows that at that time both Malcolm and Abdullah recognised Nejef as a partner. p. 17.

If Nejef was not and never had been a partner, the suggestion that he on several occasions expressed his approval of Hassan's proceedings is meaningless; there would be no possible reason for his expressing an opinion on the matter if it did not concern him. p. 17.

Nejef is asserted to have expressed his approval to Abdullah in the presence of the German dragoman in November 1907. No authority is given for this statement. Abdullah's motives for attributing such a statement to Nejef are obvious, and His Majesty's Government have explained already that they are unable to attach any weight to statements made by the ex-dragoman Mirza Hussein, who, as the German Government are no doubt aware, has now been denounced by the Persian Government, prosecuted by the Customs and Messrs. Wönckhaus for dishonesty, and dismissed from his post in the German consulate. Nejef has sworn an affidavit (Appendix 21) in which he denies having made the statement attributed to him, and his account is corroborated by the letter written shortly afterwards by Malcolm, which is set out in Appendix 20, and also by Nejef's petition to Lieutenant Gabriel dated the 16th February, 1908 (First British Memorandum, Appendix 18). These documents also show plainly that Nejef was recognised as a partner. p. 17.

With regard to the statement said to have been made by Nejef to Brown (an employé of Wönckhaus and Co.) in March 1908, to the effect that he approved of the contract with Wönckhaus, the story is incredible, in view of the fact that a month before Nejef had sent in a formal petition to the British vice-consul at Bunder Abbas (First British Memorandum, Appendix 18) stating that he "did not in any way agree to this contract made by Hassan." Nejef's account of the inter- pp. 17, 50, 51.

view, as given by him on oath, is set out in Appendix 21. But even if the story were true, it would not affect the fact that in February 1908 Nejef expressed his disapproval in the most formal method at his disposal. In any case His Majesty's Government are unable to consider an expression of approval, given long after the cancellation of the concession, as equivalent to a confirmation of the contract.

His Majesty's Government observe that the p. 18.
German Government do not allege that Malcolm ever expressly approved of the contract; all that is stated is that no objection was raised by him. Without going into the question whether a failure to raise objections could amount to the necessary approval, it must be pointed out that no inference can be drawn either from Malcolm's silence or his letters, because of Hassan's successful attempts, by means of falsehood and deception, to keep him in the dark as to the facts. When asked by Malcolm for a copy of the agreement, he first made the untrue statement that the agreement was in German, and then asserted that Wönckhaus had bound him to secrecy; while the account given by him in his letter of the 13th July, 1906 (First British Memorandum, Appendix 13) omitted the most important provisions of the contract. His Majesty's Government are quite unable to agree that this letter "communicated all that p. 18.
was of importance"; the very provisions to which the other partners took objection when they heard of them were carefully omitted. This argument is also inconsistent with the p. 18.
further contention of the German Government that Hassan was entitled to keep the terms of the contract secret from Malcolm, because the latter was connected with Strick and Co., who held the Hormuz oxide concession. His Majesty's Government are unable to appreciate this contention, and in any case it is clear from Hassan's letter of the 14th October, 1906 (First British Memorandum, Appendix 14), that the person he really wished to keep in the dark was Abdul Latif, who had repeatedly warned him against making a contract of such a nature. In his letter of the 30th October, 1906 (Annex 34 p. 51.
to Second German Memorandum) Malcolm expressly protests against the terms of the agreement being kept secret from the partners. This letter also expressly recognises the possibility of the cancellation of the contract by the partners, if they considered it advisable.

When Malcolm did ultimately receive a copy of the agreement in December 1906, the contract was already six months old, and while he was still considering what action to take the situation was completely changed by the cancellation of the concession by the sheikh.

p. 19. His Majesty's Government do not dispute the fact that Abdul Latif, on behalf of Esa, did not object in 1905 to the sale of oxide to Wönckhaus at a fixed price, but, as it is not suggested that the contracts of that date contained the provisions to which he did afterwards object, it does not affect the present question. As regards his letter of the 14th June, 1906 (First British Memorandum, Appendix 12), His Majesty's Government must repeat that no weight can be attached to any expression of approval (if such can be deduced from the terms of the letter) given in ignorance of the terms of the contract. The non-disclosure of material terms would be held fatal by any court in which it was sought to rely on any such expressions of approval as constituting a ratification of the contract. And the letter expressly warns Hassan against entering into any contract which would give an outside party an excuse for claiming rights in the island. Such warnings had been given before, and Hassan had disclaimed any intention of entering into such a contract. In addition to the documents already quoted in this connection, reference may be made to two letters from Hassan to Abdul Latif, dated respectively the 30th January, 1905, and the 5th July, 1906 (Appendix 23).

No doubt Hassan's object was to conceal the terms of the contract from his partners for as long as possible, in order that when they were ultimately discovered he might be able to say that the contract had been in operation so long that it was impossible to go back on it.

When Abdul Latif had an opportunity of examining the terms of the contract he objected in the plainest terms, and announced his resolution of cancelling the contract.

p. 20. The German Government contend that the sentence in Abdul Latif's letter of the 23rd

January, 1907 (Annex 36 to Second German Memorandum), which has been translated "the nullification of this agreement is better than its acceptance," really bears the meaning "It is better to try to cancel the agreement than to do as he [the German] wishes." In support of this contention two opinions are quoted (Annexes 37 and 38 to Second German Memorandum) which reach this conclusion upon different grounds. Both these opinions are purely theoretical, and do not take local usage into account. His Majesty's Government would point out that in Enclosure 8 to the First German Memorandum the words in question are translated "The cession [? cessation] of this contract would be preferable to its continuance." His Majesty's Government also bring forward, in support of their view, the opinion (Appendix 24) of the well-known missionary the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, who has laboured for some fifteen years among the Arabs of the Persian Gulf, and probably knows their local peculiarities of speech and writing better than any other living man. His opinion entirely supports the contention of His Majesty's Government. Being, however, of opinion that when the meaning to be attributed to a phrase is in question, the best evidence is that of the person who used it, His Majesty's Government annex a statement (Appendix 25) by Abdul Latif, which makes it clear that he used the words in the sense attributed to them by His Majesty's Government, and that such would be the ordinary meaning of the phrase as understood in those parts. The statement also shows that Hassan understood the words in that sense, and quoted them in that sense (but more grammatically and unmistakably) in his reply. This reply is set out in Appendix 26.

pp. 52, 53.

p. 20.

pp. 53–55.

His Majesty's Government do not agree with this contention that Abdul Latif's letter, by recommending the cancelling of the agreement, admits that it had legal force. It is admitted that the contract was binding as between Hassan and Wönckhaus and Co., and therefore Hassan could only be released from it by cancellation; but the question at issue is whether it was binding on the partnership, and His Majesty's Government contend that the evidence is clear that it was not.

p. 20.

There is no doubt that Esa himself objected to the contract when he heard of its terms. This is clearly shown by his letter of the 20th February,

1907, to Sheikh Sugar (Appendix 27), which also proves that he did not consider Hassan as having authority to conclude the contract without consulting his partners.

His Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion:—

1. That Hassan had no authority to conclude the contract in question without the consent of his partners.

2. That Nejef was a partner on the same terms as the others.

3. That neither Nejef, Malcolm, nor Esa ever approved the agreement, but, on the contrary, at least two of them, when they heard of the terms, formally expressed their disapproval.

4. That even if any expression of approval can be deduced from the terms of Abdul Latif's letter dated the 14th June, 1906, it was given in ignorance of the most important terms of the contract, which had been wrongfully concealed by Hassan from his partners, and that on hearing of those terms Abdul Latif emphatically repudiated the transaction.

IV.

p. 28. *The agreement with Mr. Wönckhaus is advantageous to the mining company, so that the partners have not been injured by Hassan Samaili's action as manager.*

It is not considered necessary to consider again the question whether the agreement was financially for the benefit of the company, especially as, no accounts ever having been rendered by Hassan to his partners, it is impossible to test the accuracy of the books as now quoted. It is only necessary to remark that at least two of the partners considered that the arrangement was not advantageous to the company, and formally protested against it. It may also be added that, if it really was to the benefit of the company to enter into the contract, it becomes more difficult than ever to account for Hassan's anxiety to conceal its terms from his associates. It is possible, however, that this desire for concealment was due to a feeling that the contract might impair the relations between the company and the sheikh, in which case it would not be to the advantage of the company, even though financially it might have led to an increased revenue.

p. 24.

V

There was therefore no reason for a complaint of the company against Hassan Samaih on the ground of action contrary to agreement or duty. p. 28.

This point has been discussed under the two preceding heads.

VI.

There was accordingly no ground for action on the part of Sheikh Sagar against Hassan Samaih for the protection of the other partners. Moreover, the seat of the company is at Lingah, and the partners of the company are not subjects of the Sheikh of Shargeh, so that he has no jurisdiction in matters concerning the relations of the partners with each other. In any case, he could not exercise such jurisdiction himself, but should have had the dispute settled by the judge. p. 28.

Although it is hardly accurate to say that Sheikh Sagar took action against Hassan, it has been shown that there was abundant ground for his action when appealed to on behalf of the partners whose wishes and instructions had been disregarded, and who had been deceived, by their associate Hassan.

It has been already pointed out that it has never been contended by His Majesty's Government (or, as is admitted on p. 15 of the Second German Memorandum, by Sheikh Sagar) that the sheikh's action in cancelling the concession was p. 15.
intended to be that of a judge deciding the rights of the partners as between themselves; it was an act which in his sovereign capacity he was entitled to do, and no doubt one of his objects was to release the complaining partners from the position in which they found themselves owing to the unauthorised action of Hassan. This being so, the arguments adduced in the Second German p. 15
Memorandum to show that the sheikh was not the proper tribunal to adjust the rights of the partners are beside the mark. It is only necessary to remark that, as far as the cancellation of the concession was concerned, the sheikh was the only person who could act.

After the cancellation of the concession, the adjustment of the rights of the partners, as between themselves, by the appropriate tribunal (whatever that may prove to be) would under normal circumstances have been an easy matter. Nor is it impossible that the sheikh might have been willing to grant a fresh concession under proper conditions. But the course events have taken, in particular the intervention of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., has so far rendered this impracticable; though when the questions now at issue have been settled it may yet be possible for
pp. 15, 16. steps to be taken in the matter. In any case, the question whether Sagar's action violated the rights of the partners, who were all British subjects, is obviously one to be discussed, if at all, between the sheikh and His Majesty's Government.

VII.

p. 28 *The agreement between the mining company and Mr. Wönckhaus, which is nothing but the conclusion of an ordinary and permissible business transaction, and which cannot have any political aims, neither infringes the lease agreement nor is in any way dangerous to the interests of the State of Shargeh, so that the action taken by Sheikh Sagar against the company cannot be justified on the ground of the general interests of the administration of the country.*

It has been already pointed out that, whether the sheikh's action was "justifiable" or not, it was certainly one which he had power to take, and could not legally be questioned. His Majesty's Government agree that the contract with
p. 26. Wönckhaus was not strictly a letting of the mines to him. But it is submitted that it was not unnatural that the sheikh should look with some apprehension upon the acquisition of so large an interest in the produce of the mines by persons who were subject neither to his jurisdiction nor to that of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. The German Government are aware that as late as 1904 an attempt was made to seize Abu Musa by a Belgian customs officer in the Persian service, who hauled down the sheikh's flag and hoisted the Persian standard. And it cannot be denied that the actions of Messrs. Wönckhaus have been eminently calculated

to suggest that they were anxious to claim rights in the island and not merely in the produce of the mines. Thus, on the 19th October, 1907, Messrs. Wönckhaus wrote to the sheikh :—

"We consider the mines and the concession for them as a security for the advances paid. If you force Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Somayah and Co. to withdraw their coolies and representatives, we shall have to send over some men ourselves to protect our property."

When Brown and his men left for the island on the 22nd October, 1907, they took with them a German flag, which it was intended to place on the accumulations of oxide.

On the 19th November, 1907, the German vice-consul at Bushire threatened the sheikh with a claim for a lakh of rupees, and claimed for Messrs. Wönckhaus the right of direct concern in the working of the mines.

His Majesty's Government entirely agree with the German Government that the question in this case is purely commercial, and not political. But in view of the above facts, it appears that p. 27.
Sagar's fears were not altogether as "senseless" as has been suggested.

For reasons already given, however, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the question whether such considerations "justified" the sheikh's action does not arise.

VIII.

Sheikh Sakar's interference is not limited to redressing a wrong alleged to have been done by one partner to the others, or to preventing the carrying out of an agreement alleged to be contrary to the interests of the country, but simply deprives the whole company of the basis of its existence. p. 28.

The company, in which the German firm of Robert Wönckhaus and Co. have a share, is thereby very seriously injured, since the realisation of its object is made impossible, and it is not in a position to carry out current obligations imposed upon it by contract.

No new points are raised under this head. Sheikh Sagar's action was the only one he could take with a view to putting an end to the position in which the company found itself owing to the

action of Hassan. It may be mentioned that so p. 16.
far from Sheikh Sagar having "put in his pocket the whole valuable object in connection with which the company was founded," the result of his action has been that no revenue has been received from the mines from that day to this.

The question whether Wönckhaus and Co. can be considered as interested in the company is considered below.

It is no doubt unfortunate that the company has been unable to resume its operations since the cancellation, but, as has been pointed out above, that is not the fault of the sheikh, but is due to the course which affairs have taken.

IX.

Sakar's proceedings, then, are clearly a violation of law—an exercise of arbitrary power.

The German Government do not suggest what law it is that was violated by Sagar's proceedings. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that the sheikh's right to cancel the concession is one that cannot be questioned, and that it is a mistake to consider his action as an adjudication of the rights of the parties as between themselves.

His Majesty's Government must also repeat, that even if Sagar's proceedings were "a violation of law," the question would be, under the circumstances, one which could only concern the sheikh and His Majesty's Government.

p. 29. His Majesty's Government regret that they are entirely unable to recognise Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. as in any way concerned in the present question. It is clear that Messrs. Wönckhaus had a good cause of action for breach of contract against Hassan; or, if the contention of the German Government were correct, that the contract was binding on the partnership, they would have a cause of action against the partnership. They have never attempted to avail themselves of either of these remedies. It is obvious, therefore, that Messrs. Wönckhaus can have no claim against Sheikh Sagar in their capacity as parties to the contract, whether it was made with Hassan or with the mining company.

It would appear that no serious attempt is made in the Second German Memorandum to maintain the proposition that Messrs. Wönckhaus are concerned in the matter as having purchased a share in the partnership eight months after the cancellation of the concession. Apart from the fact that the transference of a share in an extinct concession could have no legal effect, it is difficult to see what cause of action, either in contract or in tort, could exist against the sheikh, at the suit of Messrs. Wönckhaus, for cancelling a concession to which they were not parties. It is not disputed that Messrs. Wönckhaus were aware, at the time when they purported to purchase the share, that the concession had been cancelled. Even assuming that the cancellation was unjustifiable, it cannot be disputed that it was effective, and that the concession came to an end at that time. If the cancellation was unjustifiable, it might give rise to a claim for compensation by the persons who were partners in the firm at the time, but certainly not to a claim by persons who, with full knowledge of the facts, purported to acquire a share months later. Thus, in any case, Messrs. Wönckhaus have no *locus standi*; and His Majesty's Government can only regard their action as an attempt to place themselves in a position which would enable them to bring pressure on the sheikh. It is noteworthy that an attempt was made in November 1907 to induce Nojef to transfer his share to Abdullah (see Appendix 21), and the fact that the transfer was to bear a date previous to the contract between Wönckhaus and Hassan, and therefore previous to the cancellation of the concession, suggests that the intention was to retransfer the share to Messrs. Wönckhaus. p. 29.

It may also be remarked that the sales of the share in question by Yussuf to Hassan, and by Hassan to Brown, were invalid in any case, because the documents of transfer did not bear the signatures of all the partners, as was necessary under the deed by which Malcolm became a partner (see Appendix 16).

The concession having been cancelled, and Hassan having disregarded the warning given him on the 3rd October, 1907, to remove his coolies and gear within ten days, the sheikh was clearly entitled to take steps to ensure their

removal. The action taken by His Majesty's Government to ensure that no breach of the peace should take place was explained in the First British Memorandum.

pp. 29, 30. His Majesty's Government have already given the correct account of the proceedings when Brown attempted to land on Abu Musa. It is clear that the employés of Messrs. Wönckhaus had no right to be on the island at all, and this is admitted by the statement on p. 26 of the Second German Memorandum: "The stipulation that the oxide is to be delivered free on board, and the detailed arrangements concerning the quantity to be loaded daily, make it clear that Mr. Wönckhaus was not to have anything to do with the working of the mines themselves." Thus the sheikh had a perfect right to prevent the men from landing, and no claim for compensation can possibly be put forward on those grounds.

His Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that Messrs. Wönckhaus have no claim against Sheikh Sagur or His Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office,
December 6, 1911.

APPENDIX 1.

The Residency Agent, Shargah, to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

May 17, 1894.

A letter reached me from the residency agent residing at Bahrein, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Chief of Bahrein regarding a jolly boat belonging to one of Sheikh Isa's subjects, named Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jobara, which stranded on the Isle of Abu Musa. Your servant endeavoured to release the jolly boat from the hands of the inhabitants of Abu Musa for the sum of 70 dollars; at the time Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jobara was present with me the inhabitants of Abu Musa refused, but [would] only accept half [of the value of the boat and cargo], according to custom. Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jobara departed from Bahrein to inform his chief [and point out] that should he desire to entreat the Chief of Shargah on account of friendship or [for] other reason [the latter would release it]. When the [Bahrein] agent's letter reached me I returned an answer according to what had passed on this subject, but no reply has come [to it]. According to what is noticed by me [*i.e.*], that the inhabitants of Abu Musa voyage in the jolly boat and convey cargo, it has become necessary to inform you, as probably that an accident may befall the boat. It is better that the owners of the jolly boat should strive to release the boat. Bahrein agent's letter, a copy of the Chief of Bahrein's letter are enclosed.

APPENDIX 2.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Residency Agent, Shargah.

Bushire, June 22, 1894.

Your letter dated the 17th ultimo, together with its enclosures, regarding the boat of Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jebara rescued by the inhabitants of the Island of Abu Musa has been received.

If no previous agreement has been made by the parties regarding the amount of salvage, and if the circumstances of the case show that the claim for a half share of the boat and cargo is exorbitant, you may use your good offices with the Chief of Shargah to induce to salvers to accept such remuneration as may be just and reasonable according to local custom and usage.

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Residency Agent, Bahrein.

Bushire, June 22, 1894.

With reference to the correspondence between you and the residency agent, Shargah, regarding the salvage claimed by the people of the Island of Abu Musa for rescuing the boat of a Bahrein subject, by name Mohamed-bin-Saleh-bin-Jobara, I enclose a letter I have addressed the Shargah agent on the subject, which please transmit to him after perusal.

APPENDIX 3.

Residency Agent, Shargah, to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

April 14, 1907.

I beg to state that the chief officer of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Bulimba" came to me on the 1st April, 1907, reporting that the steamer had stranded on the Bu Island and asking me to notify the Shargah merchants to send lighters to Bu Musa for the purpose of landing the cargoes they had

on board her. I notified the merchants accordingly. The officer then proceeded to Dubai to meet the ship's agent, Mohamed-bin-Ibrahim, and arrange for the dispatch of lighters to Bu Musa. I was informed by the officer that the islanders had not agreed to render the vessel any assistance unless they received half the cargo.

The agent, Mohamed Ibrahim, having asked me for assistance to be rendered to the steamer, I sent with him my brother, Maaraj-bin-Abdul Rahman, to Bu Musa lest the islanders may do something irregular towards the ship's crew and the cargo, which it may be desirable to discharge on the island in order to launch the vessel. I took likewise a letter from the Chief of Shargah to the islanders ordering them to refrain from raising objections against the ship's crew, and to give them such help as they can. However, by God's grace and the company's good fortune, the sea remained calm and waveless while the vessel was stranded until arrangements were made for launching her. According to Maaraj's report to me, His Majesty's ship "Highflyer" had visited Bu Musa just as the stranded vessel was being launched. Thank God nothing unpleasant occurred in the vessel's stranding, but if a storm had taken place she would have incurred some damage having stranded on hard rock.

APPENDIX 4

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Assistant Resident, Bunder Abbas.

British Residency and Consulate-General, Bushire, March 1, 1905.

I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 14th February, 1905, regarding salvage fees.

I would first observe that the usual local custom is for the Nakhuda of a boat in distress to apply to the local authorities or people for assistance and to agree with them on the amount of salvage money.

If the vessel is in serious danger, the persons rendering assistance claim half the value of the goods salved, a procedure sanctioned by local usage, but this residency has refused to recognise that they have any absolute right to demand such a share in the absence of agreement with the Nakhuda of the vessel. Local customs in this matter, as in others, depend more on "might" than "right," and efforts are always made to mulct the owners and Nakhodas of vessels as much as possible.

APPENDIX 5.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

(Translation.) *Shargah, 23rd Rabi I*, 1329 (*March* 25, 1911).

After compliments and enquiries after your health, I beg to address you in regard to your enquiry regarding the undermentioned three points connected with the Abu Musa case:

1. You say that it is claimed that on the 12th Shaban, 1316, after my return from the Hajj, Sheikh Salim granted to three persons an agreement for the extraction of mica from Bu Musa Island without any permission from me, and you enquire from me that if I was aware of the same, how was it that I did not mention this agreement to you on the 19th Moharram, 1326, when I presented to you a statement of my relations with Sheikh Salim in regard to the Bu Musa Island.

2. You also mention to me the question of jetsam and flotsam on the Bu Musa Island, and state that it is claimed that Sheikh Salim was receiving the income on this account; and

3. You have also shown me the translation of a paper which is claimed to be dated the 4th Zilkhadeh, 1315, and to be the first draft of the oxide contract which was altered to another form on the 18th Zilkhadeh, 1315.

This is my reply with regard to three points:—

Firstly, in regard to the mica agreement, I was fully aware of it, and Sheikh Salim consulted me [about it] and it would not have been possible that the said agreement could be issued without coming to my knowledge as ruling chief. But as I informed you two years ago, I had left to Sheikh Salim all the income which he could obtain from the aforesaid island, and consequently I did not trouble [myself] to object to this [agreement]. At the same time, when I presented to you the said statement regarding my relations with Sheikh Salim in respect of Bu Musa, the question of this mica contract did not occur to my mind at all, for, as you must be aware, the mica affair produced no result whatever. As regards the sum of 1,500 dollars, payable by instalments, to Sheikh Salim, I have no information as to how many instalments were received by Sheikh Salim. I did not trouble to make enquiries about the instalments, nor did I demand anything from Sheikh Salim on that account. It was my wish that he should get something from it, and that he should not trouble me about his expenses.

Secondly, as regards the right to jetsam and flotsam on Bu Musa Island and all the Islands of Kowasim, it is not open to doubt that it is due to the chief of the Kowasim, but the usual custom on the Oman coast is that the inhabitants of the place exact their rights on the scene of the wreck, and when the chief comes to know of it he settles the matter according to his own opinion; sometimes he takes his own share from his subjects and sometimes he does not take from them. In the case of Bu Musa, as I had left all the revenue to Sheikh Salim, I treated my right of jetsam and flotsam as a part of the income to go to him and used to ask no questions about it.

Thirdly, with regard to the rejected draft of the oxide agreement, I have now noted its wording, but had neither seen nor heard of it before. The reason for its rejection is obviously because Sheikh Salim could not write about Bu Musa in these terms, namely, "So long as I, my children, and my brothers live, no one is entitled to raise objection to it." No doubt this was the cause of the draft being changed. This is what was necessary to be stated, and salaams!

(L.S.) SAGAR-BIN-KHALED-BIN-SULTAN.

APPENDIX 6.

FORM 1.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of the Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arab sheikhs in regard to the coast and islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points:—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuaïr are islands belonging to the territories of the Jawasim of Oman and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Jawasim who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he forgoes it, as he may deem fit.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-TAHNOON,
Agent of the Sultan of Muscat.

(L.S.)

Note.—The word "loth" which is translated "jetsam and flotsam" is one commonly used by all inhabitants of the Gulf Islands and littoral, for all stray things found floating in or cast up by the sea—the meaning to this given in the dictionary is "something rolling or floating in water."

APPENDIX 7.

FORM 2.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of the Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are one of the Arab sheikhs of the Persian Gulf and are familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arabs in regard to the coast and the islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points:—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair are islands belonging to the territories of the Kawasims of Oman, and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Kawasims who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam, it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he forgoes it, as he may deem fit.

(Signed and sealed) SALEH-BIN-MUHAMMAD-EL-ALI,
Chief of Charak.

Answers in a similar sense recorded by the following also:—

Ahmed-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Merbakh and Mugam.
Ahmed-bin-Muhammad-el-Ali, Headman of Kais Island.
Abdullah-bin-Majed-el-Marzooki, Headman of Bustaneh.
Khalfan-bin-Misbah-el-Ali, Headman of Dowwan.
Sultan-bin-Ahmed-Marzooki, Chief of Moghu.
Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Abeideli, Chief of Armoki and Cheeroo.
Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah-el-Hamadi, Chief of Kolat.

APPENDIX 8.

FORM 8.

Question put regarding the Jurisdiction and Ownership of Abu Musa Island, and the manner of the exercise of Rights of jetsam and flotsam on the Islands of the Gulf.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

As you are an Arab merchant of the Persian Gulf and familiar with the traditions of the past and the rights of the Arab sheikhs in regard to the coast and islands in the Gulf, what is your opinion on the following points :—

1. The islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair, to the jurisdiction of which sheikh do they belong and in which sheikh are the rights of ownership vested?
2. The right to jetsam and flotsam in the islands, by whom is it exercised?

Answer.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Firstly, I am familiar with the matters about which you ask me. It is well known amongst the Arabs of the Gulf that the islands of Bu Musa and Sir Bu Nuair are islands belonging to the territories of the Kawasims of Oman and that their owner is the ruling sheikh of the Kawasims who resides at Shargah and who is at present Sagar-bin-Khaled-bin-Sultan.

Secondly, as regards the question of jetsam and flotsam, it is always taken at the time by the inhabitants of the scene of the wreck and when the chief comes to know of it, he is entitled to take a share; sometimes he takes it and sometimes he forgoes it, as he may deem fit.

(Signed and sealed) ALI-BIN-ABDULLAH-BEHZAD, *of Keis.*
(A well known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island)

Answers in a similar sense also recorded by :—

Haji-Isa-bin-Saleh, resident of the Keis Island;
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Haji-Muhammad-bin-Hydar, resident of Keis;
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Haji-Isa-bin-Hussein-Janam;
(A well-known and reliable merchant of the Keis Island.)
Muhammad-bin-Ahmed, resident of the Keis Island;
(A well-known merchant and notable of Keis.)
Ali-bin-Muhammad-Abdul-Wahid-el-Marzooki;
(A notable of Bustaneh.)
Abdullah-bin-Ali-el-Marzooki, resident of Hasineh;
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Hassan-bin-Abdul-Rahim;
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Ali-bin-Abdullah-bin-Muhammad-el-Marzooki;
(A notable of Hasineh.)
Muhammad-bin-Hassan-el-Meithoomi-el-Marzooki;
(A leading merchant of Bustaneh.)

APPENDIX 9.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif giving history of the rejected Preliminary Draft of the Oxide Concession and explaining the reason of its rejection.

With reference to the translation which you have shown to me of what purports to be a rejected preliminary draft, dated the 6th April, 1898, of the oxide concession executed on the 10th April, 1898, I beg to make the following observations :—

I note that the document purports to be signed by (1) Hassan-bin-Ahmed and (2) Ali Ahmed Saleh.

The Hassan-bin-Ahmed mentioned was a retainer of Sheikh Salim. Ali Ahmed Saleh is the man whose identity you know as Nakhoda Ali. I had nothing to do with the writing or drafting of this document.

I remember that I had been absent on duty at Bushire during the spring of the year in question, and it was on my return to Shargah that the project for an oxide concession was discussed. The draft had been drawn up by Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh, and it was he who showed it to me. At the same time he and Nakhoda Ali, who was also there, asked me to let my son Isa come into the concern as they needed some one on the spot at Shargah in order to keep in touch with Sheikhs Sagar and Salim. I agreed, but pointed out that the terms of the proposed concession as at present drafted were quite impossible, and that neither Sheikh Sagar would confirm it nor would the Government approve it. What I especially objected to was (1) the sentence in which Sheikh Salim is made to say: "so long as I, my children, and my brothers live, no one will be entitled to raise objection to it," and (2) the inclusion of Nakhoda Ali as a signatory on the document.

With regard to (1), I would explain that Salim was an old man of 70, who might be expected to die at any time, and I was taking into account the fact that if he died, we should thenceforth have to deal with Sheikh Sagar.

As regards (2) I thought the inclusion of Nakhoda Ali was inexpedient, as I had just been visiting Bushire and knew him to be in very bad odour with the residency in connection with his Bushire affairs, and he was also at loggerheads with the well-known Muin-ut-Tujjar of Tehran, holder of the Hormuz concession, and I feared the latter would be likely to give us trouble if he came to know that Nakhoda Ali was a partner in a rival oxide enterprise. I also omitted the twenty-year time limit, as I saw no object in inserting any fixed period of time.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDURRAHMAN.

March 25, 1911.

APPENDIX 10.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif on the reference to a Dispute between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim regarding Sir Abu Nuair Island (made in his letter of the 27th Jamadi II, 1316 (November 14, 1898).

Your honour enquires from me to what I referred in my letter dated the 27th Jamadi II, 1316, when I wrote the following sentence :—

"As regards Sir a dispute has arisen between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim. It is Sagar's intention to lease without mentioning Salim's name and to give some advantage to Salim, but Salim would not agree to this."

The explanation of the above passage is as follows :—

It will be remembered that in the second agreement between Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim (dated 1884), at which my predecessor was the intermediary, Sheikh Sagar granted to Sheikh Salim an annual pension of 400 dollars together with the revenue of Sir Bu Nuair, which was expected to bring in some 200 dollars.

Up to 1889, however, this island did not produce any revenue as was expected and consequently no mention was made of it in the third agreement dated the 5th Shaaban, 1306 (1889), and Sheikh Salim ceased to take any interest in it. When, however, it became probable that the island might produce some revenue as the result of the concession alluded to in my letter to Hassan Samieh now under reference, Sheikh Salim's interest was naturally revived and he wanted to claim the revenue under the obsolete agreement of 1884, which Sheikh Sagar was altogether unwilling to agree to on the ground that under the last agreement (1889), which was now in force, the revenue of Sir Bu Nuair Island was not an item of the settlement. The sheikhs failed to come to an understanding on this point, with the result that the project for the concession fell through. This is what had to be represented.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDUL RAHMAN.

March 26, 1911.

APPENDIX 11.

QUESTION (A).

As put to the Members of the Mercantile Community.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the respected and honoured merchants. May God the Highest prolong their good fortune!

What do you say in regard to a lease which has been given, according to the following copy, by a certain party to another, and in which no specification of the period has been made, and also no legal formula has been pronounced? Can such a lease be considered proved and binding, and accepted according to the rules of Islamic commerce?

It is requested that you will record the true position in accordance with the commercial rules in Islam, and adorn and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

(Here follows imaginary deed of lease, in same terms as that given in Annex 29 to Second German Memorandum), as under :—

In the Name of God the Most Merciful.

Let all know who may see this: I, Zamil-ibn-Ibrahim-ibn-Isa Addossi, have leased the mine which is situated in Assalime to the following persons: Alhadj Abdalhamid-ibn-Abdal-Karim and Mustafa Kerim and Assayid Habib-ibn-Ibrahim, from this date for so long as they are interested in the aforesaid mine. They are to pay £T. 150 for every year. I have likewise agreed with them that, if they wish to ship dried and fresh dates for trading purposes at the place mentioned, they are to pay us £T. 100 each year as rent. We authorise them to dig wells for drinking water for their employés working in the aforesaid mining district. Friendly assistance is to be given by us to their employés working in the mining district. It is possible that I may have concluded agreements before this present one; any such are to be invalid, and this agreement alone is to hold good. It has been drawn up in duplicate. Let this be known.

Done the 18 Dulkade, 1320 (16th February, 1903).

(Signed by Zamil-ibn-Ibrahim.)

Witnesses:
SALIH-IBN-HAMDAN.
ABDALKERIM-IBN-ABDULLAH.

Opinions recorded by Members of Mercantile Community in reply to Question (A).

1. The essential basis of every transaction of the nature of a mortgage or lease, according to the rule of the enlightened Shera, is the pronunciation of the formula and the specification of the period.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI ABDUL RASUL BUSHIRI,
Rais-i-Tujjar.

(*Note.*—Recognised by Persian Government as head of the Persian mercantile community of Bushire.)

2. The commerce of Islam proceeds in accordance with the rule of the Holy Shera law. It is obvious that a lease without specification of period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI MUHAMMAD REZA BIN GHULAM ALI, *Behbehani.*

(*Note.*—One of the firm acting as agents of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, and E. D. Sassoon and Co., and a member of the Persian Chamber of Commerce at Bushire. One of the four chief merchants of Bushire.)

3. The commercial principle of Islam is in accordance with the rule of the enlightened Shera (law). It is obvious that a lease without the specification of period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) HAJI MUHAMMAD BAGER,
Behbehani.

(*Note.*—Head of the firm acting as agents of the Bombay and Persian Steam Navigation Company, and Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and a member of the Persian Chamber of Commerce at Bushire. One of the four chief merchants of Bushire.)

4. The commercial principle of Islam is in accordance with the rule of the enlightened Shera (law). It is obvious that a lease without the specification of the period and without the pronunciation of the formula is null and void.

(Signed and sealed) SEYYID JAFFAR-EL-MOOSEVI,
Behbehani.

(*Note.*—A well-known and respected merchant, whose opinion carries much weight in local public affairs.)

5. The principle for every transaction, such as sale, purchase of lease, according to the rule of the enlightened Shera (law), depends on the formula.

(Signed and sealed) ALI AKBAR-BIN-ABOOL KASEM,
Shirazi.

(*Note.*—A well-known merchant of good repute in Bushire.)

6. Whereas the commercial principle of Islam is based upon the sacred Shera law, therefore the said lease which lacks the pronunciation of the legal formula and the specification of the period is null and void, and is invalid.

(Signed and sealed) IBRAHIM-BIN-MUHAMMAD ABDUL WAHID.

(*Note.*—A leading Sunni pearl dealer of Lingah.)

7. Whereas the commercial principles of Islam are based upon the sacred Shera law, therefore the said lease, which lacks the pronunciation of the legal formula and the specification of the period is null and void, and is invalid.

SEYYID IBRAHIM-BIN-SEYYID ISMAIL-EL-MOOSEVI.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—A principal Shia merchant of Lingah.)

8. Yes; all the commercial affairs of Islam are according to the enlightened Shera. The said lease is null and void owing to the absence of the specification of the period and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, and is not valid

IBRAHIM-BIN-HASSAN-EL-OMMANI.

(*Note.*—A well-to-do Sunni merchant of Lingah.)

9. Yes; all the commercial affairs of Islam are according to the enlightened Shera. The said lease is null and void owing to the absence of all specification of the period and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, and is not valid.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-ALI SHAH.

(*Note.*—A well-to-do merchant of Lingah.)

10. Whereas the commercial principle of Islam is based upon the sacred Shera; therefore the said lease, which is without the pronunciation of the legal formula and the stipulation of the time, is null and void, and is invalid. Let it not be hidden.

(Signed and sealed) MUHAMMAD HASSAN-BIN-HAJI ISMAIL, *Bushiri.*

(*Note.*—A well-to-do Shia merchant of Lingah. Was deputy Karguzar of Bunder Abbas for a long time.)

Appendix 12.

Question (A).

As put to the Members of the Clerical Profession.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the illustrious presence of the distinguished ulemas (priests) and venerable lawyers
May God multiply the like of them!

What do you say in regard to and of a lease, which has been given, according to the following copy, by certain party to another, and in which no specification of the period has been made and also no legal formula has been pronounced? Can such a lease be considered proved and binding and accepted according to Shera law?

It is requested that you will write the true position in accordance with the precepts of the holy law of Islam, and adorn it and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

[Here follows imaginary deed of lease in similar terms to that of which a translation is given in Annex 29 to Second German Memorandum.]

Opinions of Clergy in reply to Question (A).

1. In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate.

Reply.—And God is the guide to what is right. The lease will not be valid without proposal and acceptance by legal formula and without the specification of a fixed period. And God knows more.

Written by Ibrahim-bin-Abdullah.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Chief Sunni Mullah of Bushire.)

2. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

According to the question, this lease is null and void.

Written by Mohamed Ali Al-i-Osloor.

(L.S.) Confident in God the Bounteous. His slave, Mohamed Ali-bin-Muhammad Taki.

(*Note.*—Imam Juma, the official High Priest of Bushire.)

3. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Amongst the conditions for the validity of a lease are the specifications and record of the period of the lease. Supposing, for instance, he were to say, "I have let the house at the rate of 1 toman per mensem," such a lease is legally null and void, and if the lessee says a prayer in such a house the prayer will be futile. And as to this question there is no difference of opinion between the distinguished ulemas, and God is aware of His precepts.

Written by the humble Mohamed Ali-el-Moosevi-ed-Dehdasty-en-Nejafi.

(L.S.) The hopeful Mohamed Ali-el-Moosevi.

(*Note.* The most venerable Shia Mullah in Bushire.)

4. It should be understood that the conditions for the validity of a lease are six, by the absence of any of which six conditions the lease is null and void. The first [is] the compact, *i.e.*, the proposal and acceptance, intended to indicate the fact of the assumption of the profit for a fixed period in return for something specific. Secondly, the legality of the possession. Thirdly, the taking cognizance of the rent or the measure or weight or number. Fourthly, the specification of the profit by time or by

the job. Fifthly, the retention of the profit in possession or its coming under that category [of possession]. Sixthly, the defining of the period of the lease in such a manner that it shall become neither less nor more. The subject-matter of the question [under reply], being void of certain of the conditions, namely, the compact and the period, and the cognizance of the amount of the profit, is not valid, and God is aware of the truth of affairs.

Written by the humble Abdullah-el-Moosevi-el-Baladi.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—The chief mullah of the Ussuli sect of Shias in Bushire.)

5. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The distinguished ulemas—may their blessings amongst the people endure—have defined "lease" to be the taking possession of an ascertained profit in return for something specific. So whatever is like giving possession of original property, for instance by selling it, is a thing extraneous to a compact of lease, and so is anything in which the profit is not defined, either in itself—such as by the act of sewing of a certain garment or the riding of a certain animal to a certain place—or by the fixing of a period such as a full year. And thus, as regards the subject of the question, whereas, it is not a case of taking possession of a profit, but of the original property and, whereas, the profit is not fixed by either of the two methods aforesaid, the lease is accordingly null and void, on both counts, and it is obvious that while there is no contradiction in the said two rulings, it is recorded that the majority set store by the last. And God is aware of His Commands.

Written by this humble servant of the Shera, Murteza-el-Moosevi, Sadr-el-Islam.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Soyyid Murteza-el-Moosevi is the stipendiary "Sadr-el-Islam," of Bushire, much respected for his piety.)

6. Praise be to God.

This lease as it is written is null and void and is not valid. The conditions for the lease, viz., the formula of proposal and acceptance and the stipulation of the time are not (made) therein. Further, if the mines are open they cannot be turned into property and the lease is not proper.

This, and God the Highest knows more.

Written by the humblest Muhammad Mehdi-bin-Abdullah.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest mentioned in Annex 26 to Second German Memorandum.)

7. In the case of the omission of the formula of the lease and the non-stipulation of the time, the lease is null and void and is not valid. And God knows more.

Written by Yusuf-bin-Mohamed-bin-Abdullah, servant of the law, at Lingah.

(L.S.) The dependent on God, Yusuf-bin-Muhammad-bin-Abdullah.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest mentioned in Annex 28 to Second German Memorandum.)

8. Praise be to God, the Leader to the right (path).

The said lease, apart from being null and void, is not a lease originally, because a lease without formula and a fixed period is not a lease.

Written by Abdurrahman-ibn-Yusuf. May God forgive both of them.

In Rabi-el-Mevlid, 1320.

(L.S.) SULTAN-UL-ULEMA.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest figuring in Annex 27 to Second German Memorandum.)

Endorsement.—The answer of our lord Sheikh Abdul Rahman, Sultan-ul-Ulema, is correct and is according to the Mahommedan law.

Written by the humblest of God's creatures, Muhammad Mehdi-bin-Andullah.

(*Note.*—Identical with the priest figuring in Annex 26 to Second German Memorandum.)

9. Praise be to God.

The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void and cannot be acted upon.

(Signed and sealed) JASEM-BIN-AHMED.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Bustaneh on the Persian coast.)

10. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

And God is the Guide. The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void, and God knows more.

Written by the humblest Mohammad-bin-Abdul-Rahman, servant of the august law, at Dowwan.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Priest of the Port of Dowwan.)

11. O God, lead to what is right.

The lease mentioned in the question is null and void and does not hold good for the reason that the legal formula has not been pronounced and the period of the lease has not been specified; also the owner of the property has the option to immediately prevent lessee from holding the property in his possession. And God knows more.

Written by the humble servant of the august law, Abdul-Rahman-bin-Muhammad, at Moghu.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Moghu on the Persian coast.)

12. *Answer.*—And O God, guide to the right.

The aforesaid lease, being void of the pronunciation of the legal formula and being without the specification of a fixed period, is null and void and cannot be acted upon.

Written by Muhammad-bin-Salman, servant of the law, at Hasineh.

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Hasineh on the Persian coast.)

13. O God, guide to the right in the answer!

Praise be to God alone, and peace and blessing be on him after whom there is no prophet.

And afterwards, the aforesaid lease is null and void and cannot be acted upon owing to the absence of the legal formula and the non-specification of the period and owing to the ignoring of the period.

Written by the humblest of the members of the clergy, and God knows the right better.

(Signed and sealed) ABDULLAH-BIN-MUHAMMAD SAEED-EL-ANSARI, *Resident of Kelat.*

(*Note.*—Sunni Arab Kazi of Kalet on the Persian coast.)

14. *The Answer.*—The lease has conditions; if a single condition thereof is violated the lease is spoiled. How is it now that (several) conditions are omitted? The first is that a lease requires bond such as proposal and acceptance; and the second of the conditions thereof is that it should be for a known period. So this, which is written in the question, should be nullified for several reasons, and it cannot be valid in this condition which is stated. And God knows more.

ABDUL KERIM-BIN-AHMED
(Servant of the august law, at Keis, by his own hand).

15. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Praise be to God, Who leads to the right.

The said lease is invalid and illegal in several respects and does not contain all the conditions. The first of the reasons for its invalidity is that the period of the lease is unspecified. The second reason is that the formula of the lease has not been pronounced therein. The third reason is that, legally speaking, the right to any ground rent, in the manner mentioned in the question, is unknown (*i.e.*, inadmissible) from all points of view. To take interest on unknown articles for an unknown period, and to compare it to rent is unlawful. In short, this lease, as quoted in the question, according to "the following copy," is not compatible with the precepts of the august Shera law. And God knows best.

(Signed and sealed) By this humblest and poor,
ABDUL RAHMAN-BIN-ABDUL GHAFOOR, EL MUFTI.

(*Note.*—Chief Kazi of the Sunni Arab community, who is highly respected by all the inhabitants of Bundor Abbas, Lingah, the Shib Kuh Ports and all the outlying ports.)

APPENDIX 13.

QUESTION (B) (i).

As put to the Members of the Clergy.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the learned ulemas and distinguished lawyers. May God multiply the like of them!

As regards a deed of lease which has been given by a certain party to another, and in which, owing to the absence of the specification of the time and the non-pronunciation of the legal formula, the learned lawyers and Islamic divines have, in accordance with the rules of the Sacred Shera of Islam, issued and recorded a judgment nullifying the lease, can the lessor, who is the owner of the property, cancel it and turn the lessee out of his property?

It is requested that you will record the true position in accordance with the precepts of the Sacred Law of Islam and adorn and seal it with your august seal. Please explain and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

Here follows copy of the said lease (an imaginary one) as under:—

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Let all know who may see this. I, Mohammad-bin-Abdullah-bin-Hassan have leased all the mines situated in the island of Kaem to the following persons: Haji Yakoob-bin-Mohamed-bin-Saleh, Abdul Kerim Mohammad, and Seyyid Sadek-bin-Ali from this date for so long as they have a disposition (to work) in the aforesaid mine. They are to pay us 150 French dollars for every year. I have likewise agreed with them that if they wish to ship dried and fresh dates for trading purposes at the place mentioned, they are to pay us 150 French dollars as warehouse fee; and we have authorised them to dig well for drinking-water for their employés working in the aforesaid mine, and friendly assistance is to be given by us to their employés who work on the mine. It is possible that I may have concluded agreements before this present one, but they are not to be acted upon, and this agreement, which is written in duplicate, holds good.

Dated 18th Zilkadeh, 1315.

MOHAMMAD-BIN-ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN.

Witnesses:
SALEH-BIN-HAMDAN.
ABDULLAH-BIN-MOHAMED.

Opinions recorded by Clergy in reply to Question (B) (i).

1. Praise be to God the Most High!

There is no doubt that when a lease is not proved and legalised the owner of the property has the control over his property and can turn the illegal lessee out of his property. And God the Most High knows more.

Dated Rabi 11, 1329.

Written by Abdul Rahman-bin-Yusuf. May God forgive both of them!

(L.S.) SULTAN-UL-ULEMA.

(*Note.*—The same mullah who passed opinion forming Annex 27 to Second German Memorandum.)

2. Praise be to God the Most High!

Answer.—O God, (give) success to the right and guidance to truth!

In the case that the conclusion of the agreement is not perfect as regards the conditions, the said lease is not correct legally and is null and void, and the lessor, who is the owner of the property, has, according to the Shera, the right to turn the lessee out of his property immediately, and God knows best.

Written by Yusuf-bin-Mohamed-bin-Abdullah, servant of the Shera at Lingah—the Guarded.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—The same mullah who passed the opinion forming Annex 28 to Second German Memorandum.)

3. Whereas the said lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period, the owner of the property has the right, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately.

(Signed and sealed) JASEM-BIN-AHMED,
Kazi of Bustaneh.

4. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

And God is the Guide. Whereas the aforesaid lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period the owner of the property has the right, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows more!

Written by the humblest Mohammad Abdul Rahman, servant of the august law at Dowwan.

5. O God, give guidance to the right!

The lease mentioned in the question is invalid for the reason that the legal formula has not been pronounced between them and also the period has not been specified. It is for the owner of the property to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows more!

Written by the humblest servant of the Shera law at Moghu, Abdul Rahman-bin-Muhammad.

6. *The Answer.*—O God, give guidance to the right!

Whereas the aforesaid lease is null and void owing to the absence of the pronunciation of the legal formula and the non-specification of a fixed period, the owner of the property has the right to turn out the lessee from his property immediately.

Written by Bin-Mohammad-bin-Salman, servant of the Shera law at Hasinah.

7. O God, give guidance to the right in reply!

Praise be to God alone and peace and blessing be on him after whom there is no prophet!

And afterwards. The said lease is null and void and cannot be acted upon owing to the absence of the legal formula and the non-specification of the period which is a necessary condition of the lease; and it is for the owner of the property, according to the Shera law, to turn out the lessee from his property immediately. And God knows the right better.

Written by the humblest of the members of the clergy, Abdullah-bin-Muhammad Saeed-el-Ansari, of Kelat.

8. *The Answer.*—A lease has several conditions and if a single condition (thereof) is violated, the lease becomes invalid, and how it would be now that several conditions have been omitted therefrom. Firstly, it becomes binding by a known period. This has been omitted, however. Secondly, a lease becomes binding by proposal and acceptance. Should these conditions be absent, the lease is null and void, and when the lease is nullified it is for the lessor to take possession of his property and to lease it to another; and God knows best.

(Signed and sealed) ABDUL KERIM-BIN-AHMED
(Servant of the august Shera law, by his own hand.)

And if the owner of the property wishes to turn out the lessee, he can turn him out immediately.

(Signed and sealed) ABDUL KERIM
(Servant of the Shera law at Keis).

9. *The Answer.*—Praise be to God, who leads to the right!

This lease as it is mentioned in the question is not in accord with the precepts of the august Shera, and is null and void and invalid. So, the owner of the property has the option to return to his property, and he has the absolute possession thereof, and can use his property in any manner that he may wish. He has the option (to do so), and the lessee has no right or title in that property. And whatever is invalid according to the august Shera is to be considered as non-existent. Should the proprietor desire to turn out the lessee from that place he can do so, and there is nothing to bind the owner of the place. And God knows more!

(Signed and sealed) The humblest and poor
ABDUL RAHMAN-BIN-ABDUL GHAFOOR, EL-MUFTI

(Chief Kazi of the Arab community of the Shib Kuh ports.)

APPENDIX 14.

QUESTION (B) (ii).

As put to the Members of the Clergy.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the learned ulemas and distinguished lawyers, may God multiply the like of them!

What do you say as regards a certain man who leased certain property to a certain party and did not stipulate a fixed period in the deed of lease, wherein also no legal formula was pronounced between them, and after some time the owner of the property cancelled the lease. Has the owner of the property the right of cancelling (it) and expelling Zaïd, the lessee, from his property or not?

It is requested that you will explain the true position according to the precepts of the enlightened Shera, and be rewarded, your reward being with God.

Answer

Yes, the owner has the right to expel the lessee from his property because the said lease contains nothing binding according to the Shera.

Immediately the owner cancels the lease, the lease becomes dissolved.

Written by Shubbar-bin-Ali-el-Moosevi.

(L.S.)

(*Note.*—Seyyid Shubbar is the Shia Mujtshid of Lingah.)

APPENDIX 15.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif with reference to the Memorandum of Rules of Partnership, purporting to be dated 26th Shaaban, 1316 (January 9, 1899), and on which Hassan Samich bases his title to represent the Company.
March 25, 1911.

The history of the paper purporting to be the rules of partnership is as follows:—

The drawing up of the original draft was done by me, the reason being that the oxide mining work had been in operation for nearly a year without any definite plan of operations having been arrived at. I was anxious to put the work on a more business-like footing, and therefore drew up some rules and sent them to Hassan. The latter made certain additions and had five documents drawn up including the additions and signed by himself, Abdullah, and Nakhoda Ali, and he forwarded them all to me for completion by the attachment of the signatures of Sheikh Sagar and myself. When completed I was to return three of them to him, one for himself, one for Abdullah, and one for Nakhoda Ali. Of the remaining two I was to give one to Sheikh Sagar and keep one myself. I did not, however, care about the extra condition which he had inserted and wrote back and said so. There the matter ended. These deeds were never completed nor were any revised documents drawn up. I never showed them to Sheikh Sagar, and produce them now in the state in which I received them. These rules never having become operative, Esa and I always considered and presumed that the document on which the concern was carried on was that of Zilhijjeh, 1315, in which Nakhoda Ali was admitted to partnership, and in which it is laid down that the sale, loading, and shipping should be carried out with the knowledge of all the partners. By reason of Hassan's neglect to consult us properly, and his failure to render any accounts, we became dissatisfied with his conduct of affairs.

APPENDIX 16.

Translation of Deed admitting Mr. T. J. Malcolm into partnership, dated 13th Shaaban, 1316 (December 27, 1898).

In the name of God the Highest.

We do agree and take upon ourselves, Hassan-bin-Ali Samieh, Abdullah-bin-Hassan, Isa-bin-Abdul Latif, Yusuf-bin Abdullah and Ali Ahmed Saleh, that we have admitted amongst us Mr. Tigrane Malcolm in the company for the oxide and mica mines in the Bu Musa Island, which we have leased from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan at 250 dollars per annum for the oxide mines, and 1,500 dollars for a five years' period on account of the mica mines, on the condition that he will use endeavours in disposing of and shipping what is excavated from the said mines in steamers from Bu Musa to other countries for sale, and afford full assistance for the non-stoppage of the work on the said mines. And whatever the said expenses may amount to, they will be borne by all the parties, and the profits will also be (divided) proportionately amongst all. And on this (understanding) the agreement is concluded; so that it may not be hidden.

And it is not open to any one of the partners to sell his share or to admit any one (therein) except in consultation with Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samich, and with his signature, together with those of the partners.

Dated 13th Shaaban, 1316.

(L.S.)	YUSUF-BIN-ABDULLAH.
(L.S.)	HASSAN-BIN-ALI-BIN-SAMIEH.
(L.S.)	ABDULLAH HASSAN.
(L.S.)	ISA-BIN-ABDUL LATIF.
(L.S.)	ALI AHMED SALEH.

(*Note.*—The first part of this document is in the handwriting of Abdul Latif. The concluding condition is in the writing of Abdullah-bin-Hassan-bin-Ali Samich himself.)

APPENDIX 17.

Statement of Mr. T. J. Malcolm.

MR. TIGRANE MALCOLM appears before me this 30th day of May, 1911, and makes the following statement:—

"The history of my entry into the Abu Musa oxide concern was as follows:—

"I had been for some years connected with the trade in oxide from Hormuz in association with Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, in whose name the concession then was. He, however, lost the concession and then, in consultation with me, he set to work to obtain a concession for extracting Abu Musa oxide, having first made a trial shipment. It was Nakhoda Ali who first started the Abu Musa mining, Hassan Sameiyeh knew nothing about the oxide trade until Nakhoda Ali introduced him to it. The latter had at this time a very bad name with the local authorities and in commercial circles in the Gulf ports, and so he found it convenient to work through Hassan Sameiyeh.

"After securing the Abu Musa concession the parties thought it would be to their advantage to bring me into it with a view to my arranging the shipments to Europe and elsewhere, and so I came into it. Nakhoda Ali was the moving spirit in the acquiring of the concession, Hassan Sameiyeh was only used as a screen. The former was in charge of the mining work and always complained greatly of the obstructiveness of Abdullah Sameiyeh and his father Hassan, and their ignorance of matters connected with the oxide trade. Owing, however, to his own state of bankruptcy Nakhoda Ali could not take a prominent part in the concern, and so Abdullah and Hassan gradually began to dominate it. Nakhoda Ali managed the work on the island, I was expected to manage the sales and shipment to Europe, and Hassan acted as corresponding member of the company.

"No particular basis of authority existed, so far as I know, on which Hassan was entitled to act, and to the best of my belief (and I have an excellent memory) I have never heard of or seen the so-called memorandum of association which you have now shown me, much less did I ever sign it or receive a copy of it.

"Nor was I consulted at all or informed regarding the sale of a share in the concern by Sheikh Sagar to Yusuf-bin-Abdullah, or by Yusuf to Hassan, or Hassan to Brown; it is all news to me.

"In any case, Hassan Sameiyeh never acted according to the rules now shown to me. He has never rendered any accounts at all. In fact, the mismanagement of the Sameiyehs and the extravagance of Abdullah have always been a great cause of complaint both to me and Nakhoda Ali."

T. J. MALCOLM.

Bushire, May 30, 1911.

Before me:

P. Z. Cox, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX 18.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 5th Rajab*, 1323 (*September* 5, 1905).

In the most auspicious hour and the best time, your letter dated Jamadi II reached us and we noted it with pleasure, and what you had stated was duly understood by your friend. Especially as regards the long absence of news from me, I was in poor health. May God the Most High protect us against all the distempers and may you not see anything unpleasant.

You have stated about the house that it should be under our supervision. It does not matter.

I have already notified you that a discussion took place a few days ago between us and the German, who wishes to take about 500 tons oxide more or less, and we have settled with him for it. Coolies have been working for one and a-half months now and if the remaining portion is cleared up, his steamer will come to ship. Our object is to carry on the business. I have arranged as he desired, and, God willing, if it went to Hamburg and was approved by them, they will ask for another consignment.

Let it not be hidden from you that my son Abdullah has an intention to come at the end of September. He will come to Bombay to settle Salman's account with the Bania Jeita because the court will be closed nowadays for two months. When the court opens, he will appear in the court together with his antagonists before the auditor and will settle their account if God wishes. Now there remains but little work, and he will then come to our side. You know court affairs. A day means ten days (*i.e.*, a day's work will take ten days) and no one can help it. But, God willing, patience is the key of relief.

This is what was necessary (to be said), and please convey our compliments to Haji Muhammad Hussein and Abdullah-el-Mulla.

On this side, all our friends send you greeting. And may you continue to remain preserved and guarded!

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 8th Jamadi II*, 1325 (*July* 19, 1907).

In the most auspicious time your valued letters reached us, and we noted with pleasure that your health continues to be good; and what you have stated was duly understood by your friend.

[Here a reference is made to the differences which existed at that time between Nejef and one Muhammad Ali in connection with the post of Hamal Bashi, landing contractor, at Bunder Abbas.]

My son, Abdullah, was sent by us to the island, a few days ago, in the German steamer to ship oxide, and he has not returned up to now. He will, God willing, come to us this morning. The steamer shipped oxide and left. We have not yet settled with them the account of the cargo so that we may let you know how much has been shipped.

The news of our side is tranquil, and there has been no report which should be communicated to you, except that all is well.

Give my salaams to those who are with you.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)
(After greeting.) *30th Safar*, 1325 (*April* 14, 1907).

In a most fortunate time I received your letter, dated the 25th Safar, and noted it with pleasure. I have understood what you have stated, especially as regards the receipt of our letter by you. This is satisfactory. As regards my son, Abdullah, it was firstly his intention to come by steam-ship "Mohamedi"; but God did not will this. He will, if God pleases, arrive by the steamer "Naseri," which is due in three to four days, and he will certainly meet you at Bunder Abbas.

You had stated that the German steamer visited the Bu Musa Island and shipped 1,000 tons. There had not been such a report with us, nor has any steamer visited the

island. Had any steamer visited there, how could I have omitted to write by letter to that effect? This news is false. You have also heard that the steamer "Mohamedi" will arrive at Bu Musa. This has not become known, and no communication has been made with them (*i.e.*, the agents of the company) regarding the arrival of the steamer.

You had stated that you required Omani tobacco. Tobacco is absolutely unavailable at Lingah nowadays. It cannot be procured even at 6 rs. 8 a. per maund. God willing, I will send you [some] as soon as I obtain it. I have understood all about Abdul Mohsin. May God facilitate the affairs of the Moslems!

The news of our port is quiet, and nothing has transpired that may be mentioned to you, except what is good. Please give my compliments to all those who are dear to you. May you remain preserved!

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)
(After greeting.) *Lingah, 16th Zilhijjeh*, 1325 (*January* 21, 1908).

I beg to advise you that I could not leave home for a period of forty days as I was sick, and that I am, God willing, better nowadays. I have heard from Abbas Haji Ali Akbar that you had written to him requesting him to speak with this humble in regard to Bin Musa. Indeed I did not expect that such a message would come from you by anyone, before you come to me in person and receive the facts and go into the matters (*i.e.*, learn the circumstances). Then you will come to know the account; and every thing with me is kept in proper order. And I consider you like a son and in the same position as my son Abdullah, and you know what friendship existed between us and your father, Haji Ali deceased, who did nothing except after consultation in our business. And you yourself have [nevertheless] forgotten his attitude towards us while we were hopeful that you will follow his footstep. What is certain to me is that you will not keep such things (*i.e.*, such ideas) in your mind, and that you will personally come to me and receive the facts of the matter from my own mouth, verbally, and it will become clear to you. And as regards the affairs of the island, they are pending up to now, and no settlement has as yet been made with the antagonist. I am on the same friendly terms with you as with your father, and it is my hope that your mind will not be annoyed with us. You are [however] of a hasty temper, and listen to the statements of jealous parties; [but] the matter should not be misunderstood by you. You are like a son in my estimation, owing to the friendship which I had with your father. In my opinion, you should come to us at Lingah for a week's time and, God willing, all will be well in our interview. This is what was to be stated, and may you ever remain preserved and guarded.

My son Abdullah sends you salaams.

(*Note.*—This letter is in the handwriting of Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samich.)

APPENDIX 19.

Hassan-bin-Ali Samich to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 22nd Shaaban*, 1322 (*November* 1, 1904).

I have sent you a letter by the last mail, enclosing a letter from my son Abdullah, and I hope that they have found you in good health.

I have notified you that my son Abdullah has arranged with David Sassoon for a compromise, and that they have demanded of him a power of attorney from you on behalf of your late father, Haji Nakhoda Ali, stating that you are his attorney, and that you constitute my son Abdullah as attorney on your behalf in Calcutta. My son Abdullah has written a power in your name and forwarded it to you by registered post. God willing, you will, on receipt of the power, record your signature therein, and cause it to be sealed by the resident or by the assistant resident or anyone who represents the resident, and sealed by the director [of customs], testifying that my son Abdullah is attorney on your behalf. You should forward it to Calcutta soon, because they have delayed the documents of compromise until they receive the power from you.

God willing, you will forward it to him and inform me of it.

This is what was necessary, and please convey my compliments to Haji Mohammad A., and all those who are with you, and may you continue to remain preserved and guarded.

Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh to Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *Calcutta, 1st Shaaban*, 1322 (*October* 11, 1904).

It is now a long time that I have received no letters from you. Perhaps the cause which prevented it is good. I am always receiving letters from my father, Hassan, who gives me the news of your health. You should, God willing, inform me of your health and the news of your side by every mail.

O my brother, I beg to advise you in connection with the dispute which was between us and Sassoon. We have settled with Sassoon, and it has been arranged that a compromise should be effected. And we have written papers of compromise for the settlement of the dispute. And whereas your father was one of the partners and he has now passed away, and whereas you are in his place and are his executor, it is necessary that you should give a power of attorney from yourself in my name so that I may affix in the documents your signature with the signatures of the partners which are [recorded] in the documents held by me in the case *v.* Sassoon, as Sassoon knows that Haji Ali has passed away, and that I, Abdullah, was his agent at Calcutta. Now, after Haji Ali's death, it is obvious that you are his executor, and it is necessary that you should write a power of attorney for me [saying] that I am your agent in Calcutta in all the affairs which may occur in Calcutta, as I was before in the affairs of your father.

For this purpose I have now written a power of attorney in English in accordance with the law which will be accepted by the court; it is a power of attorney from you in my name. There is also an affidavit testifying that you are Nejef-bin-Haji Ali, his executor and attorney, and that you are now in his place. This certificate, together with the power, should be taken by yourself to the British resident or assistant resident at Bunder Abbas, and you should, in his presence, admit that you are the son of Haji Ali, and are in your father's place, and that you have made this power in the name of Abdullah-bin-Hassan, who is to be your agent in Calcutta, as he was before in the lifetime of Haji Ali. Also the resident or the assistant resident should certify in the affidavit that you are Haji Ali's son and his representative.

You should also take a writing from the Belgian director of customs that you are Haji Ali's son and his representative, and obtain another certificate from the postmaster and expedite sending them to me by registered post soon and without delay, and write on the cover my address in English as follows:—

A. H. H. Samieh and Co.,
34/1, College Street,
Calcutta.

You should not delay the power and the documents, but send them to me at an early date. I have also advised my father, Hassan, who will also let you know and urge upon you. I know that at the moment of their arrival you will expedite sending them on. I have written you by this post, and I now intend going to the solicitors, so that I may write the power and the affidavit and send them to you by registered post. I need not urge you further that you should expedite doing what I have advised you. This is what was necessary. The letter was written most hastily.

Your humblest friend,
ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN SAMIEH.

P.S. (in red ink).—I was unable to send the power by this mail as it was not prepared. God willing, I shall send it to you by the next mail. Let this be known to you, I shall send it by registered post by the next mail.

A. B. H. S.

Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh to Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh.

(Translation.) *Calcutta, 1st Shaaban*, 1322 (*October* 11, 1904).

After compliments and enquiries after your health. I have this day written you a letter by post and enlightened you therein of what was necessary to be stated. God willing it will find you in good health.

I have informed you especially that a settlement has been made between us and David Sassoon by compromise and reconciliation. And let it not be hidden from you that owing to the fact that Haji Ali has passed away, there is need for a power from you so that I may sign for you in the papers appertaining to the compromise, because, in the beginning there was in our hand a power from your father, Haji Ali, [stating] that I was his agent in Calcutta, and after your father's death I informed [them] that you were in your father's place; and the court demanded that you should write a power for me setting forth that you are the attorney and executor of the will of your father, and also that I am agent in Calcutta on your behalf in the Sassoon case, and for the oxide, &c., and the power should be [written] in English in accordance with the law, because Haji Ali has passed away and it is necessary that the court should understand that Haji Ali has no son beside you. Therefore, in order to settle the affairs I have written in your name a special power in the case of oxide and our dispute with Sassoon [saying] that what we now arrange with Sassoon for settlement by compromise is agreed upon by you. I intended sending the power by registered post by this mail but it was not ready. This is for your information, and, God willing, it will reach you by registered post next mail.

You should act upon the instructions which I will now explain to you:—

When you receive the power, you should take it to the resident or British vice-consul and assistant resident at Bunder Abbas. He will read it over to you and you should admit before him that this power is from you to me and that I am your agent in Calcutta in the same way as in the days of your father, and affix your signature—Nejef-bin-Ali-Ahmed-Saleh—in the place which is marked in pencil, then the resident or vice-consul will record his testimony and seal it with the Government seal. You should forward it soon and avoid procrastination and delay and you should send it to me by registered post to Calcutta soon and without delay. On the same day when it reaches you, you should take it to the resident or the assistant who is now present at Bunder Abbas. I have written you this letter by this mail so that you may know that you will receive the power by registered post. I am sending you this letter in my father's letter and have forwarded another letter to you by post. Surely I will write you by the next mail also with the power.

Your letters to me should continue without interruption as before when Haji Ali continuously kept me informed of the situation and of the reports. This is what was necessary to be said at present. God willing, I will settle matters after the receipt of the power and proceed to your side in Shavval.

This is what had to be stated, and may you remain preserved and generous.

Your friend,
ABDULLAH-BIN-HASSAN SAMIEH.

APPENDIX 20.

Mr. T. J. Malcolm to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire, December 24, 1907.

I hear Abdullah-bin-Samieh and Mirza Hussein of the German consulate when in Bunder Abbas lately, approached Nejef, the son of the late Nakhoda Ali and one of the partners in the Abu Musa affair in order to obtain a declaration to the effect that he, Nejef, was and is still agreeable to the continuation of the contract concluded between Samieh and Mr. Wönckhaus. I am further told that Nejef had declined to give Samieh the required declaration.

APPENDIX 21.

Affidavit of Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali, dated March 19, 1910.

Nejef-bin-Haji Nakhoda Ali states on solemn affirmation :—

I solemnly declare the following to be the facts regarding my interviews with Mr. Thomas Brown, of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., and, if necessary, I am prepared to confirm this statement by oath on the Koran before a mujtehed.

I have had several conversations about the Abu Musa case with parties interested. The first was when Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samieh came to see me accompanied by Mirza Hussein "Germani." They came to Bunder Abbas and stayed in the house of Haji Amin-ut Tujjar. Abdullah, on landing from the ship, came to my house and asked me to come over and have a talk about the matter at Haji Amin's house. I went over to Haji Amin's house, and there Mirza Hussein, Abdullah, and Haji Ali "Germani" were present. Abdullah asked me to give him a paper stating that I handed over my share of the concession on Abu Musa to Abdullah-bin-Hassan. The paper was to be given a date prior to the date of the contract between Messrs. Wönckhaus and Hassan. He also asked me to give him another paper saying that I was quite satisfied with the contract. I refused, saying that I would not do anything of the sort unless they settled up my account with David Sassoon, that is, my father's, on account of oxide, carpets, &c. I said if they did not give me back the carpets they should pay me 20,000 rupees and settle my account, and then I would give them the paper. However, they did not give me the money, and I mentioned the matter to the British consulate. These two persons came to Bunder Abbas not long after the British consul, Lieutenant Gabriel, returned there from a trip he made to Shargah, &c. Some months later Mr. Brown came to Bunder Abbas. The exact date can be ascertained from the consul, Bunder Abbas, as I reported the matter to him at the time, but it was just about two years ago. Mr. Brown had two interviews with me, once at the house of Jamshidian's agent and once at the custom-house. At the first interview Agha Ghulam Ali Khorassani was present, at the second Mr. Moses Khan, the customs director. Agha Ghulam Ali is agent of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. Mr. Brown had a long talk with me. Before beginning to talk about Abu Musa he dismissed two Hindoos, Gulshan and Asanand Ghulab. Mr. Brown asked me why I had not signed the paper shown me by Abdullah and Mirza Hussein. I said there appeared to be no advantage for me in doing so, and therefore I hadn't. Mr. Brown said he had bought the share in the oxide company belonging to Sheikh Sagar for 250 reals. I replied that Sheikh Sagar had never made anything out of the business, and so would sell cheap. Mr. Brown said he wanted to buy my share, and said that he would settle up all my accounts with Hassan-bin-Ali and Abdullah. I never offered to sell my share to Mr. Brown. In fact, as I reported to the consulate at the time, Mr. Brown offered to buy my share. I would swear to this on the Koran. This took place in the presence of Agha Ghulam Ali Khorassani. At the second interview, and after Mr. Moses Khan tried to persuade me to go to Lingah to settle with Mr. Brown, he continued to endeavour to make me do this for a long time, and, on my refusing, he got annoyed with me, and worried me to such an extent that I finally had to resign my post as Hamal Bashi at Bunder Abbas.

(Mark of Nejef-bin-Haji Nakhoda Ali.)

Declared and signed before me this 19th day of March, 1910.

A. P. TREVOR, *Captain,*
First Assistant Resident.

Nejef admitted and affirmed on oath what is recorded before the humblest Khalaf-bin-Yusuf Al Osfoor.*

Dated the 28th Rabi II, 1329.

* Chief Shia Priest of Mohammerah.

APPENDIX 22.

Affidavit made by Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, dated May 27, 1911.

I, Nejef-bin (late) Haji Nakhoda Ali state on solemn affirmation :—

With reference to the paper which has been translated to me purporting to be Memorandum of Association or Rules of Partnership, I beg to say that I have never seen it before, nor have I had any copy of it, nor have such rules ever been acted upon so far as I am aware.

Secondly, with regard to the sale by Yusuf-bin-Abdullah of his share in the concession to Hassan-bin-Samieh, I beg to say that I have not heard of such a sale until to-day, and was never consulted or informed regarding it in any way.

(Signed and sealed) NEJEF-BIN-ALI AHMED SALEH.

Dated 28th Rabi II, 1329.

Before me this 27th day of May, 1911.

P. Z. Cox,
Resident, Bushire.

Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali affirmed, on oath, what is recorded in the presence of the humblest sinner, Khalaf-bin-Yusuf Al Osfoor.

(L.S.)

APPENDIX 23.

Hassan Samieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 24th Zilkedah, 1322 (January 30, 1905).*

I have read your letter of the 12th instant (19th January, 1905) with pleasure, and understood its contents.

During my interview with you we held a conversation about the visit to Abu Musa Island of Wönckhaus, the German, and you said you heard it was in connection with the lease of that island, and you warned me not to let him approach me. Please note that the fact is this as I informed you, that Wönckhaus visited the island merely to inspect the oxide, saying that if he approved (the oxide) he would perhaps communicate with me with regard to the price, and would probably buy some. This was his object. You should not think that I would fail to let you know if he communicated with me on the subject which you indicate. We could not allow this sort of interference from any one, especially on the part of these persons. You may rest assured.

On seeing the oxide he approved that from one of the mines and returned to Lingah, and says that he will perhaps buy 300 tons if he obtains reasonable rates of freight.

He left for Bushire some time ago, and has opened a branch there for the transaction of business.

Hassan Samieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 12th Jumadi I, 1324 (July 5, 1906).*

Your esteemed letter, dated Rabi ul Thani, reached me in due course, and I understood what you said. In particular regarding the receipt by you of my letter and your comprehension of its purport with reference to our transaction with the German. Insh Allah it will turn out well. You told me to take care that he did not get any bond from me (which would enable him) to enter the island. Set your mind

at rest, I, your brother, am knowledgable and well versed in matters of business, and am far from acting in such a way as you indicate. He has not the presumption to make overtures to me in that direction. For, just as I told you, he is only a purchaser of the oxide itself, nothing more. Whether it be he or someone else, whoever wants to buy the oxide from me, if the price suits me I shall sell it. Do not let any idea beyond this enter your head. You may rest assured.

(Letter goes on to speak of other matters.)

APPENDIX 24.

The Rev. S. M. Zwemer to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

Bahrein, May 29, 1911.

With reference to the meaning of the Arabic sentence and the probable intention of the writer in using those words concerning which point you asked my opinion, I take pleasure in replying as follows :—

First, it is evident that whoever wrote the sentence was not a thorough scholar in Arabic, as he confused the masculine and feminine forms in the last word of the sentence. To my mind the obvious translation of the phrase is, "the annulment of this agreement is better than its acceptance." I do not think it is at all obvious or possible to translate the sentence "the annulment of this agreement is better than to comply with (his wishes)." This translation is, to my mind, a forced one, and not the natural significance of the words in question, whatever be their connection.

I am confirmed in this opinion after consulting with one or two Arabs concerning the popular use of the pronoun in such a sentence, and I find that they agree with me that there is a great looseness in the use of the feminine or masculine pronoun at the close of a clause or sentence. I am sure that nine out of ten Arabs would give the preference to the former translation of the sentence as the obvious and natural intention of the writer.

Although my opinion does not carry weight beyond that of others who have a speaking and reading knowledge of Arabic, yet I feel confident that in this case it is not a matter of expert grammatical opinion, but of everyday usage in the Persian Gulf, and I have no hesitation in saying that the first translation is the right one.

APPENDIX 25.

Note by Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif on the meaning of the doubtful passage in his Letter to Hassan Samieh, dated 8th Zilhejjeh, 1324 (*January* 23, 1907).

I beg to refer to the sentence in my letter dated 8th Zilhijjeh, 1324 (23rd January, 1907), which runs as follows :—

استبطال هذه المقاولة خير من اجابته

and about the meaning of which there have been arguments.

I beg to say that my meaning when I wrote the sentence was :—

نقض هذه المقاولة خير من اجابة (يعنى قبولية) هذه المقاولة

("The annulment of this agreement is better than the acceptance of this agreement.")

It is not hidden from your Honour that I received my education in the Gulf, and that I am not an expert in the niceties of grammar and the shades of meaning of various measures of words. When I write, I write according to the usages and understanding of the community in which I live.

As regards the use of the measure استبطال, as synonymous with ابطال, the use is quite an ordinary one in these parts, and I can mention many other instances of the same, such as استراحة ("reposing"), استدامة ("continuance"), استخراب ("being ruined"), استدراج ("advancing"), استقامة ("remaining"). There is no idea of a "desire to" here.

Again, you will note that in the letter from my son Isa, dated 7th Moharram, 1325 (20th February, 1907), to Sheikh Sagar occurs the sentence :—

و اطلب من جنابكم المساعدة فى نقض و استبطال هذه الورقه

("Va atlub min jenabekum almosaadeh fi naqz va istebtal-i-hazehel varaqah.")

("And I beg your Honour for assistance in the breaking up and annulling of this document.")

This shows that the words نقض and استبطال were used synonymously.

Furthermore, when writing to me on the 23rd Moharram with reference to my letter to him (dated 8th Zilhejjeh, 1324) enjoining on him the نقض و استبطال هذه المقاولة, Hassan used the same form of words as I had, thus :—

"You particularly wrote about the deed of contract which I executed with Wönckhaus, the German, for the sale of oxide from Abu Musa Island. I understood what you said, namely, that your son Isa was not agreeable to the execution of a document of this purport for the reason that I had not consulted you and that it was necessary that the partners should not enter [into transaction] without the knowledge of the other partners; that this humble one had entered into this transaction without consultation, and that Isa feared that complications would result owing to the admittance of foreigners [into the concern], and استبطال هذا المقاولة خير من اجابتها."

("The annulment of this contract is better than its acceptance.")

Again, in writing to me on 15th Safar, 1325 (30th March, 1907), Hassan suggested that I had better, if I thought fit, write to the German myself and explain to him regarding the annulment of the contract. His precise words were :—

تكتب له كتاب و بتتين له من طرف ابطال المقاوله

It will be seen that he here used ابطال, and not استبطال. It is clear therefore that Hassan understood me fully in the sense I intended to convey.

Secondly, the explanation of the use of the spelling اجابته is as follows in my opinion :—

It is rendering into writing of a colloquial construction of speech. Thus, in conversation, if referring to a masculine object, such as "zaid," I should not say آسْتَقَامَتُهْ, but آسْتَقَامَتُهْ, leaving out the "zamah" after the "h," but substituting the "zamah" for "kasrah" after the "t." Similarly, if I were referring to a feminine object I should not say آسْتَقَامَتِهَا, but آسْتَقَامَتِهْ, substituting the "kasrah" after the "t" for the feminine pronoun "ha." Likewise, in writing a colloquial letter I should render the above sounds into writing.

The word اجاب, or اجابه, is constantly used, in my parlance, in reference to a thing in the sense of قبولية.

It is also evident from Hassan Samieh's reply above quoted that he uses it in this sense :—

خير من اجابتها

("Better than its acceptance," *i.e.*, better than the acceptance of the contract.) The pronoun is used in the feminine, and could only refer to the contract.

ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDURRAHMAN.

March 23, 1911.

Appendix 26.

Letter from Hassan Samich to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) 23*rd Moharrum*, 1325 (*March* 8, 1907).

Your letter dated Zilhijjeh 1324 reached me in due course, and I was glad to receive it and understand its contents. You particularly wrote about the deed of contract which I executed with Wönekhaus, the German, for the sale of oxide from Abu Musa Island. You said that your son Esa did not agree to the execution of document of such a nature, and complained that I did not consult you, although it was necessary that no partner entered into transactions without the knowledge of the other partners; that I had so entered into transactions without consultation; and that, as Esa feared that complications would result owing to the entry of foreigners into the matter, the nullification of the contract was better than its acceptance. I understood it all.

Oh! my brother, at the time I executed the deed of agreement I communicated to you the details of it, copied in Arabic alongside the English without addition or omission, and you came to know of it and approved it, and wrote to me in reply that it was all right. Similarly you asked me for a copy of the deed, and I sent it you, and you acknowledged its receipt and approved of it. It is now a matter of eight months. How can I cancel it? You, by the grace of God, are a wise man, and if you suggest complications. Remember, the German has no connection with the leasehold of the mines; he has no concern except to take from us the oxide itself, nothing further, for a stated period. There is no harm in this. The object is to effect sales and the stuff be sold whether to him or to any one else. You are aware that he took some from us last year, and we saw nothing objectionable in his deal with us; and, as you know, we have spent a considerable sum of money in expenses in this connection. If we do not sell the stuff how are we to get back our own? Please God, the matter will end satisfactorily!

Salaams to Esa and the brothers.

Appendix 27.

Esa-bin-Abdul Latif to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.

(After compliments.) 8*th Moharrum*, 1325 (*February* 20, 1907).

I HAVE to communicate with your honour with reference to the lease which I and two partners acquired from the Government of Shargah relating to the extraction of red oxide from your island of Abu Musa. As your honour is aware, the document of lease was drawn up in the names of three persons, namely, your humble servant Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiyeh, and Abdulla-bin-Hassan Samaiyeh.

I have come to know that on the 1st June, 1906 (8th Rabi-ul-Thani, 1324), the said Haji Hassan entered into a contract with a European merchant named Wönekhaus, without consulting me, and that according to the terms of the document he bound himself and his partners in giving an absolute monopoly for the extraction of the red oxide for a period of four years. And the said Haji Hassan executed this agreement and bound himself without consulting me previous to the drawing of the deed of contract. The details of the said deed have only now reached me, and I do not agree to the terms of this contract. Accordingly I forward to your honour a copy of the deed of contract for you to examine; kindly look into it. I beg from your honour assistance in taking the necessary steps for the cancellation and annulment of this contract, for I am altogether unwilling to agree to this lease. Previous to this I have written to Haji Hassan Samaiyeh expressing my disagreement to this contract, but he has sent me no answer. Finally, I am obliged to call your attention to the deed of contract, the beginning of which is as follows:—

"Contract between Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiyeh, of Lingah, owner and holder of the Abu Musa Concession, and M. Robert Wönekhaus, of Lingah."

Now Haji Hassan Samaiyeh has no deed of authority from me giving him any general power in regard to action which he might take respecting the lease, &c.; how then has Haji Hassan the right thus to mention himself only, without consulting or referring to his partners, of whom I am one? I am in consequence obliged to make a complaint on the subject to your honour, and it is for your honour to issue orders.

Appendix 28.

Statement of Gulum Hussain.

Gulum Hassan states on solemn affirmation:—

I have been living on Abu Musa as caretaker of gardens and flocks for the last twelve or fifteen years.

The following are the circumstances under which shots were fired by Sheikh Sagar's guards in connection with the arrival of Abdulla-bin-Hassan Samayieh in a "boom" (pattern of native craft) from Lingah. The vessel arrived about noon and dropped anchor off the spot where the oxide is shipped from about 300 yards to the westward of the heaps on the seashore. A jolly-boat full of people put off from her after she had anchored, and came towards the shore.

At this time there were only ten or fifteen men present out of Sheikh Sagar's guard; the rest were over at the village. Some of those present were now on the seashore in front of the oxide heaps and some above them on the rocks at the side.

Those on shore shouted to the people in the boat not to approach, but as she came on one or two shots were fired from the rocks near the big oxide heap. They were not fired at the boat or dhow but in the air.

The German was in the boat, and at the time one Haji Ali, whom I understand to be the German's clerk, was standing up in the bows of the boat ready to jump off as the boat neared the shore, but I myself called out to him, "Don't attempt to land, as there is no permission for it." I heard no answer. Then the guards on the shore called out, "If you want to ask or see anything send a man ashore, he can see and go back."

Two negroes, whose names I do not know, then jumped into the water and swam ashore. They only remained a few minutes. They were led up to the huts where Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Ahmed bin-Sultan was—he was in charge of the guard from Shargah—and they asked him what was the position of affairs and why had the shots been fired. He replied, "We are ordered not to let anyone land; if you don't like it go and get permission from Sheikh Sagar." They then returned to the boat and the boat to the boom.

As the dhow did not show any signs of departing the guard feared she might be intending to stay till dark and try and effect a landing, so about 4 P.M. they began shouting to the dhow, warning her to be off. At this time there were waves and some surf. Soon afterwards, I being in the huts at the time, I heard three or four shots fired by our men, but I did not see what at.

The dhow then, I believe, moved from her place and went further round to the right, but I did not see any more of her myself.

Dated Abu Musa, February 17, 1908.

Statement of Mattar-bin-Shamlan.

Mattar-bin-Shamlan states on solemn affirmation:—

I was one of the guard which Sheikh Sagar sent over to Abu Musa and was present on the occasion when shots were fired in connection with the presence there of a dhow from Lingah. The dhow arrived about noon and anchored opposite the oxide heaps on the shore. The guards who had gone over from Shargah were about eighty in all. Of these about thirty were present at the oxide heaps when the boom arrived. After she had anchored a rowing-boat put from her containing about ten persons. As they got near we recognised Abdulla-bin-Samayieh and a native clerk of the Germans, who was known by sight to some of us. I did not notice the German himself.

When we saw Abdalla some of us called out, "Don't come near, don't come near, Abdalla." He merely answered by calling out and gesticulating to his boatmen to row harder. We shouted, "We will fire at you if you attempt to approach." Abdalla then said to his rowers, "Don't mind what they say, they will not shoot." We repeated that we would fire. He replied, "Fire away." We then fired four shots in the air over their heads. I did not fire myself.

We should have fired straight at them had not Sheikh Abdalla-bin-Ahmed, who was in charge of us, given us orders (which he sent through me) to fire in the air.

On our firing they turned back a little and called out to us, "What is this all about?" We replied, "If you want to get news, send two men ashore. On that they sent two negroes (one named Salim), who jumped into the water and swam ashore. They said, "Why do you stop us from coming ashore, seeing that the island belongs to the German and Hassin-bin-Samayieh?" We replied, "The island belongs to Sheikh Sagar." The negroes said that Abdalla-bin-Hassan had not told the German that, and from what they said it appeared that they had brought him, the German, on false pretences.

After this conversation we told them they must return to the boom; and we warned them that if the boom did not depart before sundown we should have to fire on her. They then went off to her.

The boom did not move, however, and we feared that after nightfall she might endeavour to make a landing. Accordingly Abdulla-bin-Hamed told three of the guard to go to the cliff and fire some shots. They, however, fired six shots above the boom. It was not intended that they should fire at the boom; as a matter of fact, I did hear one shot strike her, or strike something other than the water. The man who fired that shot was Abdurrahim-bin-Saif, of the Holi tribe, who let off his rifle before getting it to his shoulder.

After this the boom weighed anchor and got off just at sunset, but they only moved a little way and anchored again opposite the mud enclosure farther up.

Four of us then went along the shore parallel and stayed there until three hours after sunset (about 9 P.M.). Then seeing that they were apparently intending to pass the night there, our men fired two more shots in the air above the dhow. She then took her departure. Our object was to frighten the visitors away.

Dated Shargah, 21st February, 1908.

[49032] No. 114.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 7).

Sir, *India Office, December 6, 1911.*

IN continuation of letter, dated the 18th September, 1911, regarding the proposed Persian Gulf order in council, I am directed by the Secretary of State to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been now received from the Government of India upon the subject.

They are, it will be seen, in accord with the political resident in thinking that a single comprehensive order, to embrace both the Persian and the Arab littoral of the Gulf, is undesirable, even if practicable, and that the most that can be done is to have an order in council which would cover the Arab principalities from Koweit to Muscat inclusive. The Secretary of State for India concurs in this opinion, and would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey on further consideration sees no objection, the amendment of the "Persian Coast and Islands order in council, 1907," should now be proceeded with on the lines proposed in my letter of the 15th June last.

As regards the preparation of an order to cover the Arab principalities, the Secretary of State for India feels some doubt whether there is sufficient advantage in drafting such an order now, if the Persian provisions of the fuller order are abandoned as proposed. The work would presumably occupy some time, and meanwhile the draft Bahrein order, of which the early issue appears very desirable, would be in abeyance. The Secretary of State for India would be glad, however, to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views upon this point, and whether, if the draft Bahrein order is proceeded with, instructions should further be sent to Colonel Cox to resume his work on a draft order relating to the trucial chiefs, with a view either to its separate issue later (if desirable), or the inclusion of its provisions in a comprehensive order covering the whole of the Arab principalities.

As regards the point dealt with in your letter under reply as to the power of the Sheikh of Bahrein to delegate his jurisdiction over foreigners to His Majesty's Government, I am to add that the Secretary of State for India accepts the opinion expressed by Sir E. Grey in this matter.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November 22, 1911.*

PROPOSED order in council for Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 15th September.

Following telegram received from resident, Persian Gulf, whom we consulted in the matter. We concur in resident's views:—

"Though not an easy matter, it would, I think, be possible to evolve a comprehensive order in council by which Arab principalities from Muskat to Koweit inclusive would be covered. A British representative is practically in the position, in regard to all these principalities, of agent of the protecting Power, rather than the head of a diplomatic (? mission) to one or more foreign Courts.

A British representative on the Persian side is merely a consular officer who is accredited, among others, to a foreign Government, nominally civilised, with whom Great Powers are in direct relations. It would be impracticable, in my opinion, to devise one order in council to embrace both Arab and Persian littorals, owing to dissimilarity of most of administrative conditions. There would also be objection to such an arrangement from political point of view. For example, the importance of maintaining Government of India's unattached and distinct position in regard to Arab principalities is demonstrated by proceedings in current dispute regarding Abu Musa. Further, as regards British subjects in (group undecypherable) [*sic*] Bahrein, our rights of jurisdiction rest on the prospective (? prescriptive) rights which the convention of the 31st May, 1861, confirmed, and which Sheikh has not challenged; our rights also rest indirectly on the fact that the subjection of Bahrein itself to form of British protection has been publicly declared by us. I submit that the above authority will suffice; no other is known to me."

[48595] No. 115.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople repeating a telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah,* who reports that an Italian cruiser has entered Perim in a disabled condition after bombarding Sheikh Said.

I am to suggest that the authorities at Perim should be instructed by telegraph to see that the obligations of British neutrality, as laid down in the "London Gazette Extraordinary" of the 3rd October, 1911, are observed in the case of the Italian cruiser, *i.e.*, that she be not allowed to remain at Perim for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed.

It is presumed that the authorities at Perim are in possession of a copy of the rules in question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 108.

[49107] No. 116.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 8.)

Sir, *India Office, December 7, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th December, 1911, regarding the proposal to inform the German Ambassador that the whole of the oxide already mined at Abu Musa is at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus.

The Secretary of State for India fully realised that if the German Government did not listen to the appeal made in paragraph 8 of Sir E. Grey's note of the 22nd August, 1910, it would be necessary, in view of the language of earlier Foreign Office communications, to permit Messrs. Wönckhaus to ship the whole of the oxide already mined. That situation has now arisen, and he is therefore prepared (while not accepting all the German arguments) to concur in the suggested intimation to the German Ambassador.

The question arises, however, whether, having regard to the objects which His Majesty's Government had in view, as described in the notes to the German Embassy of the 21st September and 13th November, 1909, it would not be desirable to require the removal of the mined oxide within a reasonable time. In this connection, I am to invite a reference to the letters of this Office, dated the 1st September and 2nd October, 1909, and to suggest that the removal of the oxide should be effected before next hot weather, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection to this stipulation being made. If, as alleged, the oxide is deteriorating by exposure to the air, the inducement to Messrs. Wönckhaus to remove it quickly will be all the greater. If, however, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that this stipulation will deprive the concession of whatever gracefulness it may be thought to possess, the Secretary of State for India will not press it.

A copy of the telegram that it is proposed, subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, to address to the Government of India is herewith enclosed.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[48595] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 447.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 9, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 533 of 4th December.

Are there forts or garrisons at Mokha and Khoka?

[49338] No. 118.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 10, 1911.*

ACCORDING to a report received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, Yezdi the Mujtchid, a man of great authority and influence who has up to the present refrained from meddling in political questions in any way, has been forced by the Kaimakam of Nejef to sign a fetva proclaiming a holy war against the Italians in Tripoli and the English and Russians in Persia.

Do you wish me to mention the matter to Assim Bey?

The Kaimakam is, I understand, a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress party.

Copies of the fetva have been distributed to Persia and the Caucasus and hung outside the shrines of Nejef and Kerbela.

[49364] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 379.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting on effect of declaration of war on population and visit of Italian war-ships to Hodeidah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, October 25, 1911.*

STEADY progress was being made by the Turks towards the pacification of the Yemen, and the political and economic state had just begun to show signs of improvement, when the news of the declaration of war by Italy was received here, causing a terrible shock to both the Turks and Arabs.

The war will now necessarily put a set-back to Izzet Pasha's work of reform and tranquillisation in this province, which has already suffered thereby.

For instance, the troublesome Idrisee question was nearing solution, and the complete subjugation of the refractory Zereneek clans that have been a thorn in the side of the Yemen administration during the past two decades was at last in sight.

Both these important outstanding questions have, perhaps unavoidably, been shelved indefinitely since the declaration of war, despite the heavy expenditure incurred and the elaborate preparations undertaken during the past few months, in anticipation of their solution, permanently and satisfactorily.

The first intimation that war had broken out was a telegram received on the 1st from the Minister of Marine instructing the Turkish commodore of the Red Sea squadron to have all Ottoman light-houses put out of use. Secret instructions were also communicated to the Turkish gun-boats in these waters.

Something like a panic occurred at Geezan where Mahomed Ali Pasha's force was encamped waiting to advance. Fearing a simultaneous attack from the Italians at sea, and from the Idrisee-ites strongly entrenched barely ten miles inland, a hasty retreat was made in search of shelter and safety.

Under cover of an official warning issued to the public that the waters north of Camaran had been mined in consequence of the state of war existing, Mahomed Ali Pasha hurriedly embarked half his infantry force, two batteries of artillery and some stores and ammunition on the transports "Bahr Ahmar" and "Bahr Jadid," and escorted by eight gun-boats, succeeded in reaching one of the secluded islands in the Farsan group, protected by numerous reef banks from the intrusion of Italian war-ships.

I believe that part of the artillery force under Mahomed Ali made for Cunfuda.

Two other battalions of infantry that were at Geezan were transported to Loheia for safety.

The torpedo gun-boat "Pek Shevket," and the transport "Bahr Ahmar," are supposed to have made for Suez subsequently. The other eight or nine gun-boats stationed in the Red Sea are believed to be in hiding at various other small ports.

Before evacuation of Geezan hundreds of tons of condensed water stored for the use of the proposed expedition was poisoned with petroleum and phenic acid, and a considerable quantity of ammunition blown up. Some four or five hundred transport animals were shot, and many tons of provisions, stores, and thousands of rifles, destroyed and burnt, to prevent them falling into the hands of the rebels.

The above events took place between the 1st and 4th of October.

At day-break on the 2nd instant, the Italian cruiser "Volturno" and the gun-boat "Aretusa" were sighted cruising off the roadstead. Later they approached, and fired on and sunk an armoured motor launch in the port that had been brought by the British ship "Guildhall" for the Ottoman authorities, and that happened to be lying at anchor astern of that vessel.

The demonstration of the two Italian men-of-war that fired several shells over the town caused great irritation on shore, and not a little alarm amongst the local officials and the population.

There were on shore at Hodeidah at the time of this ill-advised performance the Italian consul-general and some twenty Italian subjects who would have fared very badly at the hands of the excited population had it not been for the prompt and effective measures taken by the local commandant Hamdi Bey for their protection.

The consul-general and the Italian colony, numbering between twenty and twenty-five, and consisting chiefly of railway engineers and workmen, employees of the sanitary administration at Camaran and a few business men, have since quitted the port.

It might be mentioned that naval demonstrations in these waters, similar to the one above referred to, do more harm than good, and only help to stir up fanaticism amongst the Arab inhabitants of the Hedjaz and Yemen littorals, and incite hatred of the European and Christian generally.

The Italians are not strangers to this form of breeding fanaticism, and both the "Volturno" and the "Aretusa" are too well known in Yemen waters to be loved by Arabs and Turks.

Hodeidah is an unfortified town and purely commercial. Its inhabitants, it might be said, are, on the whole, quiet and peaceful, and not at all unfriendly towards Europeans.

Notwithstanding Italy's absence of interests, political and commercial in this province, her war-ships are too apt, on the slightest pretext, to demonstrate in Yemen waters and thereby upset the equilibrium of other interested communities, especially British.

After the recent incident, on an appeal of the British Indian community to my *locum tenens* that was transmitted to the Aden authorities, His Majesty's ship "Philomel" paid a visit to Hodeidah, where her appearance was welcomed by the local authorities and foreign and Arab merchants.

The Italian men-of-war proceeded later the same day northwards, probably in search of Turkish gun-boats and transports, and were sighted in the afternoon near Loheia.

The Ottoman Red Sea squadron, whose units are numerically and effectively superior to the Italian ships of war stationed in the Red Sea, evaded the latter for some obscure reason, and have not been heard of lately.

On the 14th instant the gun-boat "Aretusa" was observed cruising slowly off Mokha, where, according to reports published in Rome, a concentration of Turkish and Arab forces was supposed to have been taking place. The latter rumour, from all accounts, appears to have scared the Italians on the opposite littoral, especially at Assab, on which it was feared raids would be made from the Yemen coast.

With the exit of the Turkish force from Geezan, the adherents of Seyyid Mahomed El-Idrisee entered, followed a few days later by their leader. The rebels, it is said, are now engaged in building a wall around that town which they also intend to fortify.

Shortly after their entry into Geezan the rebels captured three dhows laden with provisions destined for Mahomed Ali's army.

The only precautionary measures adopted by the Turks since the outbreak of hostilities have been to strengthen the garrison of Mokha by a battalion of infantry (Eregli reserves), and the dispatch of a force to Sheikh Seyyid (Bab-el-Mandeb) consisting of a battalion of regulars, another of Arab militia recruited in the Yemen and known as the "millie," and a company of mitrailleuse.

The news of the war spread very rapidly throughout the country, causing a deal of excitement and fanaticism especially amongst the Zeidee tribesmen. I happened to be travelling in the interior at the time, and had an opportunity of learning the views of several prominent men on the subject.

The Seyyid Yahya and the principal tribal chieftans immediately proclaimed a "jehad" that was read out in all the mosques after prayer on the Friday following the commencement of the war.

Seyyid Yahya also telegraphed to the Sultan assuring His Majesty of the loyalty of his co-religionists and himself, and offering the services of 100,000 tribesmen.

On the 19th instant Izzet Pasha, accompanied by the whole of his staff, Mahmoud Nedim Bey, one of the deputies for Hodeidah and the prospective Vali of the Yemen, and Colonel Ahmed Bey Khobani, member for Sana'a, proceeded to Amran *en route* to a rendezvous given by the Imam.

Two days later, escorted by the Imam's lieutenants delegated to welcome him, Izzet Pasha, attended by the Ottoman officials above-mentioned, met Seyyid Yahya

personally at a place called Duan, that is about four hours' journey to the north of Amran.

The agreement recently entered into with the Government was then formally signed and sealed by Seyyid Yahya and Izzet Pasha respectively, the former categorically renouncing his claim to the Islamic Caliphate and acknowledging the Sultan of Turkey as the true Caliph.

Izzet Pasha returned to Sana'a on the 23rd, and is awaiting the ratification of the so-called treaty by the Imperial Parliament before coming down to Hodeidah.

The French engineers engaged in the interior on the railway returned to Hodeidah owing to the excitement prevailing amongst the natives on account of the war. The work of construction of the line to Hujjeila which had begun to make some headway since the collapse of the Arab revolt has now received another great set-back.

The inhabitants of Hodeidah are quieting down after the recent excitement, but have declared a boycott against all Italian goods and the few Italian commercial houses established in this city.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[49367] No. 120.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 884.)
Sir, *Pera, December 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I received on the 11th November last a telegram from the acting British vice-consul at Bitlis, informing me of the alarming increase of disorders in the district of Modky since the beginning of the month. The telegram stated that Kurdish brigandage was rife in the villages round about, that the Government had no authority, and that the Christian inhabitants, fearing an outbreak against them by the Moslems, were preparing to emigrate.

I have now received a despatch from Mr. Safrastian (copy enclosed herewith) confirming his telegram, and giving a very gloomy account of the state of anarchy which exists in the Mush and Modky district.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose attention I have drawn to the existing condition of affairs in the Bitlis vilayet, has promised to cause enquiries to be made, and, if necessary, to send instructions to the local authorities to restore order in the district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, November 19, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the anarchical condition of the districts of Modky and Mush.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Bitlis, November 13, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of the 11th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the disorders which have lately broken out in various parts of this province, I have the honour to report that the avowed inaction

displayed by the local authorities in cases of flagrant breaches of the law and their criminal complicity in many cases of disorders have greatly encouraged the Kurds to resort to their instinctive truculence against the Armenians, who invariably, finding no protection whatever from the Government, are mostly not in a position to defend themselves by their own means.

The savage Kurds of Modky, a mountainous kaza immediately west of this town, have lately been indulging themselves in brigandage upon the Armenian villages in the kaza. After centuries of oppressions and unbearable serfdom at the hands of the Kurds, who are too notorious for their fierceness, the Armenians of the district were quite happy and satisfied during the last three years, enjoying a fair amount of security and peace. Some three weeks ago, however, Haji Musa Aga and Haji Reshid Aga, the most notorious tribal chiefs in Modky, sent word to all of the twenty Armenian villages in the district to prepare all the "hafir" tax (an unlawful tax of serfdom which Kurdish chiefs used and in some parts use still to levy upon the Christians) for the last three years left unpaid, and send them with the usual amounts of corn, sugar, butter, stockings, &c., as presents. The Armenians declined to give anything, very naturally, and, as a result of this refusal, the above Kurds have been descending upon villages carrying off sheep and cattle. Since the beginning of the month seven Armenian villages in Modky have been robbed of their sheep, amounting altogether to 155 animals.

At Mozag, one of these villages, the men of the above Haji Musa Aga came at daylight and killed one Avak Muradian, who resisted the robbers; two days afterwards some police agents arrived on the scene, and, instead of holding an impartial enquiry, ill-treated the plaintiffs, and left the village cursing violently the authors of the "hurriyet," upon which were relying the Christians. Needless to say, that the above is only one of the many disgraceful misconduct displayed lately by file and rank of officials here. In Shenig, another village, the Kurds, after taking the required sum of money and corn, butchered twenty-five sheep during their two days' stay, and dishonoured several Christian women in those far-off mountains.

In the plain of Mush nothing short of a state of war has been prevailing during the last week between Christians and Moslems. The notorious Musa Bey, of Khevner, and his brother, Kassim, have been raiding several Armenian villages at night. The latter have replied, and, consequently, on four consecutive days in last week fighting has been in progress throughout the night in Armenian villages of Dermerd, Vartenis, &c. No deaths are reported, but Musa Bey has not been able to drive any sheep. According to the latest news, however, it is understood that the Armenian village of Marnik, in distant hills, has been completely wiped out by the Kurds of Khuyt. The inhabitants are reported as having fled to Mush.

In face of such an anarchy prevailing in the province, it would appear that not even the shade of a Government exists, to say nothing of a constitutional Government. Reshid Bey, the acting vali here, has been off to Molazgerd for the last ten days; a decrepit and quite useless mollah, the director of judicial courts here, is acting during his absence.

A Letter from Varto.—I have received last week a letter from the Armenians of Ustragan, village in the kaza of Varto (Mush). It is very gloomy reading indeed! The priest and chiefs of the village state that they have been turned out of their houses, their corn and winter provisions have been taken by their Kurdish neighbours, and that they are left out in the open in such a cold weather. They further add that they are now hopelessly despaired of their several applications for protection from the authorities, and that against all their human and national sentiments they have decided, they say, to denounce their holy Gregorian Church in which they were born, and pitiably request me to beseech humbly His Majesty the King to kindly accept them in the English Church. I humbly venture to add that the letter in itself, written as it is in a most harrowing style, is a sufficient proof to demonstrate the wretched and hopeless condition in which the applicants find themselves. I have referred the matter to the notice of the Armenian Bishop at Mush.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[49390]

No. 121.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 378. Commercial.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 3, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 145, Commercial, of the 7th June last, I had the honour to report that the Ottoman Chamber had in the final session of Parliament passed a measure providing for the construction and prolongation of a railway from Ada-Bazar to Bolu and onwards towards the Black Sea, and for doubling the local line from Haidar Pasha to Pendik.

The convention for the Ada-Bazar–Bolu Railway was subsequently submitted for consideration to the Financial and Public Works Commissions, which, after a minute examination of its terms, produced entirely contradictory reports on the subject. The main point of difference was the grant of the Stamboul customs receipts as security for the kilometric guarantees. The Financial Commission raised strong objections to the affectation of these revenues, which was resorted to in cases of urgent need such as for instance the raising of the 4 per cent. loan of 1911 to so unimportant a railway as the present one, which could perfectly well be secured by the revenues from the tithe and aghnam tax of the sanjaks through which it was to pass, as originally proposed.

The convention was nevertheless presented to the Senate in the form which had been approved by the Chamber and came up for discussion during the last days of last month.

A proposal put forward in the early stages of the debate to the effect that the convention should first be returned to the Government in order to be presented to the Council of State, which had not yet seen it, was rejected; though it was decided that in future all such measures must receive the sanction of that body before being sent to the Senate.

The remainder of the debate centred round the question of the kilometric guarantees. The Minister of Public Works, Houloussi Bey, supported the proposed railway on the ground that it was to be not merely a branch line of the Haida Pacha Angora Railway, but the first section of a line which would eventually run through Castamouni to Sivas and that it would be of great service for military purposes. He declared that the question of kilometric guarantees was in any case unimportant as the receipts and traffic on the Haider Pacha-Angora line had shown such satisfactory increase that they would soon afford sufficient surplus to cover the kilometric guarantees. The reason that the Stamboul customs receipt had been set aside for these guarantees instead of the tithes and aghnam tax was that the Anatolian Railway Company had decided that, having no access to the Paris market, they could obtain better value for the shares for this new line on the security of the former than on that of the latter.

As many members of the Senate remained completely unconvinced by these arguments, the Minister of Finance was thereupon summoned to give his views. Nail Bey's statement was not calculated to win over the unconvinced. He said he could see no objection to the affectation of the customs receipts for the railway; it had been objected that it was a bad precedent and that the customs receipts should be reserved for more urgent requirements; he considered, however, that it was immaterial, as no kilometric guarantees would be probably required; moreover, now that Turkey had a regular budget, all sources of revenue were of equal value.

In spite of isolated attacks upon the scheme, the opposition to it was in general almost more feeble than the defence; and when Moukhtar Bey, director-general of railways, returned from a mission to the Anatolian Railway Company and announced to the Senate that the company would give up the line rather than give way over the kilometric guarantees, and when Houloussi Bey further stated that the company, finding after careful study of the country that the terms on which they had undertaken to construct the line were highly disadvantageous to them, were now endeavouring to get out of it, and threw the responsibility of rejection upon the Senate, the House gave way to him and voted the project by a fair majority.

For the Minister's statement that the company are no longer anxious for the project to be accepted I understand there is considerable justification. The company were, it seems, never very eager to take up this particular branch of the line. The country through which it will pass is very mountainous, and construction will be

difficult and costly. Moreover, it is reported that the estimates which have been made are very much below the probable actual cost.

The acceptance of the convention by the Senate may therefore have come as an unpleasant surprise to the company; but the irregular and somewhat mysterious substitution in it of the customs receipts as kilometric guarantees in place of tithes and aghnam, may possibly be considered by the German Government as a condition the advantage of which will suffice to compensate for the bargain made by the company. By carrying through their present terms they have obtained a hold upon the security of the customs revenues, which it is natural to believe will be almost certain to come into question into connection with the negotiations which the French Régie générale are actively conducting at the present moment with the Ottoman Government relative to the Samsoun-Sivas-Kharput-Erzeroum Railway lines, and other similar concessions.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[49377] No. 122.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 894.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Adana, informing me that the section of the Bagdad Railway Adana-Ulukishla has progressed as far as Darak on the one side of the Taurus and up to a point about 3½ hours carriage drive from Ulukishla on the other. On neither of these completed strips, however, is any passenger or freight service running.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[49656] No. 123.

Memorandum communicated by Sir H. Babington Smith, December 11, 1911.

THERE is at present a strong desire on the part of the Turkish Government to settle outstanding questions, and to place their relations with the British Government on a more satisfactory footing.

This has been stated to me recently by the Grand Vizier, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance informed me that there had been a formal decision of the Council of Ministers in favour of a settlement of the questions under discussion with the British Government.

As regards the Bagdad Railway, I gather that the point to which they take most objection is the assignment to Russian capital of a share in the Bagdad-Gulf section of the railway.

Supposing Russia to be excluded, the capital might be divided between English, German, French, and Turkish interests in such a manner as to give a majority to England and France together, if Turkey would be content with a smaller share than the other three, *e.g.*, England, France, and Germany 28½ per cent. each, Turkey 15 per cent.; or, England, France, and Germany 26⅔ per cent. each, Turkey 20 per cent.

Assim Bey informed me, in the course of conversation on the 25th November, that the least the Ottoman Government could accept would be 20 per cent. and the presidency. I suggest that it would be possible to arrange so that the presidency should be honorary, and should not carry a casting vote.

It appears to be very desirable to take advantage of the present favourable disposition of the Porte to arrive at a settlement.

There are some indications that the Germans may cease to be content with the settlement apparently contemplated in their recent arrangement with the Turkish Government. In this connexion I refer to a conversation with M. Günther, which I reported to Sir G. Lowther on the 26th November.

In the meantime preparations are being actively pursued for the construction of the line from Bagdad northwards. Negotiations are also being carried on for the erection of a custom-house and bonded warehouse at Bagdad by the agency of the Bagdad Railway.

H. BABINGTON SMITH.

December 11, 1911.

[49342] No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.*

CAIRO telegram No. 58 of 9th December.
You should inform Italian Government of Lord Kitchener's views.
(Repeated to Cairo, No. 64.)

[49832] No. 125.

Western Assurance Company to Foreign Office.—(Received December 12.)

Sir, *14, Cornhill, London, December 11, 1911.*

REFERRING to our previous correspondence during the last two and a-half years re Adana, and more particularly to our letters in October last, in which we informed you that in the action against us a verdict had been given contrary to this company, we do not now propose to recapitulate the facts and arguments in this case, as they will, no doubt, be familiar to you, but the object of the present is to advise you that we have effected a compromise with our insured under the three policies which were the subject of the action, and we are proposing now to claim the amount paid from the Turkish Government. We shall be glad to know whether this claim should be made through the Foreign Office, or whether we should present the same in Constantinople.

We would also once more claim your assistance in any future cases which may be brought against us arising out of the riots at Adana, as we still protest against the verdict given, and claim that the policy conditions exempt us from payment of losses arising from similar disturbances. We would, therefore, respectfully suggest that this company should either not be permitted to present themselves before the Turkish Court in Constantinople to answer similar claims, or that, if in the judgment of His Majesty's Government it is expedient that they so present themselves, instructions should be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople to the effect that the Dragoman should refuse to sign any judgment of the court in similar cases.

Thanking you in anticipation, I have, &c.

R. H. R. BURDER.

[49971] No. 126.

Anglo-Algerian Steamship Company to Messrs. Shaw & Co. (London).—(Communicated to Foreign Office by Mr. Greenway, December 12, 1911.)

Dear Sirs, *Bussorah, November 18, 1911.*

IN conversation with his Excellency the vali this week he mentioned that he would like a firm to make a proposition for dredging the Bar beyond Fao, and that he would support an application for a concession. We do not know, of course, what your views may be on this matter, but if the concession could be obtained, by which, in consideration of dredging the Bar and keeping it dredged, the sole right to enforce dues on steamers entering and leaving the river were secured, it would be well worthy of consideration. Next week we will send you details of steamer seeming to Bussorah during the last three years.

From what Mr. Greenway said, when we had the pleasure of seeing him, we understood that you would entertain such business, and, further, that an application had been put in for the concession. If you wish us to take any steps in the matter,

would you be good enough to wire us on receipt? and we will pursue the matter further. We think a permission, not a concession, might be obtained for dredging the creeks.

Would you be good enough to give us an idea of what a suitable dredger for such purpose would cost, together with the cost of working, quantity of mud lifted for twelve hours, and any other details, which the engineers think would be useful?

A concession is being granted to the natives for the pumping of water from the river to the town of Bussorah, and the laying of pipes in the town. If we could obtain the working of this, would it suit you to entertain it and put money into it? Further particulars next week.

Your faithfully,
(for Strick, Scott and Company, Limited),
C. DARBY, *Manager*.

[49881] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 341.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Pera, December 12, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 10th December.

Turkish Government have now withdrawn order for expulsion of Italians from Smyrna and Salonica, but it is to be applied to Dardanelles and Gallipoli.

[49338] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.*

ACTION proposed in your telegram No. 338 of the 10th December is approved.

The Porte should be asked to disavow the kaimakam; the latter should also retract, in so far as his action applies to us.

[49895] No. 129.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 904.)
Sir, *Pera, December 7, 1911.*

I YESTERDAY called on the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicated to him the substance of your telegram No. 444, on the subject of the recent accident at Smyrna and of the pilotage service in that port and at Salonica.

Assim Bey informed me that, according to reports received from Smyrna, it could not have been a mine that struck the steam-ship "Ismailia" (not the "Saidieh," as stated in your telegram), but that it was probably a piece of wreckage. His Excellency promised, however, to cause instructions to be sent that great care should be taken regarding the pilotage service at the two ports.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[49976] No. 130.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 342.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 13, 1911.*

TURKISH forts in the Red Sea.

I am enquiring of His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, who was recently at Mokha, with regard to the question contained in your telegram No. 447 of the 9th December.

[50272] No. 133*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 344 of 13th December: Kaimakam of Nojef.

Please inform consul-general at Bagdad and ask for his observations.

According to information available here, there is no fort or garrison at Khouka. At Mokha there are two ruined forts with three batteries mounting old and probably useless guns; one battalion is the normal garrison. The normal peace garrison of Port Sheikh Said is two companies, and there is a fort with four or five workable guns.

[50272] No. 131.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 344.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December* 13, 1911.

PROCLAMATION of holy war by Mujtehed of Nejef (see your telegram No. 450 of the 12th December).

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated that kaimakam has categorically denied taking action complained of, and that mujtehed, in issuing fetva, acted entirely on his own responsibility.

Interference on part of kaimakam is precluded by extremely important religious position of mujtehеds.

[49107] No. 132.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant respecting the export of the oxide already mined at Abu Musa.

I am to inform you, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposed telegram to the Government of India, subject to the substitution of the words "before the end of December 1912" for "before next hot weather," and subject also to the following addition at the end: "but he should as far as possible facilitate the German operations."

Sir E. Grey is making a communication to the German Ambassador in the sense of the draft telegram as amended.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[50293] No. 133.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 353.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December* 15, 1911.

FORTIFIED ports in Red Sea.

With reference to my telegram No. 342 of the 13th December, I have received a telegram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah to the effect that there are no garrisons at Mokka or Khoka, and that Sheikh Said is the only fortified port in the Yemen.

[49107] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 6th November respecting the export of the oxide already mined at the island of Abu Musa.

His Majesty's Government have now caused instructions to be issued to the British

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the effect that Messrs. Wönckhaus should be allowed to export all the oxide already mined, provided the final shipment is made before the end of December 1912.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[50564] No. 135.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 909.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 784 of the 6th November, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Aleppo respecting the Bagdad Railway and British interests at Jerablus.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 135.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, November 27, 1911.*

IN a despatch No. 39 of the 28th October last, I had the honour to report to your Excellency that there then appeared to be some reason for fearing that the site at Jerablus (Charchemish), where Dr. Hogarth and his party were excavating earlier in the present year, might be interfered with by the Bagdad Railway.

In the course of a recent journey in the district I passed through Jerablus, and, being very kindly entertained by the German engineers who had lately arrived there, I took occasion to refer to the great interest of the site, and to mention that there were grounds for hoping that the English excavators would shortly resume operations at least in the part of the site which was British property. From the head engineer's reply I gathered that the plans for this part of the railway were still under consideration in Berlin, and that it had not yet been decided precisely where the line would have to pass.

Herr Vollner, Meisner Pasha's successor at Aleppo, now (27th November) gives me to understand that there is no longer any fear of the railway disturbing the site in question.

Presumably this decision will be adhered to; but, in view of the vastness of the work which will be doing in the very near neighbourhood, the German consul's suggestion (*vide* No. 39 of the 28th October) that there should be someone on the spot to protect any British property from injury by natives or other untoward accident is perhaps worth the attention of those interested.

I have, &c.
H. W. YOUNG.

[50565] No. 136.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 910.)
Sir, *Pera, December 9, 1911.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 884 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that two further telegrams have been received from the British acting vice-consul at Bitlis, stating that in the course of the week the situation had gone from bad to worse. On the 3rd December, he reported that one woman and two men, all Christians, had been killed, and three dangerously wounded. Sums of money were being levied by the Mussulman community at Modky, and these were also raiding cattle and sheep. The conditions at Mush were no better. Mr. Safrastian added that the new Governor-General instead of taking immediate action to quell the disorders had only sent a few gendarmes to Modky to protect the villagers, and they were surrounded by the

Mussulman community. As I informed you in my despatch alluded to above, I had drawn the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to these disorders around Bitlis, and I was glad to receive on the 7th December a further telegram from Mr. Safrastian, stating that the Government were sending troops. He also reported that about seventy Kurds had been killed in action.

I again alluded to these disorders in a conversation which I had with Assym Bey on the 6th December.

I also enclose a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the Russian propaganda among the Kurds in that district, which Mr. Safrastian describes as making widespread progress. You will observe that another Russian consular officer has been appointed at Bitlis as vice-consul and secretary.

Mr. Safrastian's information as to the alleged "propagandists" is very vague, and it seems to me very improbable that the Russian Government can have any interest in encouraging their activities at this moment, and I am, therefore, not disposed to attach any importance to these reports, which are probably very much exaggerated.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, November 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on alleged Russian propaganda among the Kurds of Melazgerd.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Bitlis, November 17, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to inform you by my despatch No. 29 of the 13th instant, Reshid Bey, the acting vali here, has lately been visiting Melazgerd and Mush later.

In spite of his efforts to conceal the true reasons of his visit, I now understand from a well-informed official source that some alleged Russian propagandists were lately making a good business among hundreds of discontented Hamidié officers at Melazgerd and Bulanik in the way of paving road for a "Russian occupation" of the territory. There appears really to exist striking proofs that the Russian cause among Kurdish malcontents is making widespread progress.

Abdur Rezak Bey, one of the notorious and most turbulent Bedrkhans, has no doubt been serving the same cause, in every way detrimental to the interests of this country. Ever since August 1910 he has been travelling from Paris to Tabreoz and Russo-Persian frontier, now publishing pamphlets and disseminating the ideas of a Kurdish principality at Bohtan, then preaching the blessedness of the Russian rule. He seems to be very active of late in both of the above-described directions, in the first one finding help and encouragement on the part of his relatives, the other three or four Bedrkhans at Bohtan, and in the second one assisted by several Kurdish chiefs in Van and in certain parts of Bitlis.

Rumours of such Russian propaganda and the distribution of large sums of Russian money among Kurds seem to have reached the Sublime Porte, which, terrified by the bitter experience of Tripoli, ordered the acting vali to proceed at once to Melazgerd and inquire into the matter. Four suspected Hamidié officers have been arrested and sent to prison at Mush, and two other notorious ones are being searched for.

I have, further, the honour to state that one M. P. Loiko has arrived here, as vice-consul secretary to the Russian consulate here. M. Chirkow, the consul, is understood

to have stated confidentially that M. Loiko would act for him in case he might be obliged to leave his post suddenly.

Under present circumstances, the addition of another Russian consular officer at Bitlis is causing great anxiety to Moslems here, and is taken by the latter to show the imminence of Russian activity in this region. I am informed by representative Kurds here that the possibility of a Russian invasion is widely commented, that serious apprehensions prevail, and that they think the sincere friendship of Great Britain could save the Empire from its present crisis.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[50572] No. 137.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 917.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 340 of the 10th December, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna respecting the expulsion of Italian subjects from that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Smyrna, December 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No. 29 of yesterday on the subject of the intended expulsion of Italian subjects, that this measure will very seriously affect the business of many of the leading British firms at Smyrna.

I have been asked whether exception could be claimed in particular cases. As the decision will rest with the commission which will carry out the order of expulsion, I have advised the parties to wait until their employés are called upon to leave and then present a petition to the commission through the consulate.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[50510] No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 429.)
Sir, *Berlin, December 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Herr von Gwinner, the director-general of the Deutsche Bank, delivered a lecture yesterday in the Upper Chamber of the Prussian Diet on the Bagdad Railway.

The lecture was attended by the Emperor, by Baron Montzuffel, the president of the Upper Chamber, and by many of the Cabinet Ministers, heads of Government offices and the principal commercial houses in Germany, and by several members of the diplomatic body, among them the Turkish Ambassador.

Herr von Gwinner began his lecture by giving a history of the railway from 1888, pointing out that although it was financed by Germany and to a certain extent France, it was not a German, but a Turkish undertaking. It was a great engineering feat and a very costly one, some of the sections necessitating work which had cost £59,000 a kilometre. Herr von Gwinner illustrated his lecture with magic lantern slides, showing views of the railway, and explaining its progress. The lecturer said that the railway would benefit Turkey both economically and from a military point of view. He spoke in terms of high praise of the manner in which the Turkish officials had co-operated and of the assistance rendered to the enterprise by Baron von der Goltz,

and expressed the hope that the great work would be brought to a conclusion by Germans, and that it would be an honour to the name of Germany.

It is worthy of note that Herr von Gwinner did not touch upon the political side of the Bagdad Railway question.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[50577] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 922.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 13, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 876 of the 29th November, I had the honour to report that the Bagdad Railway Company was engaged in negotiations with the Porte, the object of which was to obtain an alteration of the original *tracé* of the line between Mosul and Bagdad, as laid down in the concession of 1903 to a new alignment, which would pass through the district of Suleimanieh to Khanikin on the Persian frontier, and thence to Bagdad. In itself the détour is almost trifling, and seems at first glance to be unimportant, but I venture to think that on closer examination it will be recognised that if it becomes a fact, a situation will be created which will have grave consequences for our interests. From the German point of view the change has several manifest advantages, but, so far as we are concerned, it seems that their main object is to obtain command of the traffic between Bagdad and Khanikin. If the new *tracé* is adopted we may safely assume that the line from Bagdad to Khanikin will be open in a very short period, and in that case our transit trade to Persia, reaching Bagdad by river, will be conveyed thence to Khanikin by the new line; if we could place any faith in the fairness of the German management, the improved transport should be of benefit to trade in general, but I am personally quite convinced that such confidence would be misplaced, and that experience would prove that while every sort of facility was shown to German trade over the German rail, so every kind of obstruction and discrimination would be practised against our merchants. It may, of course, be argued that this would only be temporary, and that the construction of the contemplated "international" Ottoman Company's line from Bussorah to Bagdad would, as the Board of Trade believe, put an end to such discrimination; but, with all deference to the expert opinion of that department, I am personally unable to entertain any such hope, and I am convinced that means will always be found by the Germans to favour their own trade at the expense of ours. However that may be, the fact remains that for a certain period, *i.e.*, until the Bagdad–Gulf section of the railway is built, and built under conditions intended to ensure us the administrative control, and to secure us against unfair treatment on through traffic, our trade must be very much at the mercy of the Germans, and during this period the Germans may succeed in gaining a foothold at our expense, from which it will not be easy to dislodge them. If, on the other hand, the original concession of 1903 is maintained, our trade will for a time also suffer, but as the branch from Sadijeh will in the nature of things not be constructed so soon as the trunk line to Khanikin, the period of unfair treatment will be shorter. Moreover, so long as there is no direct railway from Bagdad to Khanikin, there is always the possibility that such a line may be constructed by the new company, which is to undertake the Bagdad–Gulf section, and in which we hope to obtain a controlling interest.

So far for the direct consequences to our interests; but I apprehend that the indirect may be more far-reaching in the long run. They are, however, in the nature of things, more difficult to define, and I do not propose to do more than indicate their general character. The first is that if the new alignment is agreed to, we must be prepared to see the development of the petroliferous fields around Suleimanieh fall into German hands. Mr. D'Arcy appears to have lost interest in the concession, and, failing any other British interest, it would be strange if with German engineers constantly surveying the country German capital were not attracted to the prospect of its exploitation; moreover, the financiers who control the Bagdad Railway Company have already interested themselves in the matter, and their attention to it has probably revived. A large increase of German influences in these regions is therefore to be apprehended, and it could not of course fail to act prejudicially on our own position. To a certain extent this danger already exists, but it would be certainly increased and be made more imminent if the German railway is to traverse these petroleum fields.

Again, the diversion of the line from the old *tracé* implies that the moment when the German railway will reach Khanikin, and when, therefore, the circumstances foreseen in the Potsdam agreement come into existence, will be brought materially nearer. I do not venture to predict with any precision what the results will be, but I cannot believe that they will be to our advantage, and therefore the longer that moment is deferred the better.

In these circumstances, I think that our interests require that we should take some action to prevent any further arrangement being reached, without our knowledge and consent, between the German Company and the Porte. It will be within your recollection that in not very dissimilar circumstances the French Ambassador and I recommended (my telegram No. 29 *et seq.*) that, to prevent a surprise in the nature of the Potsdam agreement, we should be authorised to inform the Porte in firm language that our Governments desired to be consulted in regard to the negotiations then going on between the Bagdad Railway Company and the Ottoman Government. The suggestion was, however, overruled, partly on the ground that we had no legal standing to make such a representation, and partly because the form which M. Bompard and I had proposed that the communication might take would commit us too far in the question of the 4 per cent. increase of the customs duties. No communication was therefore made, and in the event the Germans were left free to obtain from the Porte not only such valuable concessions as the Osmanieh-Alexandretta branch and the port at the latter place, but also obtained stipulations which in effect secure to them the right to be consulted at every phase in the negotiations concerning the Bagdad–Gulf section; for, as you will remember, the International Company for its construction is to be formed in consultation with the Bagdad Railway Company, and when it has been formed, the Bagdad Railway Company have the right to obtain compensation for the loss it has suffered by the sacrifice of that section. Such stipulations obviously afford endless opportunities for obstruction and bargaining, so much so, that it is scarcely too much to say that the possibility of our coming to an agreement with the Turks depends primarily on German goodwill.

It appears to me that unless we take some action now we may again find ourselves in the presence of another untoward *fait accompli*. But if, on the other hand, we avail ourselves of the present conjuncture, we may possibly regain some of the lost ground. Nor do the reasons which decided His Majesty's Government to make no move last February exist now. We have, I submit, valid and legitimate grounds for intervention. On the one hand, the Turks have submitted to us proposals for the settlement of the Bagdad Railway question on the basis of the situation which would be created by the German agreement of March last. Negotiations are presumably imminent on that basis, and it is not therefore legitimate for the Turks to enter into any arrangement which would alter that basis without our knowledge and assent. No mention of the 4 per cent. need be made, as that question is reserved as a condition of a satisfactory solution of the main issue. The Germans, on the other hand, as it seems to me, much as they will dislike it, will have no plausible pretext for objecting to our action, for they have by their agreement of last March substantially recognised our interests in the Bagdad Railway question, and, that being so, they should be precluded from disputing our right to be kept informed of all negotiations that may affect our interests in that question, or to raise objections to a modification of the *status quo*.

I have not as yet mentioned this matter to my French colleague, as it appears to me that our interests involved are so vastly greater than those of France that it was better to ascertain your views before doing so.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[50785] No. 140.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 355.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 18, 1911.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 456 of the 15th instant.

I have been informed by the consul-general at Bagdad that the Kaimakam of Nejef has been charged with obtaining fetwa by force, and is now at Bagdad.

Russian consul-general declares he has complete proof of the kaimakam's guilt, and says that the vali has orders to permit him, the Russian consul-general, to take part in the enquiry if necessary.

Vali told British consul-general that, unofficially, he would try to stop the recurrence of the violent newspaper campaign, but that officially he could do nothing.

I am told by my Russian colleague that he considers the attempt made by the Kaimakam of Nejef to stir up anti-foreign feeling has failed, and that he is perfectly satisfied with the energetic action of the Vali of Bagdad.

[49971] No. 141.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 18, 1911.*

AS you are aware, on the 29th July last His Majesty's Government communicated a memorandum to the Turkish Ambassador containing the following passage:—

"Certain difficulties have recently arisen in regard to the buoyage of the Shatt-el-Arab. For a great number of years British shipping has, owing to its volume, been predominantly, and until recently almost exclusively, interested in these aids to navigation. For over fifty years the work of surveying, buoying, and lighting the river has been carried out by British agency to the general satisfaction of all concerned.

"In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have some difficulty in appreciating why the Ottoman Government have taken exception to existing and long-standing arrangements; but, being desirous of dealing with the difficulty in a spirit of conciliation, they would propose to the Ottoman Government the appointment of a small riverain commission, composed of a British and a Turkish representative, with an engineer to be mutually agreed upon. This commission would superintend all matters pertaining to improvement of navigation, and it would likewise superintend the requisite periodical surveys."

The Turkish Ambassador has been asked for a reply to this memorandum; but in the meantime the Vali of Bussorah has mentioned to the local agent of Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co. that he would like a firm to make a proposal for dredging the bar beyond Fao, and that he would support an application for a concession. A copy of the agent's letter to Messrs. Shaw is transmitted herewith.†

Mr. Greenway, acting on behalf of Messrs. Shaw, has enquired if His Majesty's Government would object to their obtaining such a concession.

Subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, Sir E. Grey is inclined to answer this query in the negative, as he considers that, if the Turkish Government do not accept the proposal for an Anglo-Turkish riverain commission, it would be an advantage for the work to be done by British contractors.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[50785] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 462.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 355 of 19th December; Action of Kaimakam of Nujef.

Do you consider any further action on our part advisable?

[51342] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 304.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1911.*

COUNT METTERNICH came to see me to-day.

He said that he had no instructions to propose anything to me. Indeed, he had turned over in his own mind whether it would not have been better to wait till

* Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*. † Not printed.

January or February before saying anything, but he had come to the conclusion that he ought not to wait so long.

It would be very desirable if the tension in Germany could in some way be relaxed. Much, no doubt, must be left to the soothing influence of time; but in talking to people here, whether they were Conservatives or others, he found a disposition favourable to any steps which would produce more cordial relations with Germany.

He reminded me of what I had said, during the negotiations as to Morocco, about not standing in the way of Germany, and of the phrase which the Prime Minister had used in Parliament as to a "place in the sun" for Germany. Even if no territorial questions arose, perhaps where German and British interests were concerned some occasion might be found for the two countries to work together, instead of in opposition, without prejudicing the friendships or *ententes* of either.

I said that I doubted whether any progress could be made until the German elections were over. At present the favourable effect of anything that might be done was very liable to be upset by some untoward incident such as Captain Faber's speech: a most trivial thing, founded on gossip, but one that had had a most prodigious effect in Germany. However, if what Count Metternich aimed at was some means of showing that, though we had been in opposite camps in regard to the question of Morocco, the motive on our part was not a desire to thwart German interests everywhere, I should be very glad to prove that that was true. I asked what he had in his mind, but he had no suggestion to make.

I mentioned that the Bagdad Railway was the case which occurred to me.

We then went over some old ground as to the railway, after which Count Metternich said that to ask Germany to give up a part of her concession to England could hardly be taken as a marked evidence of goodwill on our part.

I explained our difficulties in connection with the railway, and the concession which we should be willing to make as to Turkish customs dues.

Eventually, when I dwelt upon the importance of rates, he suggested that an equal share to us in controlling rates from Bagdad to the Gulf, coupled with an agreement about the terminus, might be a possible arrangement, if Germany was left with the controlling voice in the construction and management of the line apart from the question of rates.

I said that it had never occurred to me that the control of rates could be separated from the management of the line. It was a point which I should have to consider. I suggested that possibly an agreement about the Bagdad Railway, if it appeared to be too one-sided in a sense adverse to Germany, might be combined with some agreement in matters of a kindred kind elsewhere. In other words, that if British participation came into a German enterprise in the case of the Bagdad Railway, German enterprise might be assured of participation in British in some other part of the world.

Count Metternich proposed that we should look at the map of Africa. We did so, and he drew special attention to the Portuguese colonies, saying that Portugal was in a very bad financial position, and that the disposal of her colonies might become a question of practical politics. He commented upon the "enclave" reserved for us in Portuguese West Africa under the secret agreement.

I said that it was not apparent to me what the exact value of that "enclave" was to us, and I could not say, without enquiring, why it had been arranged originally.

He then talked about the Belgian Congo.

I pointed out that, if there were territorial changes, there might be some rectifications of the frontier on the side of East Africa that we should require, and there was the Katanga district coming right down into Rhodesia. But, apart from these small things, we had no territorial ambitions; and if the Congo should be for sale it would be no object of ours, as some people supposed, to prevent German territory from extending across Africa from east to west, as it would do if Germany purchased part of the Congo between Angola and German East Africa, and eventually acquired Angola; though no doubt we would ask for a wayleave for a railway from north to south.

We agreed, however, that Belgium did not show any disposition to part with the Congo.

Finally, I said that I would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister and Mr. Harcourt. We should need the Christmas holidays to consider it. We had every goodwill to show that we did not desire to thwart German interests. The difficulty was to find any concrete expression of our friendliness, especially as a good many

opportunities had already been disposed of by the secret agreement as to the Portuguese colonies, and by the arrangement for the transfer of Heligoland to Germany.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51088] No. 144.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

Sir, *India Office, December 20, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, regarding the dredging of the Shat-el-Arab, and in reply to say that he agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, if the Turkish Government do not accept the proposal for a joint riverain commission, it would be an advantage for the work to be done by British contractors. He is, however, reluctant to acquiesce, while the negotiations are pending, in what is really an important alteration of the *status quo*, since on the one hand the Turkish Government will be in a stronger position for refusing the proposed joint commission if there is already a Turkish registered company (see despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, No. 55, dated the 31st October, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople) at work under their sole auspices; while on the other, the hands of His Majesty's Government will be to some extent tied if British capital is involved.

He would, therefore, suggest that in the first instance determined efforts should be made to bring the negotiations with the Turkish Government to a point, and that meanwhile Mr. Greenway should be confidentially informed of the facts and advised to delay his reply as long as possible.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[51168] No. 145.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, December 21, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th December, relative to a proposed application to the Turkish Government for a concession for dredging the bar of the Shat-el-Arab beyond Fao, and in reply to inform you that they concur in the reply which Sir E. Grey proposes to return to Mr. Greenway's enquiry.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[51284] No. 146.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received December 22.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, December 21, 1911.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 30th ultimo, together with a copy of a letter from the India Office, dated the 18th November, which accompanied it, further respecting the buoyage and lighting of the Persian Gulf.

My Lords gather from the India Office letter that the Secretary of State for India in Council is now of opinion that the places in the Persian Gulf where lighting and buoyage are most required are Bahrein, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Jask, and they note that the financial provision for these purposes would amount to an initial expenditure of 2,800*l.* with a recurrent charge of 210*l.* per annum.

It will be within the recollection of Secretary Sir E. Grey that in the Foreign Office letter, Secret, of the 11th October last, he, acting in accordance with the information furnished him by the India Office, represented to their Lordships the importance of

providing for buoyage and lighting at Shat-el-Arab, Musandim, Tamb Island, Sheikh Shuaib, and Bushire on the ground that at these places exceptional circumstances rendered a provision of this character most urgently necessary, and in their reply of the 28th October last my Lords, with certain modifications, sanctioned the proposals put forward on the express understanding that the measures suggested were of urgent and pressing necessity, and that exceptional considerations from an international point of view had to be taken into account.

It would now appear from the telegram dated the 30th September last from the Government of India that, of the places referred to in Foreign Office letter, Secret, of the 11th October last, Bushire alone requires one lighted buoy as a matter of urgency, and incidentally I am to point out that in their letter of the 26th October last my Lords had urged the substitution of a buoy for a light-ship, which had been suggested by the India Office as required at that place. Apart, however, from this particular point, I am to state that my Lords cannot but regard as highly unsatisfactory the whole method in which these proposals have been placed before Sir E. Grey and themselves, and, in view of the discrepant and varying statements as to the places where provision of buoyage, &c., is of primary importance, they are not disposed to sanction as a charge on the Exchequer the moiety of the expenditure proposed in the letter under reply, and they must further request that no action should be taken on the provisional sanction conveyed in their letter of the 26th October to the undertaking of various works referred to therein.

When their Lordships are placed in possession of what may be taken as final and reasoned proposals for the lighting of the Persian Gulf, they will be prepared to give them their careful consideration, and, if necessary, to sanction a moderate expenditure for the purpose. Sir E. Grey is aware of their Lordships' reluctances (which they feel sure he shares with them) to burthen the British tax-payer with expenditure for purposes so apparently remote, and, in their view, the sole justification for undertaking such charges must be imperative considerations of a political or commercial character. On the conflicting evidence before them they are not satisfied to what places in the Persian Gulf these considerations apply.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH.

[51273] No. 147.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated the 13th December, 1911, regarding Abu Musa oxide.

India Office, *December* 21, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 147.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December* 13, 1911.

HIS Majesty's Government have acceded to request made by German Embassy in a note dated 6th November (which was sent to you in Political Secretary's letter of 8th December), that permission should be given to Wönckhaus to effect a shipment of oxide from Abu Musa which they had proposed, and also to ship any further oxide already mined. But proviso has been attached that all such oxide must be removed before the end of December next. Political agent should receive immediate instructions to this effect. He should facilitate operations of Wönckhaus as much as possible, but is of course authorised to require the precautions thought necessary before.

A communication to this effect is being made to the German Ambassador.

[51468] No. 148.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December* 23, 1911.

PROCLAMATION of holy war. Please refer to your telegram No. 462 of the 19th December.

I do not consider any further action necessary for the present, as movement has apparently failed.

[50577] No. 149.

*Foreign Office to War Office.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1911

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Army Council, the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting a projected change in the *tracé* of the Bagdad Railway between Mosul and Bagdad.†

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that such a change, if approved by the Turkish Government, would have an important bearing on the negotiations taking place between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government in regard to the proposed increase of the Turkish customs duties; and it would also seem to enhance the importance of the construction of a railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad.

In these circumstances, he considers it desirable that an inter-departmental conference should meet at the Foreign Office at an early date to deliberate and advise on the situation which has arisen; and I am to request that a representative of your department may be designated for this purpose.

Sir E. Grey would suggest that the first meeting should take place at 3 P.M. on the 28th December.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[49032] No. 150.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, intimating that the Secretary of State for India concurs in the view of the political resident and the Government of India that a single comprehensive Order in Council to embrace both the Persian and the Arab littoral of the Gulf is undesirable even if practicable.

I am accordingly to transmit, for the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, and before submission to the Law Officers of the Crown in the customary manner, the accompanying draft of a "Persian Coasts and Islands (Amendment) Order in Council," embodying the amendments contained in the India Office letter of the 15th June, 1911.

Sir E. Grey also agrees that the draft Bahrein Order in Council forwarded in the India Office letter of the 24th July, 1911, should now be proceeded with, and he is for this reason now causing that draft to be carefully examined in this department. The amendments, if any, which he may be advised should be made in that draft, will form the subject of a further communication.

The extension of an Order in Council to the Trucial chiefs can be further considered when a settlement has been come to with Turkey in regard to the Arab littoral.

Sir E. Grey would in the meantime be glad of any observations which the Government of India may have to offer on the policy of such an extension in accordance with the request conveyed in my letter of the 30th August.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Also to Board of Trade and India Office, *mutatis mutandis*. † No. 139.

[51588] No. 151.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 940.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 19, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 843 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the destruction of the late brigand Tchakirdjali's band.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 151.

Consul-General Barham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 103.)

Sir, *Smyrna, December 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the death of the brigand Tchakirdjali has been followed by the destruction of his band.

The commander of the troops at Thyra telegraphed on the 11th instant that, having received information that five wounded men belonging to Tchakirdjali's band were sheltered in a house at the village of Guereli, he proceeded to the spot with thirty Circassians, set fire to the house in which they had entrenched themselves and that they perished in the flames.

Two of the bodies were afterwards recognised as those of Kior Mehmed and Tchamlidjali Mehmed.

With a view to the suppression of brigandage in this vilayet the vali, considering that the gendarmes of Smyrna are too young and inexperienced for the work, has proposed to the Minister of the Interior that he should be allowed to form a flying column of picked men chosen from the battalions of troops now stationed in the province.

One of the bands now operating in the neighbourhood of Sokia is commanded by a certain Samih Bey, an ex-officer, who, after having been employed by the Government in the pursuit of brigands, has adopted the profession himself.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[51595] No. 152.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 949.)

Sir, *Pera, December 22, 1911.*

I HAVE read in the Confidential Print the India Office letter of the 17th October and your reply of the 3rd ultimo, on the question of vindicating our position in the Persian Gulf, and I observe from the India Office letter of the 11th November that the Secretary of State for India has suggested to the Viceroy that he should consult with the naval commander-in-chief as to the material steps that might be taken for the purpose in case of non-compliance by the Porte with our demands. It appears to me that while I note that you, Sir, considered that in the situation that existed early in November it would have been unwise policy on our part to present anything in the nature of an ultimatum to the Porte, yet the fact that the possibility of some action in those regions is still seemingly under contemplation leads me to think that some remarks from myself on the present state of the questions pending between us and the Porte in those regions will not be uncalled for.

I will first deal with the particular grievances which moved the Government of India to advocate the application of pressure of a material kind, as set forth in their telegram to the Marquess of Crewe of the 12th October, viz :—

(1.) The "demolition" claims and kindred questions at Bagdad; and
(2.) The question of the recognition of our protectorate of Bahreinese in Turkey.

As regards (1), our claims under this head have not only been paid, but paid without any dispute as to the amount, and judging from the generous latitude usually adopted by claimants, it is to be presumed that Messrs. Lynch and Co. and the other claimants

have been liberally compensated. As to the further street improvements which the vali was desirous of effecting, I fail to see on what grounds we could oppose them, even if they should cause inconvenience to British proprietors, always provided that due compensation is paid according to law, and in view of the recent precedent I think we may assume that the local authorities will be chary of repeating the illegalities practised under Nazim Pasha. Whether we could successfully resist the cutting in half of the residency grounds, if this became imperative in the public interest, is open to doubt, but in any case I have no reason to believe that it is contemplated.

(2.) The illegal detention of the Bahreinese at Bussorah affords undoubtedly a serious cause for complaint, and I regret to have to state that my notes of the 8th April and the 14th August remain unanswered. I must point out that the Porte did not endorse the attitude taken up by the vali, as during the trial, which resulted in the acquittal of the accused, a representative of the British consulate was present, and the point of principle was therefore safeguarded. Rifaat Pasha also informed me that the vali had been instructed not to raise questions which constituted a breach of the *status quo*. The fact is, as I have frequently had occasion to point out, that we have had for some time past to do with a weak Government, which, in view of the chauvinism of the Young Turks, has not unnaturally shrunk from putting on paper a statement regarding the status of the Bahreinese which might be construed into something in the nature of an abandonment of certain sovereign rights of the Sultan. If, however, this question formed part of the general arrangement of Persian Gulf affairs, a settlement in accord with our wishes would be less open to criticism; both the present and late Governments have very earnesty requested that His Majesty's Government would not press too closely for a reply on this matter, but incorporate it in that general settlement.

I now pass to other questions which are not mentioned in the Indian Government's above-mentioned telegram, but which were no doubt present in their mind in writing it. These questions are the claims of the ice-merchant for the forced sale of his produce at an arbitrarily fixed price; the recognition by the local authorities as sufficient proof of British-Indian nationality of certificates of registration at a British consulate; and lastly, the question of the erection of a hospital by the Church Missionary Society.

As to the ice-merchant's claim, the Porte has declared its readiness to pay, but there seems to be some doubt whether the claimant is not rather inclined to abandon it in favour of some other profitable concession for which he has been treating with the local authorities; so that, if the claim is still outstanding, the present Government is not responsible. The second matter, that of the recognition of consular certificates of registration, on which I reported in my despatch No. 647 of the 22nd September, and again in my despatch No. 900 of the 5th instant, is still under discussion, but I am led to believe that the instructions sent to Bagdad have been sufficient to put an end to the extreme pretensions of the local authorities.

The question of the firman for the erection of the Church Missionary Society's hospital at Bagdad has not yet, I believe, been brought to your notice. The Porte desires to make the issue of this firman dependent on a general settlement of the questions as to the immunities of missionary and charitable establishments from taxation throughout the Empire. The Porte feels strongly on the subject, and desires to terminate a system under which such establishments enjoy privileges such as are conceded to them in no other country in the world, and which result in a considerable annual loss in land taxes and import duties, &c., to the Ottoman Treasury. The question is one which interests other missions as much as—and in the cases of the French and American Embassies even more than—ourselves. That the Porte should endeavour to use an application for a firman as a lever to obtain a settlement of the general question is not unnatural, but I hope to be able to find some solution. But the point which I wish to make is that the refusal does not arise from any aggressive policy of the local authorities at Bagdad, and would have confronted us just as much had the hospital in question been situated in any other part of the Empire.

The India Office letter of the 17th October would seem also to imply that we have been specially singled out as victims of unfriendly acts on the part of the Turkish authorities. I think, however, that there must be some misapprehension on this point. At all events other foreigners considered that they were in much the same boat as ourselves, for Mr. Lorimer in his report for October wrote that his German colleague had told him that his position with the Turks was then nearly intolerable. I may add

also, that besides the Minister for Foreign Affairs both the Grand Vizier and the Minister for War have informed me that instructions of a very categorical nature have been given to the new Vali of Bagdad to avoid raising questions and to endeavour to maintain the most friendly relations with the British consular authorities. The India Office letter also observes that "there is no indication that the negotiations initiated for a comprehensive settlement in the Persian Gulf are likely to reach a conclusion satisfactory to India." I venture to submit, on the other hand, that there are no indications that the negotiations are likely to fail. On the contrary, several members of the present Cabinet have expressed to me their earnest wish to see an arrangement concluded. Without desiring in any way to excuse the dilatory methods of the Turkish Government, which obtain as much under the constitution as in the days of Abdul Hamid, I would observe that the Turkish proposals were handed to me on the 1st March, and the counter-proposals of His Majesty's Government were communicated to Tewfik Pasha in London on the 29th July, *i.e.*, almost five months afterwards. Up till now the Porte has been almost as long in sending their reply. But there are various sufficient reasons to explain the delay. The late Grand Vizier always imagined that he would achieve more by a personal discussion of the matter with you, Sir, than by more formal discussion through the usual channels, and he intended to go to London for the purpose, but the war with Italy broke out and brought about his fall. The change at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs naturally likewise caused delay, more especially as the new Minister has been overburdened with work in consequence of the war.

I submit, therefore, that since October last there has been a very marked improvement in the general situation, and that the "distinct stand" of which the Secretary of State for India could see no sign has actually been achieved. To examine what are the causes that have brought this about would be foreign to my present purpose, which is to show that at no time has the provocation offered us been sufficient to justify the presentation of an ultimatum backed up by a demonstration of force. The actual material injury done to British interests would have been amply covered by 6,000*l.*; but our grievances were enhanced not only by a series of attacks on rights, sometimes, but not always, incontestable, but also by the frequently aggressive and irritating language and demeanour of the local valis. I say "rights not always incontestable," for it is at least open to doubt what view a court of arbitration would take of such a claim as, for instance, our pretension to light and buoy the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. Such attacks and pin-pricks have, of course, been intensely irritating, and I can understand that the resident at Bagdad, with his experience of India, where toleration and patience cannot be carried beyond a certain point, has found the delays of diplomatic action with an Oriental Government unbearably dilatory, and that unconsciously judging the situation by a foreign standard he has been led to exaggerate its gravity and to suggest the adoption of desperate measures out of proportion to its real importance.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[50577] No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1911.

THE change of alignment in the Bagdad Railway which is reported in your despatch No. 922 of the 13th instant as being under discussion would greatly alter the basis on which our proposals, as set forth in my memorandum of last July to Turkish Ambassador in London, were made. You should therefore at once intimate to Minister for Foreign Affairs, unofficially, that this is our view; and ask his Excellency to defer finally committing himself until you receive further instructions, which are under consideration. If the Turkish Government disregard our wishes we must reconsider the terms of our assent to the proposed increase in the Turkish customs duties from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*.

It would, moreover, be desirable to discuss the subject with the Councillor of the Turkish Embassy in London on his arrival in Constantinople: the object of his visit is to obtain authority to negotiate in London respecting our proposals.

[50743] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 468.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1911.

SIR R. CRAWFORD wrote on the 9th December to Mr. Tyrrell regarding a proposal to allow the Bagdad Railway to exploit bonded warehouses and construct customs buildings at Bagdad and Bussorah, and also regarding the wish of the Ottoman Government to substitute for the present *ad valorem* system a specific tariff.

Please give him at once a copy of the memorandum which I communicated last July to Tewfik Pasha respecting British assent to the increase of the customs, and inform him that before encouraging the proposals indicated in his letter we should be glad if he could arrange to await a considered statement of our views.

[52213] No. 155.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 29.)

(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December* 29, 1911.

BAGDAD Railway. Alleged change of *tracé* (see your telegram No. 467 of the 27th December).

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there is no question of such a change. It appears from information given me confidentially by the Under-Secretary that the company proposed a change of *tracé*, but the Council of Ministers rejected the proposal.